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ABSTRACT OF THE DISSERTATION 
FRAMING INFECTIOUS DISEASES AND U.S. PUBLIC OPINION 
by 
Mita Saksena 
Florida International University, 2011 
Miami, Florida 
Professor Paul A. Kowert, Major Professor 
The United States has been increasingly concerned with the transnational threat 
posed by infectious diseases. Effective policy implementation to contain the spread of 
these diseases requires active engagement and support of the American public. To 
influence American public opinion and enlist support for related domestic and foreign 
policies, both domestic agencies and international organizations have framed infectious 
diseases as security threats, human rights disasters, economic risks, and as medical 
dangers. This study investigates whether American attitudes and opinions about 
infectious diseases are influenced by how the issue is framed.  It also asks which issue 
frame has been most influential in shaping public opinion about global infectious diseases 
when people are exposed to multiple frames. 
The impact of media frames on public perception of infectious diseases is 
examined through content analysis of newspaper reports. Stories on SARS, avian flu, and 
HIV/AIDS were sampled from coverage in The New York Times and The Washington 
Post between 1999 and 2007. Surveys of public opinion on infectious diseases in the 
same time period were also drawn from databases like Health Poll Search and iPoll. 
vii 
Statistical analysis tests the relationship between media framing of diseases and changes 
in public opinion. 
Results indicate that no one frame was persuasive across all diseases. The 
economic frame had a significant effect on public opinion about SARS, as did the 
biomedical frame in the case of avian flu. Both the security and human rights frames 
affected opinion and increased public support for policies intended to prevent or treat 
HIV/AIDS. The findings also address the debate on the role and importance of domestic 
public opinion as a factor in domestic and foreign policy decisions of governments in an 
increasingly interconnected world. The public is able to make reasonable evaluations of 
the frames and the domestic and foreign policy issues emphasized in the frames. 
viii 
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I.  INTRODUCTION  
During the Cold War, nuclear weapons and bloc rivalry dominated the foreign 
policy and security agenda of the United States government.1 Issues such as public health 
and infectious diseases were considered to be “low politics.”2 Although the 1981-89 era 
saw the discovery of a new plague (HIV/AIDS), it was not seen as a security or foreign 
policy concern within the United States. With the end of the Cold War, as old military 
threats from other states waned, some scholars alleged that rather than originating from 
rival states, threats were either domestic or transnational (i.e., non-state) or the state itself 
posed a challenge to its citizens.3 Not only was the origin of threats different, the nature 
of threats differed as well.4 Some international relations theorists focused attention on 
threats arising from political, environmental, and societal sectors.5 Scholars argued that in 
an increasingly interconnected and interdependent world, events such as civil wars, 
environmental degradation, infectious diseases, migration of refugees, international 
narcotics, and terrorism were transnational threats that could not only threaten the 
                                                            
1 Stephen M. Walt, “The Renaissance in Security Studies,” International Studies 
Quarterly 35, 2 (1991): 211–39. 
 
2 David P. Fidler, “Health as Foreign Policy: Between Principle and Power,” The 
Whitehead Journal of International Relations and Foreign Policy 179 (2005): 179–94. 
 
3 Ayoob Mohammed, “Defining Security: A Subaltern Realist Perspective,” in Critical 
Security Studies, ed. Keith Krause (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1997). 
 
4 Barry Buzan, Ole Weaver, and Jaap de Wilde, Security: A New Framework for 
Analysis (Boulder: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 1998), 71–161. 
 
5 Ibid., 61-171. 
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internal stability of states but also the security of other states. These transnational issues 
were security issues to be addressed by foreign policy officials. 
While twentieth century scholars argued about whether poverty, degradation of 
the environment, climate change, and other concerns should be treated as security issues, 
it was HIV/AIDS that was declared a security threat by the United Nations Security 
Council and United States security agencies in 2001.6 With globalization and increased 
migration, air travel, and food and animals trade, infectious diseases could emerge 
anywhere in the world and spread quickly to other parts of the world, including the 
United States. Threats could arise not only from naturally occurring diseases but also 
from deliberate use of microbes as weapons. Policy makers grew increasingly concerned 
about the threat of bioterrorism.7 Infectious diseases were not just the concern of public 
health officials and a domestic issue of any one country but a foreign policy concern as 
well. The potential danger posed by infectious diseases required coordination among 
national health agencies, investment in disease surveillance, and close cooperation among 
international agencies. This dissertation explores the reaction of the public to this new 
foreign policy and security issue—one that traditionally was a biomedical and 
humanitarian issue. While the focus of this work is on the public response to framing 
infectious diseases as security threats, this study also adds to the larger debate regarding 
                                                            
6 National Intelligence Council, The Global Infectious Disease Threat and Its 
Implications for the United States (National Intelligence Estimate 99-17D, January 2000), 
at http://www.dni.gov/nic/PDF_GIF_otherprod/infectiousdisease/infectiousdiseases.pdf, 
last accessed August 1, 2011. 
 
7 David P. Fidler, “Public Health and National Security in the Global Age: Infectious 
Diseases, Bio-terrorism, and Realpolitik,” George Washington Law Review 35, 4 (2003):  
787–856. 
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domestic public opinion as a factor that affects the foreign policy decisions of 
governments in an increasingly interconnected world.8 A body of scholarly work has 
debated the role of public opinion in foreign policy decision making in democratic 
societies. The debates have centered on the role of the public in foreign policy decision 
making (i.e., whether public opinion follows, determines, or sets some limits on leaders 
who avoid making policies that might later evoke “public retribution”). 9  With the 
increased importance of issues such as immigration, infectious diseases, and the 
environment, the policy making elite increasingly feel the pressure to consider and 
respond to domestic public opinion and popular preferences. 10  The study of public 
opinion on a transnational issue like infectious diseases also contributes to the existing 
debates on the theory of international relations. In a world faced with pressing non-
military issues and with domestic and transnational actors linked to these issues, 
                                                            
8 James D. Fearon, “Domestic Politics, Foreign Policy, and Theories of International 
Relations,” Annual Review of Political Science 1 (1998): 289–313; Philip J. Powlick, 
“The Sources of Public Opinion for American Foreign Policy Officials,” International 
studies Quarterly 39,4(1995): 427–51; Thomas Risse Kappen, “Public Opinion, Domestic 
Structure, and Foreign Policy in Liberal Democracies,” World Politics 43, 4 (1991): 479–
512; Bruce Beuno de Mesquita, “Domestic Politics and International Relations,” 
International Studies Quarterly 46, 1 (2002): 1–9; Lawrence R. Jacobs and Robert Y. 
Shapiro, Politicians Don’t Pander: Political Manipulation and the Loss of Democratic 
Responsiveness (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2000), 3-27.  
9 Josh N. Price, “Identifying Conceptions of the Public Opinion/Foreign Policy Nexus,” 
in A Dialogue on Presidential Challenges and Leadership: Selected Papers of the 2008- 
2009 Presidential Fellows, eds. In Alex J. Douville and Jessica L. Zapf (Washington 
D.C.: Center for the Study of The Presidency and Congress, 2009), also available online 
at http://www.thepresidency.org/storage/documents/Fellows2009/Price.pdf, last visited 
July 7, 2011. 
10 Paul Berstein, “Bringing the Public Back in: Should Sociologists Consider the Impact 
of Public Opinion on Public Policy?” Social Forces 77, 1 (1998): 27–62.  
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international behavior could be the result of a “multiplicity of motives, not merely the 
imperative of systemic power balances.”11 
An extensive literature on the nexus between public opinion and foreign affairs 
exists. The literature, however, is limited to an understanding of traditional security 
issues. Much of the early literature from the two decades after the Second World War, as 
represented by the works of Walter Lippmann, Hans Morgenthau, and Gabriel Almond, 
posits a rather pessimistic view of public opinion on domestic and foreign policy issues. 
Studies on public opinion on foreign policy issues were concerned mainly with issues 
such as war, military intervention abroad, nuclear arms policy, international trade, 
defense spending, and foreign aid. Policy makers perceived these issues to be far 
removed from peoples’ lives, and the public was seen as disinterested in these issues. 
Added to this was the belief that some of the foreign policy issues required secrecy, 
speed, and flexibility in the use of classified information.12 Decision makers, therefore, 
felt that there was little need to engage public opinion, which they considered to be 
erratic, unstable, emotional, and volatile.13  
The Vietnam War was a turning point at which policy makers began to 
understand that public opinion was important. Subsequent studies by liberal theorists, 
including Richard Aldrich, Benjamin Page, Robert Shapiro, Ore Holsti, John Mueller, 
                                                            
11 Ole R. Hosti, Public Opinion and American Foreign Policy, Revised Edition, 
Analytical Perspectives on Politics (Michigan: University of Michigan Press, 2004), 339. 
 
12 Ole R. Holsti, “Public Opinion and Foreign Policy,” International Studies Quarterly 36 
(1992): 439–466. 
13 Almond A. Gabriel, “Public Opinion and National Security,” Public Opinion Quarterly 
20, 2 (1956): 371–78. 
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and Bruce Jentleson, suggested that the public did have stable views and was capable of 
addressing serious foreign policy issues. In the post-Cold War era, researchers such as 
Richard Sobel, James Larson, Bruce Jentleson, Rebecca Britton, Eugene Wiittkoph, 
Miroslav Nincic, Bruce Russett, Ronald Hinckley, Peter Feaver, Christopher Gelpi, 
Kenneth Scheve, Matthew Sloughter, Richard Eichenberg, and Elisabeth Neuman studied 
issues like public tolerance of war causalities, international trade, and military 
involvement. Although no consensus exists amongst these scholars as to what determines 
people’s attitudes towards these problems, most scholars “understand the public as 
reasoned and reasonable.”14 
Within the context of this persistent debate, there was agreement among scholars 
of public opinion and foreign policy about the sources of information about international 
events and foreign policy issues and the accessibility of this information to the public. 
Because many ordinary citizens were inattentive to international issues and foreign news, 
public opinion about foreign policy issues often was activated through elite discourse 
(e.g., policy making elite and opinion leaders) and by the media.15 Extensive research has 
shown that the media is most able to activate opinion when these elite debates are 
presented as “frames” to which people are particularly receptive and which seem to have 
                                                            
14 Christopher Gelpi, “Performing on Cue? The Formation of Public Opinion towards 
War,” Journal of Conflict Resolution 54, 1 (2010): 88–116. For a detailed review on this 
subject read John H. Aldrich, Christopher Gelpi, Peter Feaver, Jason Reifler, and Kristin 
Thompson Sharp, “Foreign Policy and the Electoral Connection,” Annual Review of 
Political Science 9 (2006): 477–450. 
15 Benjamin I. Page, Who Deliberates? Mass Media in American Society (Chicago: 
Chicago University Press, 1996), 1-17. 
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an impact on people’s lives.16 Framing may be seen as an attempt by leaders and other 
actors to insert into the policy debate organizing themes that will affect how the public 
and other actors such as the media will perceive an issue.17 Political actors, who perceive 
the importance of media coverage in influencing policy outcomes, often try to advance 
their policy positions via greater media coverage and engage in what has been called 
“framing wars.”18 The assumption here is that widespread discussion of issues in the 
media will activate public opinion. 
My dissertation focuses on a non-traditional security threat—infectious disease—
that has significant impact on the daily lives of people.19 On this issue, the relationship 
between public opinion and foreign policy in United States takes on “added rather than 
diminished significance,” in two distinct ways, and the public is likely to “play a more 
autonomous role.”20  First, although scholars agreed that while some issues, such as 
military conflicts and resulting domestic costs and war causalities, attracted intense 
public attention, public opinion was, in general, considered to be important only in so far 
                                                            
16 Philip J. Powlick and Andrew Z. Katz, “Defining the American Public 
Opinion/Foreign Policy Nexus,” Mershon International Studies Review 42, 1 (1998): 36. 
 
17 Alex Mintz and Steven B. Redd, “Framing Effects in International Relations,” 
Synthese 135, 2 (1997): 193-213. 
 
18 Robert E. Entman, “Framing: Towards Clarification of a Fractured Paradigm,” Journal 
of Communication 43, 4 (1993): 51–8. 
 
19 Michael C. Williams, “Words, Images, Enemies: Securitization and International 
Politics,” International Studies Quarterly 47, 4 (2003): 511–31. 
 
20 Ole R. Hosti, Public Opinion and American Foreign Policy, Revised Edition, 
Analytical Perspectives on Politics (Michigan: University of Michigan Press, 2004). 
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it had electoral implications.21  The public was assumed to be more easily manipulated on 
issues of wars and military crises abroad, than on domestic issues, that affected them 
directly.22 The need for speed and secrecy in issues of war and military confrontation 
often was used as justification by policy makers for denying public engagement in 
foreign policy decision making. The same justification, however, cannot be used for 
policy making on an issue such as infectious diseases. On the contrary, on this issue 
policy makers consider an active, informed, and engaged public to be important, and 
public cooperation is actively sought. Infectious diseases are a major source of concern to 
people and government alike. They are potentially transferable from one person to the 
other and can cause death and disability, impose high health care costs, lead to loss of 
productivity, and thereby cause social and economic disruption. 23  Due to the 
transmissibility of infectious diseases and their direct impact on people, any public health 
intervention, support for surveillance, or policy decisions regarding funding, prevention, 
and control of global infectious diseases requires the active engagement of the American 
public. 
                                                            
21 Philip B. K. Potter and Matthew A. Baum, “Democratic Peace, Democratic Audience 
Costs and Political Communication,” Political Communication 27, 4 (2010): 461. 
Vincent Price and John Zaller, “Who Gets the News: Alternative Measures of News 
Reception and their Implication for Research,” Public Opinion Quarterly 57, 2 (1993): 
133–64. 
 
22 David Domke, Erica S. Graham, Kevin Coe, Sue Lockett John, and, Ted Coopman, 
“Going Public as Political Strategy: The Bush Administration, an Echoing Press, and 
Passage of the Patriot Act,” Political Communication 23, 3 (2006): 291–312. 
 
23 World Health Organization, WHO Global Burden of Disease: 2004 update. Available 
from:www.who.int/healthinfo/global_burden_disease/2004_report_update/en/index.html, 
last visited January 2, 2011. 
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Secondly, on issues of war and military crisis, local actors, including the 
executive branch of the government, members of the Congress, interest groups, media, 
and often academia, have traditionally dominated the elite discourse.24 Challenges arising 
out of the spread of infectious diseases, however, have put focus on actors beyond the 
national states. Intergovernmental organizations such as the United Nations, the World 
Health Organization, and the World Bank have become increasingly prominent. These 
organizations have drawn attention to the impact of infectious diseases on human rights 
and economic development of countries and have urged collaboration and pooling of 
resources to fight the increased threat of epidemics. Many organizations that transcend 
national boundaries, including multinational corporations, pharmaceutical companies, 
epistemic communities, and civic society organizations, also have entered the debate on 
global and national health policies.25 Multinational corporations are worried about the 
implications of infectious diseases on the growth of the economy, tourism, trade, and 
travel. Pharmaceutical companies are concerned that issues relating to health and 
medicine are influencing policies on trade, particularly trade negotiations with other 
countries and with multilateral organizations.26 Health challenges have given rise to a 
new set of actors as well. For example, transnational groups and civic society 
                                                            
24 A growing body of research documents how public support for military intervention 
increases if the public feels that the action had the approval of international organizations. 
See Joseph M. Grieco, Christopher Gelpi, Jason Reifler, Peter D. Feaver, “Let’s Get a 
Second Opinion: International Institutions and American Public Support for War,” 
International Studies Quarterly 55, 2 (2011): 563–83. 
25 Rene. Loewenson, Civil Society Influence on Global Health Policy (Training and 
Research Support Center ,Zimbabwe: World Health Organization: 2003) available at 
http://www.tarsc.org/WHOCSI/pdf/WHOTARSC4.pdf, last accessed 08/06/2011 
 
26 Ibid. 
9 
 
organizations (e.g., Health Action International) have also enriched and participated in 
the debate on global and national health policies.27 Transnational civic groups’ at the 
global level have given consideration to field of pharmaceuticals and equal access to 
treatment. To influence public opinion and enlist support for their proposed policies, 
these organizations emphasize different dimensions of infectious diseases (e.g., human 
rights and economic and biomedical issues) and frame issues in ways that strategically 
emphasizes their political positions.28 On this issue, therefore, the public is exposed to 
frames espoused by domestic, transnational, and international organizations.  
The primary purpose of this dissertation is to enhance our understanding of 
“framing effects,” meaning changes in decisions or judgments resulting from different 
ways of presenting an issue, by exploring the ways in which public opinion responds to 
shifts in media framing. This study further explores the linkages between public opinion 
and domestic and foreign policy and assesses whether the public is able to make 
reasonable evaluations of the frames and the policy issues emphasized in the frames. This 
research is rooted in the broad literature proposing that the public responds in systematic 
and prudent ways to information presented on domestic and foreign policy issues.29 
                                                            
27 Gill Walt, Louisiana Lush, and Jessica Ogden, “International Organizations in Transfer 
of Infectious Diseases: Iterative Loops of Adoption, Adaptation, and Marketing,” 
Governance 17, 2 (2004): 189 –210. 
 
28 Matthew C. Nisbet and Bruce V. Lewenstein, “Biotechnology and the American 
Media: the Policy Process and the Elite Press 1970-99,” Science Communication 23, 4 
(2002): 162. 
 
29 Bruce W. Jentleson, “The Pretty Prudent Public: Post Post-Vietnam American Opinion 
on the Use of Military Force,” International studies Quarterly 36, 1 (1992): 49–74. 
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To examine the impact of issue framing on public attitudes towards infectious 
diseases, I studied three infectious diseases: Human Immunodeficiency Virus (HIV), 
Severe Acute Respiratory Syndrome (SARS), and the avian flu and four ways of framing 
them: biomedical, economic, security, and human rights problems. On June 5, 1981, the 
United States Centers for Disease Control and Prevention issued the first warning of 
HIV/AIDS in United States. SARS was first identified in Guangdong Province in 
Southern China in November 2002. Since then, it has spread to many countries in 
Southeast Asia and to Canada. In the United States, fewer cases of SARS have been 
reported. While the global spread of SARS was contained within 3 months, it had 
tremendous economic and political fallout and generated many debates about human 
rights issues. The avian flu refers to a highly contagious influenza A virus usually found 
in birds. Since 1997, confirmed cases of infection in humans have been reported in many 
countries outside the United States. In the United States, only poultry has been affected to 
date, and no cases of infection among humans have been reported.30 Scientists and public 
health officials in the United States, however, fear that if the virus mutates to allow for 
transmission among humans, it could have devastating results.31Avian flu has affected the 
poultry industry in the United States. For example, in 2005, because of a Highly 
Pathogenic Avian Influenza (the “molecular” nonlethal HPAI) outbreak on a single 
United States farm in the summer of 2004, more than fifty countries imposed a ban on 
                                                            
30 Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) Key Facts about Avian Influenza 
(Bird Flu) and Highly Pathogenic Avian Influenza A (H5N1) Virus, available at 
http://www.cdc.gov/flu/avian/gen-info/facts.htm, last accessed February 12, 2011. 
 
31 Julian Palmore, “A Clear and Present Danger to International Security: Highly 
Pathogenic Avian Influenza,” Defense and Security Analysis 22, 2 (2006): 111–21. 
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United States poultry that resulted in a 3% decrease in total United States poultry exports 
for that year.32 This clearly scared the 2.5 billion dollar poultry industry in the United 
States. 
 These three diseases were chosen as case studies for two primary reasons: They 
have greatly affected the United States, and they have their origins outside the United 
States. These infectious diseases have spread from countries in Africa and China to the 
United States and have raised serious biomedical, human rights, economic, and security 
concerns in the United States. Public health officials, international organizations, 
government agencies, and many non-governmental groups have drawn attention to the 
impact of infectious diseases on human rights and the economic development of countries, 
and they have urged global collaboration and pooling of resources to fight the increased 
threat of epidemics.  
Although similar frames are present for all three diseases, the patterns of framing 
effects are different, and some frames are more influential than the others. For example, 
the security frame greatly influenced public concern about HIV/AIDS but not SARS and 
avian flu. The three diseases differ in terms of their origins, patterns of transmission, 
consequences for human health, and potential to inflict damage. These factors could also 
influence the response of the public to different conceptualizations of the infectious 
diseases studied.  
                                                            
32 Council for Agricultural science and Technology (CAST) .2006. Avian Influenza: 
Human Pandemic Concerns. CAST commentary QTA 2006-1 CAST, QTA 2006-2 
Ames, Iowa, online at ,www.cast-science.org, last visited, 22 March, 2006  
 
12 
 
The secondary purpose of this dissertation is to use frames as conceptual 
instruments to analyze important changes in public health policy towards infectious 
diseases in United States in the post-Cold War era. Infectious diseases and epidemics are 
not new, but their “incidence in humans has increased within the past two decades or 
threatens to increase in the near future."33 Infectious diseases are specified as “those 
caused by pathogenic microorganisms, such as bacteria, viruses, parasites or fungi; the 
diseases can be spread, directly or indirectly, from one person to another.”34 Newly 
emerging infectious diseases are those “infections that have newly appeared in a 
population.” In addition to SARS and HIV/AIDS, which are new infectious diseases, 
other examples of emerging diseases in different parts of the world include Rift Valley 
fever, which is found in Africa and was identified in Saudi Arabia and Yemen in 2000; 
hantavirus pulmonary syndrome, which was first recognized in an outbreak in the 
southwestern United States in 1993; and hemolytic uremic syndrome, a food- or 
waterborne infection caused by certain strains of the common bacterium Escherichia coli, 
which were identified for the first time in 1982 in the United States. Influenza also 
remains a persistent concern, with worldwide epidemics (pandemics) of novel influenza 
varieties occurring, on average, several times in a century.35 Avian influenza of subtype 
                                                            
33 Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, Addressing Emerging Infectious Disease 
Threats: A Prevention Strategy for the United States. (Atlanta: U.S. Department of Health 
and Human Services, Public Health Service, 1994). 
 
34 World Health Organization, Health Topics: Infectious Diseases, available at 
http://www.who.int/topics/infectious_diseases/en/, last accessed January 21, 2011. 
35 Stephen S. Morse, “SARS and the Global Risk of Emerging Infectious Diseases,” 
(Zurich, Switzerland: International Relations and Security Network (ISN), 2006), 
available at Columbia International Affairs Online: Case Studies. 
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H5N1 (the so-called bird flu) was discovered after an outbreak in Hong Kong in 1997, 
with 18 human cases and 4 deaths reported.36 Since then, H5N1 has continued to evolve 
in Asia. Infection has spread from infected poultry to humans in several countries, 
including Vietnam, Thailand, Indonesia, Cambodia, and China. Reemerging diseases are 
those “that have been around for decades but have now occurred in a different form or in 
a new geographic location.”37 Some examples of infectious diseases that have reemerged 
are monkey pox in the United States in 2003, West Nile virus in the United States in 1999, 
and yellow fever in Cote d’Ivoire and Togo in 2008.38 
Study of the United States’ response to plagues and infectious diseases show they 
have not always been high on the government’s national security and foreign policy 
agenda.39 The end of the twentieth century was a period of optimism and complacency, as 
infectious diseases were thought to be successfully eradicated due to vaccinations, 
antibiotics, antiviral drugs, and great advances in medical science.40 For example, the 
World Health Organization officially certified in 1980 that small pox was eradicated from 
                                                            
36 WHO News: Avian Influenza Virus Reappears in Hong Kong Special Administrative 
Region, available at http://whqlibdoc.who.int/bulletin/2003/Vol81-No3/bulletin_2003_81 
(3) _232.pdf, last accessed January 21, 2011. Also see Laurie Garrett, “The Next 
Pandemic?” Foreign Affairs 84, 4 (2005): 3–23. 
 
37 Anthony Fauci, “Emerging and Reemerging Infectious Diseases,” Academic Medicine 
80, 12 (2005): 1079–85. 
 
38 Ibid., 1080. 
 
39 Fitzhugh Mullan, Plagues and Politics: The Story of United States Public Health 
Service (New York: Basic Book Publishers, 1989), 14-40. 
 
40 Felissa R. Lashley and Jerry D. Durham, Emerging Infectious Diseases: Trends and 
Issues (New York: Springer, 2007), pp xvii.  
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the world.41 In 1967, the United States Surgeon General, William H. Steward, proclaimed 
that “the war against infectious diseases had been won.”42 Laurie Garrett and several 
other researchers, however, pointed out that the belief that infectious diseases had been 
eradicated rested on two false assumptions.43 One was that microbes could not evolve 
into new drug-resistant strains or develop new hosts, and the other was that infectious 
diseases could be contained at state borders.44 What followed was exactly what some 
public health specialists, like Richard Krause, had feared.45  Not only was microbial 
evolution taking place, thereby necessitating the need for new drugs and vaccines to 
control the infectious diseases, but increased global interconnectedness through 
transportation, trade, and tourism enabled infectious diseases to be spread over great 
distances.46 More and more people crossing national borders everyday and unprecedented 
levels of air travel made it very difficult to geographically isolate and contain diseases in 
                                                            
41 Mark A. Strassburg, “The Global Eradication of Small Pox,” American Journal of 
Infection Control 10, 2 (1982): 53–9. 
 
42 Anthony A. Fauci, “Infectious Diseases: Considerations for the 21st Century,” Clinical 
Infectious Diseases 32, 5 (2001): 675–85. 
 
43 Laurie Garrett, “The Return of Infectious Disease,” Foreign Affairs 75, 1 (1996): 66–
79. 
44 David M. Morens, Gregory K. Folkers, and Anthony S. Fauci, “The Challenge of 
Emerging and Reemerging Infectious Diseases,” Nature 430, 6996 (2004): 242–49. 
45 Richard M Krause, The Restless Tide: The Persistent Challenge of the Microbial 
World (Bethesda: U.S. National Foundation For Infectious Diseases, 1981), 25-44. 
 
46 Giovanni Berlinguer, “Globalization and Global Health,” International Journal of 
Health Services 29, 3 (1999): 579–95. 
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their countries of origins. 47  Screening at airports was a fruitless exercise, as the 
incubation period of many infectious diseases is more than 2 weeks and thus an infected 
person might not display any symptoms of the diseases. The result was a resurgence of 
highly lethal infectious diseases that had developed high resistance to antimicrobials and 
insecticides.48 The emergence of Ebola in 1989 in Virginia in the United States therefore 
evoked great concern among public health specialists. Until 1989, Ebola had been found 
only in jungles of Africa. The New York Times ran the following editorial portraying the 
virus as a big threat to the United States:  
For much of this century the United States has served as "the world's 
policeman" in armed crises. Now, with the Cold War over, it may be time 
to put on the hat of "world's doctor," alone or in concert with others. As 
the danger of nuclear war recedes, we may have less to fear from rogue 
nations than from rogue viruses.49 
 
Further, prominent publications such as “The Coming Plague,” by Laurie Garrett, led to 
great awareness by politicians and the general public of the potential dangers incurred by 
new and emerging diseases. The rapid spread of HIV/AIDS coupled with co-infection 
with tuberculosis, the emergence of SARS, and the threat of an influenza pandemic in the 
future have forced foreign policy makers to deal with health issues and engage in 
                                                            
47 Laurie Garrett, “The Return of Infectious Disease,” Foreign Affairs 75, 1 (1996): 66–
79. 
 
48 David L. Heymann, “The Evolving Infectious Disease Threat: Implications for 
National and Global security,” Journal of Human Development 4, 2 (2003): 194. 
 
49 Editorial, “Who Will Be the World’s Doctor?” The New York Times, May12, 1995. 
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“microbialpolitik” (i.e., political strategies amongst states as they deal with pathogenic 
microbes).50 
Slowly, a coalition of domestic actors that included political leaders, human rights 
activists, security agencies, public health experts, and think tanks began expressing 
serious concern about economic and security implications of emerging and reemerging 
diseases. These groups were also responding to the changing international environment 
and interacting with transnational forces and international organizations in an effort to 
capture public attention on issues closely related to infectious diseases.51 Strategic actors 
had realized that they needed to frame issues in ways that would engage the American 
public and persuade policy makers to support their arguments. The next chapter presents 
the evolution of this debate in the context of three infectious diseases. 
  
                                                            
50 David P. Fidler, “Microbialpolitik: Infectious Diseases and International Relations,” 
American University International Law Review 14, 1 (1998): 1–53.  
51 Andrew Moravcsik, “Taking Preferences Seriously: A Liberal Theory of International 
Politics,” International Organization 51, 4 (1997): 513–53. 
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II. FRAMES IN THE INFECTIOUS DISEASE DEBATE 
This chapter traces the historical development of the prominence of the issue of 
infectious diseases and the key stages of policy development relevant to infectious 
diseases. The development of governmental policies and international laws and 
regulations concerning infectious diseases has not been a simple, straightforward, 
uncomplicated process. It has involved the collaborative action, and competition of 
multiple agencies and institutions as well as among policy makers, and scientists.1  
`These organizations have defined the issue of infectious diseases in persuasive 
ways by emphasizing and focusing on different dimensions such as security, economic, 
human rights, and biomedical. The objectives of the different actors were similar: They 
aimed to create awareness of infectious diseases, mobilize public opinion and 
government resources to support funding for prevention and treatment of these diseases. 
Different actors, however, framed the issues in different ways to highlight different 
aspects and dimensions of the diseases. For example, public health professionals and 
researchers devoted themselves to studying the causes, transmission patterns, 
epidemiology, and treatment of these infectious diseases, whereas the United States 
government and international organizations increasingly began to focus on the security, 
human rights, and economic implications of the diseases. In general, therefore, the three 
infectious diseases on which the dissertation focuses (HIV/AIDS, Severe Acute 
Respiratory Syndrome (SARS), and the avian flu) have been commonly framed as 
                                                            
1 Matthew C. Nisbet and Bruce V. Lewenstein, “Biotechnology and the American Media: 
The Policy Process and the Elite Press, 1970–1980,” Science Communication 23, 4 
(2002): 359–91. 
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biomedical, security, economic, and human rights concerns. These diseases have been the 
subject of much biomedical research, because of their contagiousness and lethality. 
 While scholars and policy makers have increasingly drawn linkages between 
infectious diseases and economic, security and human rights concerns, the biomedical 
frame has been dominant and constant. The continued evolution of many infectious 
diseases that can spread easily all around the globe has intensified advanced research on 
microbial genomes, epidemiology, transmission, microbial pathogens, human 
susceptibility to disease, and research on development of vaccines, medical supplies, and 
diagnostics.2 All of this has had implications for the diversion of resources to medical 
infrastructure, and also for the increased importance of medical professionals and experts 
in the formulation of economic and security policies.3  Needless to say, a great deal of the 
public discussion of these diseases naturally revolves around their epidemiology and 
other biological aspects. This emphasis is relatively invariant. The emphasis placed on 
other frames, however, varies over time. This chapter presents an historical overview of 
that variation. The remainder of this chapter will focus on the security, economic, and 
human rights frames. 
 
  
                                                            
2 Anthony S. Fauci, “Infectious Diseases: Considerations for the 21st Century,” Clinical 
Infectious Diseases, 32(2001): 675-81. 
 
3 Stefen Elbe, “Pandemics on the Radar Screen: Health Security, Infectious Disease and 
the Medicalisation of Insecurity,” Political Studies 59, 4 (2011): 848-66. 
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2.1. HIV/AIDS as a Security Threat  
 
Human Immune deficiency Virus (HIV) damages a person’s body by destroying 
specific blood cells (CD4+ T cells) that are crucial to helping the body fight diseases.4 
This causes a life-threatening condition called Acquired Immunity Deficiency Syndrome 
(AIDS). Since the 1980s, HIV/AIDS has become a worldwide epidemic and one of the 
most studied diseases in history. Research continues on many biomedical aspects of the 
disease as well as its origins.5 
Since the beginning of the 1990s, scholars of international relations, foreign 
policy, and security have framed HIV/AIDS as a threat to human security, state security, 
and even international security because it threatened individuals and had the potential to 
destabilize states in the post-Cold War era.6 Scholars of security issues and international 
                                                            
4 Basic Information about HIV/AIDS is available online from the Centers for Disease 
Control and Prevention: Department of Health and Human Services at 
http://www.cdc.gov/hiv/topics/basic/index.htm, last accessed February 2, 2010. 
 
5 It is widely accepted that HIV was originally harbored in chimpanzees inhabiting the 
western rain forests in Africa and that it crossed over into the human population as early 
as the 1940s. It moved slowly from West Central Africa’s isolated land to its current 
status as a global pandemic. 
 
6 Some important works by academics include: Andrew T. Price Smith, “Ghosts of 
Kigali: Infectious Diseases and Global Stability at the End of the Century,” International 
Journal 54, 3 (1999): 426-42; Andrew T. Price Smith, The Health of Nations: Infectious 
Disease, Environmental Change, and Their Effects on National Security and 
Development (Cambridge: MIT press, 2002), 117–41; Chris Bayer, “Accelerating and 
Disseminating across Asia,” The Washington Quarterly Winter (2001): 211–25; Susan 
Peterson, “Epidemic Disease and National Security,” Security Studies 12, 2 (2002/3): 43–
81; Jack Chow, “Health and International Security,” The Washington Quarterly (1996): 
62–77; P. W. Singer, “AIDS and International Security,” Survival 44, 1 (2002): 145–58; 
Stephen Elbe, “Changing Landscape of War in Africa,” International Security 27 (2002): 
167–71; Stephen Elbe, “AIDS, Security, Biopolitics,” International Relations 19, 4 
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relations who framed HIV/AIDS as threats to individual, state, and international security 
did so as circumstances changed in the post-Cold War (i.e., domestic and non-military 
threats had increased as external military threats had decreased in importance). This new 
way of framing HIV/AIDS triggered a debate in the field of security studies, as some 
scholars disagreed with widening the concept of security to include issues such as the 
environment and infectious diseases.7 
Scholars who argued that infectious diseases such as HIV/AIDS were a human 
security threat viewed HIV as a threat to the lives of individuals, their quality of living, 
and their capacity to participate in economic activities.8 The term “human security” was 
first used officially in the 1994 Human Development Report of the United Nations 
                                                                                                                                                                                 
(2000): 403–19; Jonathan B. Tucker, “Contagious Fears: Infectious Disease and National 
Security,” Harvard International Review 23, 2 (2001): 82; David P. Fidler, “The Return 
of Microbial Politick,” Foreign Policy (2001): 1–53; Stephen Morrison, “The African 
Pandemic Hits Washington,” The Washington Quarterly 24, 1 (2001): 197–209; Dennis 
Pirages, “MicroSecurity: Disease Organisms and Human well Being,” Washington 
Quarterly 18, 5 (1995): 9–14; Dennis Pirages, “Ecological Theory and International 
Relations,” Indiana Journal of Global Legal Studies 5, 1 (1997): 53–64; Dennis Altman, 
“Understanding HIV/AIDS as a Global Security Issue,” in Health Impacts of 
Globalization: Towards Global Governance, ed. K. Lee et al. (Basingstoke: Palgrave, 
2003), 33–46; Gwyn Prins, “AIDS and Global Security,” International Affairs 80, 5 
(2004): 931–52; Robert. L. Ostergard, Jr., “Politics in the Hot Zone: AIDS and National 
Security in Africa,” Third World Quarterly 23, 2 (2002): 333–50; David L. Heymann, 
“The Evolving Infectious Disease Threat: Implications for National and Global Security,” 
Journal of Human Development 4, 2 (2003): 191–204; Lincoln Chen and Vasant 
Narasimhan, “Human Security and Global Health,” Journal of Human Development 4, 2 
(2003): 181–90. 
 
7 Daniel Deudney, “The Case Against Linking Environmental Degradation and National 
Security,” Millennium 19, 3 (1990): 461–76; Walt Stephen, “The Renaissance of Security 
Studies,” International Studies Quarterly 35, 2 (1991): 211–39. 
 
8 Peter Fourier and Martin Schonteich, “Africa’s New Security Threat: HIV/AIDS and 
Human Security in Southern Africa,” African Security Review 10, 4 (2001): 57. 
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Development Program (UNDP).9 The concept of human security challenged the state-
centric notion of security and made a case for individuals as objects of security and 
members of a transcendent human community with common global concerns.10  
Political scientists who have drawn links between infectious diseases and threats 
to national and international security include Andrew Price Smith, Susan Peterson, 
Robert Ostergard, Gwyn Prins, Stephen Elbe, Dennis Altman, Peter Singer, Peter Chalk, 
and David Fidler. These scholars have analyzed infectious diseases (mainly HIV/AIDS) 
as threats to a state’s capacity to govern in many distinct ways. They have been mainly 
concerned about the high rate of HIV infection in sub-Saharan Africa. High rates of 
infection in armies, state peacekeeping forces, and civilian personnel threatened domestic 
stability of these states and undermined both defense and civilian worker productivity, as 
it reduced life expectancy and killed skilled personnel in their most productive years.11 
High rates of infection affected the public health infrastructure of fragile economies and 
                                                            
9 United Nations Development Program (UNDP), Human Development Report (New 
York: Oxford University Press, 1994). Available online at 
http://hdr.undp.org/en/reports/global/hdr1994/chapters/, last accessed June 10, 2011. The 
term “human security” was first officially used in the 1994 Human Development Report 
of the UNDP, which defined human security as protection from a) chronic threats such as 
hunger, disease, and repression and b) sudden and harmful disruptions in daily life. Later, 
most proponents of human security defined human security as any threat to individuals, 
their communities, and their overall development. 
 
10 United Nations Commission on Human Security, Human Security Now: Protecting and 
Empowering People (New York: United Nations, 2003), 4–25; Ronald Paris, “Human 
Security: Paradigm Shift or Hot Air,” International Security 26, 2 (2001): 87–102; Keith 
Krause, “Broadening the Agenda of Security Studies: Politics and Methods,” Mershon 
International Studies Review 40 (1996): 229–54. 
 
11 Jennifer Brower and Peter Chalk, The Global Threat of Emerging and Reemerging 
Infectious Diseases: Reconciling U.S. National Security and Public Health Policy (Santa 
Monica: Rand Corporation, 2003), 1–7. 
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led to increased health care costs, medical expenses, and funeral costs for individuals and 
to reduced foreign investment and increased debt in affected countries such as Somalia, 
Botswana, Nigeria, Lesotho, Mozambique, Ethiopia, and many other countries in sub-
Saharan Africa. All of these factors posed serious risk to these states.12 As many states 
failed, the international security of states became threatened. Scholars of security studies 
feared it could lead to coups, ethnic struggles, struggles over resources, and increased 
flows of refugees into other countries. Another factor of concern in many African 
countries was that death of both parents left AIDS orphans or new “pools of combatants” 
that were easily susceptible to crime and violent activities.13 In many countries of the 
African subcontinent, AIDS was used as a weapon of war, with the disease being 
deliberately transferred during rape.14 These scholars did not, however, see the spread of 
HIV/AIDS in Africa as a direct security threat to the United States. 
             Conceptualization of HIV/AIDS as a threat to the United States came from 
governmental agencies in the United States that were studying the implications of the 
spread of HIV/AIDS in sub-Saharan Africa on the national security of the United States. 
Policy makers began to recognize the nexus between HIV/AIDS and national security in 
the United States. As Tim Werth put it: 
HIV/AIDS has potentially devastating impacts on whole sectors of 
societies. In the most vulnerable nations, these trends could have 
devastating consequences for sustainable development and contribute to 
                                                            
12 Radhika Sarin, “A New Security threat: HIV/AIDS in the Military,” World Watch 16, 
2 (2003): 17–22. 
 
13 Peter W. Singer, “AIDS and International Security,” Survival 44, 1 (2002): 145–58. 
 
14 Gwyn Prins, “AIDS and Global Security,” International Affairs 80, 5 (2004): 931–52. 
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conflict and instability. We must understand the pandemic for its ability 
to affect the social, economic, and political fabric of many nations and 
thus, its implications for U.S. foreign policy, American leadership, and 
global cooperation.15  
For most policy makers, linking disease with security has been a “means of highlighting a 
particular problem, capturing scarce resources, and stepping up national, international 
and transnational response.”16 For example, Peter Pilot, executive director of the Joint 
United Nations Program on HIV/AIDS (UNAIDS), explained public health advocates’ 
tendency to invoke security this way:  
Whether we conceptualize AIDS as a health issue only or as a 
development and human security issue is not just an academic exercise. It 
decides how we respond to the epidemic, how much is allocated to 
combating it, and what sectors of government are involved in this 
response.17 
 
In the early 1990s, the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) commissioned a study 
that projected 45 million deaths due to HIV/AIDS by 2000. 18  Many reports were 
published after the 1990 CIA memorandum that recognized the potential implications of 
                                                            
15 Tim Werth, foreword to Global HIV/AIDS: A Strategy for U.S. Leadership: A 
Consensus Report of the CSIS Working Group on Global HIV/AIDS, by Kimberley A. 
Hamilton and Carolyn A. Ducker (Washington D.C.: Center for Strategic and 
International Studies, 1994), vii. 
16 Emma Rothschild, “What is Security?” Daedalus 124, 3 (1995): 53–98. 
 
17 Joint United Nations Program on HIV/AIDS, “AIDS and Human Security (statement 
by Peter Pilot at the United Nations University, Tokyo, Japan, October 2, 2001). 
Available online at 
http://data.unaids.org/Media/Speeches01/Pilot_Tokyo_02Oct01_en.doc, last accessed 
July 6, 2010. 
18 United States Department of State, The Global AIDS Disaster: Implications for the 
1990’s (Washington D.C.: Department of State, 1992). Available online at: 
http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/aids/docs/statedept.pdf, last accessed February 
2, 2009. 
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the global spread of HIV/AIDS and other infectious diseases on the security of the United 
States. Such reports included those by the Institute of Medicine, the World Bank, the 
Center for Strategic and Security Studies, the National Science and Technology Council, 
the Committee on Engineering, Science, and Technology, and the Global Emerging 
Infectious Surveillance and Response System, which was set up by the Ministry of 
Defense.19 
In 2000, the National Intelligence Estimate on “The Global Infectious Disease 
Threat and its Implications for the United States” was published.20 It was the first time 
that a security agency (the National Intelligence Council (NIC)) had intervened in a 
health question. The report was viewed by the United States government as an important 
action on the part of the intelligence community, as it considered for the first time the 
national security dimensions of a non-traditional threat. It reviewed the most lethal 
diseases globally and by region, developed alternative scenarios about their future course, 
examined national and international capabilities to deal with them, and assessed their 
global social, economic, political, and security impacts. It then scrutinized the threat of 
                                                            
19 Joshua Lederberg, Robert E. Shope, and Stanley L., Jr. Oaks, eds., Emerging 
Infections: Microbial Threats to Health in the United States (Washington D.C.: Institute 
of Medicine/National Academy Press, 1992), 220–94. See also Report of the U.S. 
National Science and Technology Council Committee on International Science, 
Engineering and Technology Working Group on Emerging and Reemerging Infectious 
Diseases–A Global Threat (Washington D.C.: National Science and Technology Council, 
1995). 
20 National Intelligence Council, The Global Infectious Disease Threat and Its 
Implications for the United States (Washington, D.C.: NIE-99-17D, 2000). Available 
online at 
http://www.dni.gov/nic/PDF_GIF_otherprod/infectiousdisease/infectiousdiseases.pdf, 
last accessed January 21, 2011. 
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infectious diseases from international sources to the United States. According to the 
report, new and emerging infectious diseases would pose a rising global threat and 
complicate United States and global security over the next 20 years, endanger United 
States citizens at home and abroad, threaten United States armed forces deployed 
overseas, and exacerbate social and political instability in key countries and regions in 
which the United States had significant interests. The report also warned that restrictive 
immigration controls and disputes over intellectual property rights for drugs could lead to 
friction between the United States and its key trading partners. In 2002, another report by 
the NIC projected that the alarming spread of HIV in countries of strategic interest to the 
United States (i.e., Russia, India, and China) could have economic, social, political, and 
military implications for the United States.21 In addition to the security agencies, several 
think tanks and research organizations published reports focusing on the increased threat 
from biological weapons and infectious diseases.22 
HIV/AIDS also received the attention of the UN Security Council. In his speech 
to the Security Council in 2000, then vice president Al Gore called for a “more expansive 
                                                            
21 National Intelligence Council, The Next wave of HIV/AIDS: Nigeria, Ethiopia, Russia, 
India and China (Washington D.C.: ICA 2000-4 D, 2002). Available online at 
http://www.dni.gov/nic/special_nextwaveHIV.html, last accessed February 18, 2010. 
Also see Nicholas Eberstadt, “The Future of AIDS,” Foreign Affairs 81, 6 (2002): 22–45. 
 
22 In 2001, the Chemical and Biological Arms Institute and the Center for Strategic and 
International Studies International Security program issued a report titled “Health, 
Security and Global Leadership under the guidance of Jonathan Ban.” Other reports 
include Jordan S. Kassalow, Why Health Is Important to U.S. Foreign Policy (New York: 
Milbank Memorial Fund and Council on Foreign Relations, 2001), available online at 
http://www.milbank.org/reports/Foreignpolicy.html, last accessed October 2, 2010; Peter 
Chalk and Jennifer Brower, The Global Threat of New and Reemerging Infectious 
Diseases: Reconciling U.S. National Security and Public Health Policy (Santa Monica: 
RAND Corporation, 2004), 140–66. 
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definition of security” that includes emerging and reemerging infectious diseases such as 
AIDS.23 The UN Security Council met on January 2000 to discuss the impact of AIDS on 
peace and security in Africa. On July 17, 2000 the UN Security Council passed resolution 
1308 regarding “the potentially damaging impact of HIV/AIDS on the health of 
international peacekeeping personnel, including support personnel.”24 By its resolution 
26-S/2 (annex), the General Assembly, at its twenty-sixth special session held in New 
York from 25 to 27 June, 2001, adopted a resolution declaring HIV/AIDS to be an issue 
that “constitutes a global emergency and one of the most formidable challenges to human 
life and dignity, as well as to the effective enjoyment of human rights.”25 
Concern about economic and security implications of emerging and reemerging 
diseases was only one aspect of the increasing threat presented by microbes. Concern 
about the threat of bioterrorism also was increasing. During the Cold War, the control of 
biological weapons was strictly an arms control issue. In the 1990s, perturbed about the 
magnitude of the former Soviet Union’s biological weapons program and concerns about 
a similar capacity in Iraq raised more general security concerns about biological 
                                                            
23 Vice President Al Gore’s Statement at the Opening Session of the United Nations 
Security Council on AIDS in Africa on January 10, 2000 is available online at 
www.whitehouse.gov/ONAP/pub/vp_sc2.html; last accessed March 10, 2009. 
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accessed February 4, 2011. 
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warfare.26 In 1975, despite the commencement of the Convention on the Prohibition of 
the Development, Production and Stockpiling of Bacteriological and Toxin Weapons, 
there were no mechanisms for verifying the Convention’s prohibition on the production, 
development, and stockpiling of biological weapons.27 In response to negotiations for an 
additional protocol, the United States Congress passed the Chemical and Biological 
Weapons Act of 1991, which had provisions for economic sanctions and economic 
controls to curb the spread of biological weapons.28 There was no domestic law, however, 
to control the spread of biological toxins by domestic groups within the state. The 
Biological Weapons Act and the Anti-Terrorism Act followed in 1989 and 1996, 
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respectively.29 Revisions were also made to the Biological Weapons Act to include action 
against any domestic group who “threatens” or “attempts” to use biological weapons.30  
The terrorist acts of Aum Shinrikyo in Japan in the mid-1990s raised awareness of 
the threat posed by biological weapons. In this case a non-state actor had committed a 
major act of violence by releasing a chemical agent (Sarin) in Tokyo subway. Unlike the 
threats of biological and chemical weapons from states such as the former Soviet Union 
and Iraq, this event raised the possibility of threats from non-state actors and terrorists 
and their use of chemicals and biological agents as weapons of mass destruction.31 
Biological agents and weapons could now be used not just as an arsenal of war but also to 
spread terror.32 The anthrax attacks that occurred in 2001 in the United States further 
demonstrated the potential for bioterrorism to inflict damage in a country.33 All previous 
attempts by the United States to control the spread of biological and chemical weapons 
concentrated on preventing acquisition of biological and chemical weapons by states. The 
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anthrax attacks delineated the importance of more caution on the part of domestic law 
enforcement agencies. It was agreed that that the first line of defense would be a 
strengthened public health system.34 This required strengthening laboratory capacities, 
expanding the number of trained medical practitioners and epidemiologists, and 
improving planning and coordination among law enforcement, the public, and medical 
professionals. 35  Control of bioterrorism thus became a part of the national security, 
homeland security, and foreign policy of the United States. 
The National Security Strategy of the United States, announced in September 
2002, and the National Strategy for Homeland Security released in July 2002 emphasized 
the importance of strengthening the public health system against any future biological or 
chemical attacks. 36  The United States Global Pathogen Surveillance Act of 2002 
acknowledged the universal nature of the infectious disease threat and admitted that 
“domestic surveillance and monitoring, while absolutely essential, are not sufficient to 
combat bioterrorism or ensure adequate domestic preparedness.” 37  The Bush 
                                                            
34 David L. Heymann, Jerusha Achterberg, and Joelle Laszlo, Lessons From the Anthrax 
Attacks: Implications for U.S. Bioterrorism Implications: A Report on a National Forum 
on Biodefense (Washington, D.C.: Centre for Strategic and International studies, 2002). 
 
35 Ibid. 
 
36 President of the United States of America, National Security Strategy of the United 
States (September 2002), available online at http://www.whitehouse.gov/nsc/nss.pdf, last 
accessed January 14, 2005. President Bush also signed the Public Health Security and 
Bioterrorism Preparedness and Response Act of 2002 to enhance the nation's ability to 
prevent, identify, and respond to bioterrorism. 
 
37 David P. Fidler and Lawrence O. Gostin, BioSecurity in the Global Age (Stanford: 
Stanford University Press, 2008), 157–58. Also available online at 
http://www.cbo.gov/ftpdocs/35xx/doc3510/S2487.pdf, last accessed February11, 2011. 
 
30 
 
administration launched the National Biosurveillance Initiative in 2004 and the National 
Biosurveillance Integration System in 2005 to strengthen the United States’ capacities for 
surveillance and early warning of bioterrorist attacks and detection of outbreaks of 
infectious diseases. 38  Three other programs that were created to this end were the 
BioShield, BioSense, and BioWatch programs. 39  These programs established that 
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therapeutics not yet approved. Also see United States Congress House: Committee on 
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Representatives, One Hundred Eighth Congress, First session, April 4, 2003 
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surveillance and intervention were the two mainstays of the United States government’s 
strategy to protect its country and people from the threat of bioterrorism and naturally 
occurring infectious diseases that have the potential to threaten or disrupt the social, 
economic, and political fabric of societies. David Fidler aptly named this strategy 
“BioSecurity.”40  
 
2.2. HIV/AIDS and the Economic Frame 
 
As HIV/AIDS spread to countries around the world, policy makers and 
international organizations such as the World Health Organization (WHO) and the UN 
realized its devastating economic implications. They focused on the economic factors that 
contributed to the spread of HIV/AIDS, the economic devastation caused by HIV/AIDS 
in sub-Saharan Africa and in many other parts of the world, and the economic burden on 
national governments that treatment and management of the disease entails. Framing of 
HIV/AIDS as an economic issue helped highlight the need for more resources to fight the 
disease. As James Wolfensohn said in his address to the UN General Assembly Special 
Session regarding HIV/AIDS in 2001:  
HIV/AIDS is no longer just a health problem, but a global development 
problem, threatening to reverse many of the gains made over the last half 
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century. Every war needs a war chest, but that provided by the 
international community is woefully empty.41 
Factors such as poverty, illiteracy, and migration, lack of preventive programs, an unsafe 
blood supply, prostitution of women in poor countries, and the high cost of treatment 
drugs were recognized as contributing to the spread of AIDS in poor countries of the 
world.42 The economic devastation caused by HIV/AIDS has been well documented in 
many studies over the past 20 years.43  
The WHO established the Global Program on AIDS in 1986 and UNAIDS was 
formed in 1996: These were the first multilateral responses to the epidemic. Together 
with other organizations, UNAIDS developed strategies to finance and provide 
technology to programs aimed at prevention and treatment of AIDS.44 Several other 
initiatives, such as the Global Fund to Fight AIDS, Tuberculosis, and Malaria and the 
United States President’s Emergency Plan for AIDS Relief, as well as philanthropic 
foundations, especially the Bill and Melinda Gates Foundation, are important actors 
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devoting resources to dealing with the HIV/AIDS pandemic. The United States was 
gravely concerned with the economic consequences of the growing problem of 
HIV/AIDS at home and in other parts of the world, and this was influential in the 
conceptualization of HIV/AIDS as a security threat by the United States government. 
One of the earliest reports that emphasized economic implications of spread of 
HIV/AIDS to United States was a publication in 1997 by the Institute of Medicine titled, 
America’s Vital Interest in Global Health.45 Both the Clinton and Bush administration 
recognized the growing costs of HIV/AIDS to United States government and in countries 
outside.46  The Bush administration launched United States President’s Emergency Plan 
for AIDS Relief (PEPFAR) and assistance to countries in Caribbean and Africa 
acknowledging that HIV/AIDS was an economic threat. 47  Much of the aid through 
PEPFAR was dispersed as bilateral aid efforts and this was seen as an exercise in power 
by many critics, as they argued for extending aid through multilateral institutions.48 
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2.3. HIV/AIDS and Human Rights 
 
International organizations and human rights activists groups have been 
particularly energetic in framing HIV/AIDS as a human rights issue in order to draw the 
attention of the world community to the plight of people infected with HIV/AIDS. The 
major human right concerns affecting those with HIV/AIDS are discrimination and lack 
of universal access to HIV prevention, treatment, care, and support. 
The linkage between health and human rights is old. A huge step towards 
incorporating human rights into international law was taken when the Universal 
Declaration of Human Rights was signed by 48 UN member states in 1948.49 Article 25 
is of special importance to health care professionals. It states, in part: 
Everyone has the right to standard of living adequate for the health and 
well being of himself and his family, including food, clothing, and housing 
and medical care and necessary social services.50  
 
The United Nations adopted the Universal Declarations of Human Rights as a statement 
of aspirations. The legal obligations of governments were to derive from formal treaties 
that member states would eventually sign and incorporate into domestic law. 51  The 
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Universal Declaration of Human Rights and the two subsequent treaties (the International 
Covenant on Civil and Political rights and the International Covenant on Economic, 
Social, and Cultural Rights) form a global human rights framework for action and have a 
special relevance for global health. 
The human rights concern in the early stage of the campaign for rights of people 
living with HIV/AIDS in the 1980s in the United States was linked to the rights of 
homosexuals, including protection of the civil and political rights of gays and lesbians 
and the fight against stigma and public discrimination in the work place. This campaign 
took place mainly in the developed world. Several human rights activists raised the issues 
of discrimination, imprisonment, segregation, and isolation of homosexuals, prisoners, 
migrants, sex workers, women, and children infected with AIDS. 52  HIV can be 
transmitted when specific body fluids of an infected person come into direct contact with 
mucous membranes, damaged tissue, or the blood stream (through the exchange of 
needles, tattooing, and blood transfusion).53 Because of its association with behavior that 
may be considered socially unacceptable, HIV/AIDS is a stigmatized disease that results 
in discrimination against the HIV-positive population.  
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In 1987, the WHO’s first global response to AIDS called for compassion and 
respect for the rights for people living with HIV/AIDS. It placed responsibility on the 
governments to protect the rights of people living with HIV/AIDS.54 The WHO’s framing 
of AIDS in terms of human rights allowed HIV/AIDS policies to become anchored in 
international law, thereby helping to make governments and intergovernmental 
organizations publicly accountable for their actions in the context of HIV/AIDS.55  
To further assist governments, international organizations, non-governmental 
organizations, and civil society groups in creating a positive, rights-based approach to 
tackling AIDS, the UN Center for Human Rights and the WHO laid out guidelines on 
HIV/AIDS and human rights beginning in 1989 and further revised them in 1996 and 
2002.56 The Commission on Human Rights has asked states to take all necessary steps to 
ensure the respect, protection, and fulfillment of HIV-related human rights as contained 
in the guidelines and has urged states to ensure that their laws, policies, and practices 
comply with the guidelines. 
Slowly, human rights concerns became linked to the issue of free and non-
discriminatory access to medicines and treatment. These concerns have intensified 
because of deep poverty and widening inequalities within and across countries. The UN 
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Assembly Special Session on HIV/AIDS made a key Declaration of Commitment on 
HIV/AIDS in 2001 that contains an entire section devoted to human rights.57 The World 
Summit Outcome in June 2005 and the UNAIDS High-level Meeting on AIDS in 2006 
and in June 2011 further resolved to provide universal access to antiretroviral drugs to 
treat HIV and to intensify efforts to eliminate AIDS. 
As national governments and intergovernmental organizations grapple with these 
issues, a new set of transnational actors have begun to play an important role in solving 
these global health problems.58 They extend widely from more formal organizations (e.g., 
multinational organizations and international non-governmental or civic society 
organizations) to loosely formed networks.59 They try to influence national governments 
and international organizations such as the UN. 
Transnational actors in the field of global health have been particularly effective 
in mobilizing resources and the attention of policy makers by framing issues of access 
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and treatment as human rights issues. In the early stages of their campaign, human rights 
activists protested against practices such as compulsory testing and quarantine advocated 
by public health officials in the developed world.60 Unlike victims of other infectious 
diseases, AIDS patients were considered by some to have brought this disease upon 
themselves by engaging in sexual behavior that was socially unacceptable and/or by 
injecting illegal drugs. Human rights activists protested the resulting lack of political will 
and the apathy of government officials towards the disease, and they pressed officials to 
incorporate rights for HIV patients into their domestic legislation.61 Beginning in 1987, 
human rights advocates such as Jonathan Mann framed this fight for civil, political, and 
social rights as a human rights issue for people living with HIV. He and his group, the 
Global AIDS Policy Coalition, focused on the marginalization, stigmatization, and 
discrimination that people with HIV/AIDS, mainly homosexuals, were subject to in 
relation to housing, access to education, health care, international travel, and access to 
treatment.62  Mann and his group further framed the denial of these rights to HIV patients 
as an impediment to the realization of HIV prevention strategies.63 Thus, the human 
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rights activists drew a strong linkage between the protection of human health against 
infectious diseases and the promotion of human rights. 
As years passed, however, many AIDS activists alleged that addressing issues of 
stigma and discrimination was not enough.64 The changing demographics and geographic 
pattern of AIDS, both within the United States and around the world, has redefined the 
nature of the rights demanded by human rights activists for HIV patients. As HIV spread 
in many poor and developing countries in Asia, Africa, and Eastern Europe, it became 
evident that it was not just the risky behavior of individuals that was causing AIDS. In 
fact, the most defenseless sections of society—poor women without access to education, 
employment, health care, and the legal system—were the ones more likely to be infected 
by AIDS.65 As one of the foremost AIDS activists, Paul Farmer, wrote, “regardless of the 
message of public health slogans that AIDS is for everyone–some are at higher risk for 
HIV infection.”66 Even in the United States, the demographic profile of people infected 
with AIDS was changing: It was no longer affecting mainly white homosexual males but 
also prisoners, injection drug users, African American and Latino women, people living 
in inner cities, and poorer neighborhoods in America.67 
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The advent of more effective antiviral medication accentuated those inequalities 
further, particularly in poorer nations of the world, which were hit hard by the 
epidemic.68 As HIV/AIDS spread to some of the poorest countries in the world, issues of 
treatment and access to medicines arose. Effective treatment of HIV/AIDS required 
development of new drugs and vaccines as well as widespread access to them. However, 
there was a conflict between these two objectives.69 The development of new drugs 
required enormous investment of both time and money into research by pharmaceutical 
companies, and the products were hence patented by the companies to recover their high 
development costs. These drugs were often unaffordable in poor countries, and this issue 
brought health advocacy groups and many non-state actors campaigning for universal 
access to treatment and drugs into direct conflict with the pharmaceutical industry. 
Transnational groups have taken up the issue of providing access to antiretroviral 
(ARV) therapy drugs for the poor at affordable prices.70 These groups include doctors, 
scientists, public health experts, and professional lawyers who provide the much-needed 
technical expertise in intellectual property related issues. They contribute to the ongoing 
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debate and also present their views at various AIDS conferences around the world. Many 
AIDS activists, “ including Jonathan Mann (WHO), Peter Pilot (UNAIDS), Jeffery 
Sachs, Paul Farmer (physician and founder of Partners in Health), Tony Barnett, Laurie 
Garrett (Newsday), Barton Gellman (The Washington Post), Bono (Debt, AIDS, Trade, 
Africa), Alan Berkman (New York physician and social activist), Jamie Love (The 
Consumer Project on Technology), and John James (AIDS Treatment News),” expressed 
the view that ARV treatment should be extended globally, and they helped create a 
network of individuals committed to the cause.71 
They also linked up with many advocacy networks.72 Advocacy networks have 
played a very important role in the global campaign for treatment access by framing 
rights to treatment as an ethical, moral, and human rights issue and by linking up with 
international organizations and other actors in states or civil society to provide important 
solutions to policy issues.73 Until 1996, the movement for greater access to medication 
was confined to Western countries. When the triple drug combination ARV therapy was 
introduced in 1996, it was reserved mainly for AIDS patients in developed countries. 
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Thereafter, many organizations in the United States, such as Health Gap, the Clinton 
Foundation, and Health Action International, reached out to organizations in other 
countries to fight for ARV medication for people in poor countries.74 
Closely connected to this debate was the issue of evolving global intellectual 
property rights for pharmaceuticals. 75  According to the Trade Related Intellectual 
Property Rights regime (TRIPS), member countries of World Trade Organization (WTO) 
were to provide patent protection to countries (including the pharmaceutical sector) for 
20 years.76  The advocacy networks fought a long struggle against these provisions in an 
effort to promote drug access, which resulted in some concessions at the Fourth 
Ministerial Conference of the WTO at Doha in 2001. The Doha Declaration held that 
“the TRIPS agreement does not and should not prevent members from taking measures to 
protect public health.”77 This was a major victory, as it later led to the advocacy of 
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“universal access to ARV treatment” at a UN General Assembly Special Session in 
2006.78 
 
2.4. SARS as a Security Threat 
 
From its appearance in November 2002 to July 3, 2003, when the WHO officially 
declared it as contained, SARS took the world by surprise as it spread rapidly to many 
countries of the world. The SARS experience illustrated that lack of surveillance facilities 
and adequate response capability in a single country could threaten global public health 
security.79 The WHO declared SARS to be “the first severe infectious disease to emerge 
in the twenty-first century, that poses a serious threat to global health security,” in so far 
it “threatened the livelihood of populations, the functioning of health systems, and the 
stability and growth of economies.”80  
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 The WHO henceforth played an important role in controlling the spread of the 
disease by issuing unprecedented travel advisories to specific regions most impacted by 
SARS, by gathering a team of scientists, epidemiologists, and public health experts to 
immediately act on this emergency situation, and by working in close collaboration with 
health agencies in countries affected by SARS.81 Framing SARS as a threat to global 
security also brought attention to the limitations that the WHO faces when trying to 
control the global spread of disease. Although the need for provisions to better deal with 
the spread of infectious diseases across borders already was being felt throughout the 
1990s, the arrival of SARS accelerated the process.82 The only set of international rules 
binding WHO members in terms of infectious diseases was the International Health 
Regulations (IHR), and they were applicable to only three communicable diseases: 
cholera, plague, and yellow fever.83 Member states were under no obligation to report the 
emergence of new infectious diseases such as SARS and HIV/AIDS to the WHO, nor 
could the WHO or the UN intervene in these countries to prevent the movement of 
people or goods and avoid cross-border transmission. In 1990, the WHO initiated the 
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process of revising these regulations to be able to deal effectively with new emerging 
infectious diseases. In 2000, the Global Outbreak Alert and Response Network 
(GOARN) was set up as a  technical collaboration of existing institutions and networks 
that pool human and technical resources for the rapid identification, confirmation, and 
response to outbreaks of international importance.84  
          Although GOARN played an important role in keeping the international 
community informed of disease outbreaks, the fact that it was up to countries to 
voluntarily disclose the outbreak of diseases other than the three IHR diseases limited its 
functioning. In 2004, the UN High-Level Panel on Threats, Challenges, and Change was 
instituted, and it listed infectious diseases as one of the threats facing countries 
worldwide. 85  The IHR was revised in 2005 to include threats from chemical and 
biological disasters. It also allowed the WHO to obtain information from non-state actors 
in countries where infections were occurring so that it could ensure security against the 
international spread of disease.86 
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2.5. SARS and the Economic Frame 
 
 Sever Acute Respiratory Syndrome (SARS) was contained within a few months, 
but it had significant economic consequences. The costs to the affected countries 
included expenditures for medical treatment as well as income lost as a result of sickness 
or morbidity.87 The economic consequences were enormous for SARS due to extensive 
trade and financial linkages in a globalized world.88 Tourism, retail trade, the airline 
industry, and small businesses closed as precautionary measures, and confidence in 
investment, delivery, and export declined in SARS affected countries.89 Foreign direct 
investment in China suffered greatly.90 The Canadian economy suffered due to travel 
advisories issued by the WHO alerting the rest of the world and Canadian authorities 
about the spread of SARS in Toronto and neighboring areas.91 The WHO estimated the 
                                                            
87 Some significant studies on losses to individual countries are Ji Chou, Nai- Fang Kuo, 
and Su Ling Peng, “The Potential Impacts on the Taiwanese Economy of the Outbreak of 
SARS,” Asian Economic Papers 3, 1 (2004): 84–99; Wen Hai, Zhong Zhao, Jian Wang, 
and Zhen-Gang Hou, “The Short-Term Impact of SARS on the Chinese Economy,” 
Asian Economic Papers, 3, 1 (2004): 57–61. 
 
88 Jonk Wha Lee and Warwick J. McKibbin, “Globalization and Disease: Case of SARS,” 
Asian Economic Papers 3, 1 (2004): 113–31.  
 
89 Mely Caballero-Anthony, “SARS in Asia: Crisis, Vulnerabilities, and Regional 
Responses,” Asian Survey 45, 3 (2005): 482–84. 
 
90 Thomas Rawski, “SARS and China’s Economy,” in SARS in China: Prelude to 
Pandemic?, eds. Arthur Kleinman and James Watson (Stanford: Stanford University 
Press, 2006), 105–21.  
 
91 Syed Harris Ali and Roger Keil, “Global Cities and the Spread of Infectious Disease: 
The Case of Severe Acute Respiratory Syndrome (SARS) in Toronto, Canada,” Urban 
Studies, 43, 3 (2006): 491–509. 
 
47 
 
cost of SARS to the Asian region at US$ 30 billion, whereas the Asian Development 
Bank’s estimate was twice that amount.92 Many industries in the United States with 
business processing units and manufacturing plants in Asia suffered huge losses.93 The 
media reported instances of people shunning Chinese and Asian restaurants in the United 
States. 94  The economic impact on all countries due to SARS brought multinational 
organizations, business interests, and leaders of countries together to invest in global 
surveillance and improve the public health infrastructure of all countries of the world. 
 
2.6. SARS and Human Rights 
 
Although SARS was contained within 2 months, many human rights issues were 
raised by governments, international organizations, and activists groups. The most 
important issue within individual countries and in their international relations was the 
balancing of civil and political rights of individuals with the public health of people and 
communities. Public health experts and international organizations argued that based on 
the experience of HIV/AIDS, anthrax attacks, and SARS and in light of concerns about 
the possibility of an avian influenza outbreak in Asia, new international laws were needed 
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to regulate the international spread of infectious diseases. The inapplicability of the 
existing IHR to deal with new emerging diseases and concerns about biological and 
chemical attacks made it necessary for international laws on infectious diseases to be 
revised. New rules were needed for international surveillance and global health 
security.95  
The need to effectively balance public health with civil and political rights of 
individuals was given a prominent place in the revised health governance regime (i.e., the 
revised IHR).96 The new revised IHR stated: 
that all state parties notify the WHO of all activities within their borders 
that may constitute a public health emergency of international concern, 
must be mindful of human rights, including civil and political rights when 
implementing any public health measure that may restrict people's 
freedom of movement and security of person.97  
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The new IHR also announced that “the implementation of these regulations shall 
be with full respect for the dignity, human rights and fundamental freedoms of 
persons.” 98  Any public health measure that restricts individual mobility should be 
declared in the face of specific public health risks (Articles 23.2, 31.1, 31.2, and 43.1) 
and must be applied in a transparent and non-discriminatory way (Article 42).99 
Another issue that SARS raised was that of the obligation of nation states to 
international health and international security.100 This included the reporting of infectious 
diseases within their countries by state governments to the WHO. It was China’s refusal 
to share details about the presence of SARS as early as 2002 in Guangdong Province that 
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was believed to be responsible for the spread of the disease.101 The IHR provisions had 
not been revised by then, and China was not under any obligation to report any infectious 
diseases other than cholera, plague, and yellow fever to the WHO.102 
During the SARS outbreak, public health measures employed to control its spread 
encountered opposition from some civil and political rights groups. The most important 
debate centered on the use of isolation and quarantine by governments to control the 
spread of the disease. No vaccine against SARS was available and little was known about 
the incubation period of the virus or how it was spread. It was known, however, that 
SARS was virulent and contagious, and medical experts believed that the most effective 
way to limit transmission was to isolate those who had been infected and to quarantine 
those who had been exposed. This approach brought into attention the legal status of 
quarantine decisions and the different kinds of human rights that could be violated by 
quarantine policies.103 Containment measures in Canada, Asia, and to a lesser degree the 
United States provoked a long debate on the ethics, legality, and civil and political rights 
threatened by these measures.104 In the United States, in response to the SARS outbreak 
and based on the recommendation of the Secretary of Health and Human Services, 
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President Bush added SARS to the list of reportable diseases on April 4, 2003. Executive 
Order 13295 effectively revised the existing list of quarantinable communicable diseases 
by adding SARS to cholera, diphtheria, infectious tuberculosis, plague, smallpox, yellow 
fever, and viral hemorrhagic fevers.105 This order granted legal authority to the Centers 
for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) to “isolate, quarantine, or place the person 
under surveillance and … order disinfection” based on a reasonable belief that a person 
arriving in the United States or traveling in interstate commerce is infected or may have 
been exposed to SARS.106 This triggered a debate involving legal experts and activist 
organizations such as the American Civil Liberties Union. 107  Rights to freedom of 
association with family or children and to work and earn an income were all at risk,108 
and this could, moreover, lead to mental anguish and stigma.109 Another concern raised 
by the prospect of quarantine was that it could be discriminatory, particularly against 
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racial minorities, migrant workers, and the poor.110 Activist groups feared that vulnerable 
groups were more likely to be quarantined and denied access to medication and 
information as a precautionary measure against SARS.111 Additional rights issues were 
related to compensation for people who were quarantined.112 In fact, a major hurdle to 
convincing people to assenting to quarantine was loss of income during quarantine and 
loss of employment after quarantine because of absence or stigma associated with the 
disease. 113  Many human rights activists called for adequate laws to compensate the 
people concerned, arguing that “quarantines are measures designed to benefit a 
community as a whole while imposing costs on particular individuals.”114 
People infected with SARS and their relatives faced ostracization and, as a result, 
they often delayed seeking care and reporting their illness.115 In the United States, Asian 
                                                            
110 Lesley A. Jacobs, “Rights and Quarantine During the SARS Global Health Crisis: 
Differentiated Legal Consciousness in Hong Kong, Shanghai, and Toronto,” Law and 
Society Review 41 (2007): 89–90. 
 
111 Anne Loveband, “Nationality Matters: SARS and Foreign Domestic Workers’ Rights 
in Taiwan province of China,” International Migration 42, 5 (2004): 121–45. 
 
112 Lesley A. Jacobs, “Rights and Quarantine during the SARS Global Health Crisis: 
Differentiated Legal Consciousness in Hong Kong, Shanghai, and Toronto,” Law and 
Society Review 41, 3 (2007): 511–52. Also see Michael J. Selgelid, “Ethics and 
Infectious Disease,” Bioethics 19, 3 (2005): 272–89. 
 
113 Mark A. Rothstein, and Meghan K. Talbott, “Encouraging Compliance With 
Quarantine: A Proposal to Provide Job Security and Income Replacement,” American 
Journal Of Public Health 97, S1 (2007): S49–S56. 
 
114 Ibid. 
 
115 Sing Lee, Shui-shan Lee, Corina Shuk-Ching Fung, and Pik-san Kwok, “Public 
Attitudes Toward SARS and Their Implications for Societal Preparedness for Other 
Emerging Infections,” Social Medicine 3, 2 (2008): 57–63.  
 
53 
 
American communities were often shunned.116 This was of concern to the public health 
officials who recognized it as a major obstacle in controlling transmission of the disease. 
The public health officers emphasized the importance of addressing this issue by 
preventing fear, stigmatization, and discrimination of certain sections of society through 
community outreach programs.117 
Another human rights issue that was highlighted by the SARS outbreak was that 
of freedom of the press and media coverage of infectious disease.118 Many scientists 
believed that the spread of SARS could have been contained had China reported it to the 
rest of the world instead of censoring its press about the outbreak of the disease in 
November 2002. Only much later, due to scrutiny by the international press, was China 
forced to admit to having cases of SARS within its territory. In its April 2003 issue, the 
Economist noted: “When news of the catastrophe broke, it was because scientists in free, 
neighboring countries had detected what the Communist authorities knew about, but had 
tried to conceal.”119 
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2.7. Avian Flu as a Security Threat 
 
In 2005, when avian flu was infecting poultry at an alarming rate around the 
globe, public health experts and scientists wrote extensively about how it could become a 
threat to international and national security.120 The biggest concern was that a human 
influenza pandemic could occur. The few human cases reported had been the result of 
close contact with infected poultry, and scientists feared that genetic changes would 
allow the avian influenza A virus (H5N1) to achieve the potential for efficient and 
sustained transmission among humans. A human influenza pandemic could cause illness, 
death, and other economic and social costs throughout the world. 121  Scientists and 
epidemiologists who gathered at the American Association of the Advancement of 
Science meeting in February 2005 emphasized that the potential for the virus to mutate 
into a form allowing human-to-human transmittal was high, and a global influenza 
pandemic could occur if a new subtype of the H5N1 influenza A virus were introduced 
into the human population.122 Policy makers responded to this threat immediately and 
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very effectively. President Bush unveiled the pandemic influenza plan to the National 
Institutes of Health.123 The four basic strategies of the plan were to: strengthen domestic 
surveillance, stockpile antiviral drugs, speed up the development of vaccine technologies, 
and develop an emergency pandemic plan in conjunction with public health officials in 
all 50 states and local communities. Emergency plans across the nation were also needed 
as the nation prepared for other dangers, such as a terrorist attack using chemical or 
biological weapons.124 The National Security Strategy of 2006 also outlined threats from 
avian flu. It stated:  
Globalization has exposed us to new challenges and changed the way old 
challenges touch our interests and values, while also greatly enhancing our 
capacity to respond. Examples include: public health challenges like 
pandemics (HIV/AIDS, avian influenza) that recognize no borders. The 
risks to social order are so great that traditional public health approaches 
may be inadequate, necessitating new strategies and responses.125  
 
The threat of a worldwide pandemic also became a foreign policy concern for the United 
States government. 
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2.8. Avian Flu and the Economic Frame 
 
The economic impact of the spread of avian flu was felt mainly by the world’s 
multibillion-dollar poultry industry. International organizations such as the UN Food and 
Agricultural Organization (FAO) and the World Bank have released country and sector 
reports on the losses of poultry trade, travel, and tourism.126 A report in 2007 estimated 
that around US $1.02 billion was disbursed and another US $1.68 billion had been 
committed, as of June 2007, to preparedness efforts.127 These reports also estimated the 
long-term investment costs of containing the spread of bird flu. News reports also 
emphasized the actual costs incurred particularly by Asian economies that had been most 
affected by the spread of avian flu. These losses were based on estimates of direct 
morbidity due to HPAI caused by H5N1 virus, governmental expenditure to control the 
spread of avian flu(i.e., measures such as surveillance, vaccination of poultry, and hiring 
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workers for culling and clean up), and on reactions of markets, trade, and associated 
industries.128 
 
2.9. Avian Flu and Human Rights 
 
The spread of avian flu raised several human rights issues, including quarantine 
and isolation, compensation for farmers whose birds were culled in the public interest, 
and equitable distribution of vaccines. Because no human-to-human transmission of this 
disease has been established, there has not been any need to isolate and quarantine 
individual human beings. This has not, however, prevented the emergence of a debate 
both in the United States and in the world community. 
President Bush’s National Strategy of Pandemic Influenza, which was unveiled in 
November 2005, discussed quarantine and isolation as tools to contain the spread of the 
human influenza virus in case the United States was threatened by a pandemic.129 This 
provoked a debate among human rights activists and legal experts on the likely adverse 
impact these measures would have on the rights of individuals. The activists also argued 
for legislation on compensation for lost income or jobs by quarantined individuals.130 
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They argued that job security and income replacement laws would not only assure 
individuals of their rights but also encourage public cooperation and compliance with 
quarantine measures. This issue was also discussed by the world community. The revised 
IHR (2005) had provisions that would govern intervention strategies such as quarantine, 
isolation, border controls, and social distancing within countries if the world were faced 
with mutations in H5N1 that could allow human-to-human transmission of avian flu.131 
The spread of bird flu has also raised two important human rights issues. First, it 
has raised issues of compensation for governmental destruction of private property, as the 
destruction of private property (e.g., infected poultry) is performed in the public interest. 
Compensation in this case has been defined as “indemnification of private actors for 
losses incurred as a result of public action undertaken to promote the public good, such as 
in the case of payments to farmers for culled birds.”132 Currently, the most effective way 
to contain avian flu is by culling poultry belonging to farmers in regions that are infected. 
Not paying adequate compensation not only infringes on the rights of farmers but also 
becomes a disincentive for farmers to notify authorities of disease outbreaks.133 This 
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issue has been raised by intergovernmental organizations such as the World Bank, the 
FAO, and the International Food Policy Research Institute, which have laid out 
guidelines on best practices for payment of compensation as part of Highly Pathogenic 
Avian Influenza eradication strategies.134 The second human rights issue that has come 
up with regard to the spread of bird flu is the equitable distribution of vaccines. In 2006, 
the Indonesian government refused to share virus samples with the WHO’s Global 
Influenza Surveillance Network unless developing countries, such as themselves, were 
assured of adequate vaccine supplies.135 This decision was supported by several other 
states in Southeast Asia and caused global concern, as public health officials and 
scientific researchers required viral samples to conduct surveillance on changes in 
pathogen strains and accordingly develop vaccines to effectively address the threat of 
influenza.136 Indonesia’s decision was seen by many developed countries as a threat to 
the WHO’s vision of global public health security and the provisions of the revised IHR 
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Law,” American Society of International Law Insights January (2004). Also available 
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last accessed August 12, 2011. 
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March 27, 2007. 
 
136 Richard Holbrooke and Laurie Garrett, “Sovereignty that ‘Risks’ Global Health,” The 
Washington Post, August 10, 2008. 
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(2005).137 The provisions of the revised IHR required WHO member states to submit to 
the WHO “public health information about events that may constitute a public health 
emergency of international concern.”138 On May 23, 2007, the World Health Assembly 
adopted a resolution on sharing influenza viruses and promoting access to vaccines in 
connection with pandemic influenza preparedness.139 The episode involving Indonesia, 
however, highlighted the inconsistencies between the developed countries’ proclamation 
of global health security as an ideal and the developing countries’ need for access to 
medications, vaccines, and treatment.140 
  
2.10. Conclusion 
 
The above review indicates that many governmental and non-governmental 
agencies are involved in the campaign against the spread of infectious diseases. The 
security frame used by the national and international agencies stressed the dire 
                                                            
137 World Health Organization, The World Health Report 2007 - A Safer Future: Global 
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consequences that would follow if action against diseases were not taken. Activists who 
framed infectious diseases as an ethical/human rights issue tried to evoke compassion 
towards the victims of disease, whose rights to health and good living were being denied. 
Some of these activists have been critical of “securitizing” infectious diseases, as it gives 
more power to the military and intelligence community at the expense of civil society. 
Human rights activists also fear that representing HIV/AIDS or other infectious diseases 
as a security threat diminishes the work of many activist organizations that are trying to 
normalize social apprehensions about people living with these diseases (mainly 
HIV/AIDS). 141  The economic frame, which identifies the alarming economic and 
financial losses that epidemics could incur, is promoted by individuals, multinationals, 
business interests, travel and tourism industries, and state governments that have a vested 
interest in the smooth running of the economy. 
While infectious diseases were framed as economic risks, infringement of human 
rights, and security threats, the biomedical frame continued to persist as a backdrop 
against which these other frames emerged. The importance of medical technologies, in 
prevention, detection, and treatment of infectious diseases was widely emphasized by 
government officials and in the mainstream media. 
The mass media is the primary arena in which these issues come to the attention 
of the public, interest groups, and policy makers. Given the influence of the media and 
the effect its coverage has on public opinion, the nature of media coverage and its impact 
on public opinion has become an important subject of study. There has been considerable 
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research on the role of the media- how it portrays or frames issues, and how audiences 
understand the issues framed in alternate ways by the media. The concept of framing has 
become particularly important in media research. The next chapter turns to the study of 
framing in more detail.  
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III. LITERATURE REVIEW AND RESEARCH DESIGN 
Framing may be broadly defined as any attempt to influence public opinion 
through formulation of messages that offer different perspectives on some event. This 
chapter will examine some of the important debates about the impact of issue framing 
and the effectiveness of certain frames over others in influencing public opinion. The 
chapter will also outline the research design for the dissertation. 
 
3.1. Framing and Framing Effects 
 
The concept of “framing” and “framing effects” has been studied widely in the 
social sciences.1 Studies of agenda setting and framing as developed in research on social 
movements, communication, and foreign policy all suggest that public opinion may be 
shaped by the way in which an issue is framed. Framing refers to, “efforts by leaders and 
other actors to insert into the policy debate organizing themes that will affect how the 
public and other actors, such as the media, will perceive an issue.”2 Framing effects occur 
when the media’s decision to highlight or emphasize only certain aspects of an issue 
causes individuals to base their views and opinions on these salient aspects.3 
                                                            
1 For a review, see Dietram A. Scheufele and David Tewksbury, “Framing, Agenda 
Setting and Priming: The Evolution of Three Media Effects Models,” Journal of 
Communication 57, 1(2007): 9–20; Bertram Scheufele, “Framing-effects Approach: A 
Theoretical and Methodological Critique,” Communications 29 (2004): 401–28. 
2 Alex Mintz and Steven B. Redd, “Framing Effects in International Relations,” Synthese 
135, 2 (2003): 193–213. 
 
3 William A. Gamson and Andre Modigliani, “The Changing Culture of Affirmative 
Action,” Research in Political Sociology 3 (1987): 143. 
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Communication scholars categorize framing effects as either “equivalency” 
framing effects or “emphasis” framing effects.4 An equivalency framing effect is one that 
involves the use of different but analytically equivalent words or phrases (e.g., 5% fat or 
95% fat free) to cause individuals to change their preferences.5 Generally, equivalency 
framing effects occur when frames that cast “the same critical information in either a 
positive or negative light” cause individuals to alter their preferences.6 Framing effects 
may challenge even the most basic axioms of the rational actor model of decision 
making.7 They suggest that a person’s preference and choice may change depending on 
the way in which a choice is presented, even if none of the objective features of the 
choice change. The term “framing effect” thus refers to changes in decision outcomes 
resulting from these alterations in the presentation of choices.8 Tversky and Kahneman 
showed, for example, that people’s choices could be reversed simply by presenting the 
outcome of decisions as either a gain or a loss.9 Most studies on framing and framing 
                                                                                                                                                                                 
 
4 James N. Druckman, “The Implications of Framing Effects for Citizen Competence,” 
Political Behavior, 23, 3 (2001): 225–48. 
 
5 Ibid., 228. 
 
6 Irwin P. Levin, Sandra L. Schneider, and Gary J. Gaeth, “All Frames are not Created 
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(2002): 491–517. 
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effects in the field of foreign policy and international relations are studies of equivalency 
framing effects. For example, scholars analyzing foreign policy decision making have 
dealt with the outcomes associated with alternative courses of action, as gains or losses 
relative to a reference point.10 Others have evaluated public support for humanitarian 
intervention in terms of gains and losses: Support increases when the public perceives 
minimization of losses to be the objective and it declines when the public assesses the 
goal to be seeking of gains.11 In contrast, some scholars have found more support for 
humanitarian intervention when intervention is framed as creating gains.12 In the field of 
health care and disease detection, most studies also have focused on framing of health 
messages as a gain(lives saved)  or loss(lives lost), and the effectiveness of framing 
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behavioral changes or in motivating testing for diseases for which early detection could 
enhance treatment.13 
The emphasis framing effect occurs “when, in the course of describing an issue or 
event, a speaker’s emphasis on a subset of potentially relevant considerations causes 
individuals to focus on these considerations when constructing their opinions.”14 Like 
equivalency framing effects, emphasis framing effects work by causing individuals to 
focus on certain aspects of an issue or problem instead of others. For example, if an 
organization argues for funding more research on vaccines to prevent infectious diseases 
because these diseases cause economic losses to the state and to individuals, it may cause 
people to evaluate their policies based on the economic implications of the disease. 
Unlike equivalency framing effects, the frames focus on different conceptualizations of 
the same issue rather than on mere changes in wording. Emphasis framing thus adds 
information, often suggesting underlying causes or remedies.15 Hence, these frames are 
also referred to as issue- or content-related frames.16 The individuals subject to these 
                                                            
13 Alexander Rothman, Amy E. Latimer, and Peter Salovey, “The Effectiveness of Gain 
Framed Messages for Encouraging Disease Prevention Behavior: Is All Hope Lost?” 
Journal of Health Communication 12, 7 (2007): 645–49; Anthony D. Cox and Dena Cox, 
“Communicating the Consequences of Early Detection: The Role of Evidence and 
Framing,” The Journal of Marketing 65, 3 (2001): 91–103. 
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Journal of Politics 63, 4 (2001): 1041–66. 
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of Communication 43, 4 (2003): 51–8. 
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frames evaluate the strength of alternative policy conceptualizations. For example, 
foreign engagements have been framed as humanitarian interventions, as promoting 
American values, or sometimes as wasteful expenditures.17 On the domestic front, several 
issues also have been debated in this way. For example, Ku Klux Klan rallies are framed 
as “exercises of free speech” or “threats to public safety,” and welfare programs were 
framed as “giving away tax payers’ dollars to lazy people” or “helping children who are 
innocent victims.”18 
  In this dissertation I analyze different conceptualization of infectious diseases as 
security, economic, biomedical, and human rights concerns. The focus, therefore, is on 
emphasis framing and its impact on changes in public opinion. The goal is to identify 
which kinds of frames have the greatest influence on public opinion about infectious 
diseases. Other questions addressed in this dissertation include: What kinds of frames can 
persuade the public to change behavior and support funding and other policies regarding 
infectious diseases? Do different frames have varying impacts? If they do, which issue 
frame is the most compelling or persuasive in influencing public opinion to support 
governmental policies on infectious diseases and why? The next section presents some 
prominent and important debates about what kinds of frames influence public opinion 
and how framing effects take place. Several studies have focused on framing of infectious 
                                                            
17 Richard K. Hermann, Philip E. Tetlock, and Penny S. Visser, “Mass Public Decisions 
to Go to War: A Cognitive-Interactionist Framework,” American Political Science 
Review 93, 3 (1999): 553-71. 
18 Thomas E. Nelson and Zoe M. Oxley, “Issue Framing Effects on Belief Importance 
and Opinion,” The Journal of Politics 61, 4 (1999): 1040–67; Thomas E. Nelson and 
Donald E. Kinder, “Issue Frames and Group Centrism in American Public Opinion,” The 
Journal of Politics, 58, 4 (1997): 1055–78. 
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diseases and understanding public attitudes towards infectious diseases.19 Most of these 
studies are descriptive in that they examine variations in media coverage of infectious 
diseases. These studies do not explore the impact of the frames on public opinion. None 
of the existing studies evaluated the impact of infectious disease framing on public 
opinion.  
 
  
                                                            
19 Catherine A. Luther and Xiang Zhou, “News Framing of SARS in China and the 
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Rachel B. DeMotts and Lawrence P. Markowitz, “Framing the Epidemic: The Case of 
UNAIDS” (paper Presented at the 2004 Annual Meeting of the American Political 
Science Association, Chicago, IL, September 2–5, 2004), available online at 
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August 5, 2011. 
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3.2. Studies on Emphasis Framing 
 
A number of studies have examined the impact that emphasis frames have on 
people. Some of the early work on emphasis or issue framing was conducted in the 1980s 
and early 1990s in the fields of sociology and communication. Communication scholars 
posited that mere media attention to a particular issue (agenda setting) could influence 
public opinion.20 For example, Iyengar argued that increased news coverage of the 1990–
91 Persian Gulf crisis was associated with an increase in the proportion of survey 
respondents who considered it to be the most important issue facing the nation and who 
also gave foreign policy performance greater weight when evaluating the President.21 
Allen et al. (1994) argued that the media’s pro-war footage of Operation Desert Storm 
and lack of coverage of any dissenting voices (i.e., those pointing out economic costs or 
                                                            
20 Shanto Iyenger and Donald R. Kinder, News that Matters: Television and Public 
Opinion (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1987), 1–183; Maxwell McCombs, 
Setting the Agenda: The Mass Media and Public Opinion (Malden, MA: Blackwell 
Publishing, 2004), 1–134; Vincent Price, David Tewksbury, and Elizabeth Powers, 
“Switching Trains of Thought: The Impact of News Frames on Readers Cognitive 
Responses,” Communication Research 24, 5 (1997): 481–506; John R. Zaller, The 
Origins  and Nature of Public Opinion (London: Cambridge University Press, 1992), 1–
97. Closely related to agenda setting was the concept that issues receiving more media 
coverage may be used by citizens to judge performance of their leaders and governing 
bodies (i.e., priming). 
21 Shanto Iyengar and Adam Simon, “News Coverage of the Gulf Crisis and Public 
Opinion: A Study of Agenda Setting, Priming and Framing,” Communication Research 
20, 3 (1993): 365–83.  
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loss of lives) resulted in overwhelming support by the Americans for the war.22 Soroka’s 
more recent work also established a strong connection between the importance of foreign 
affairs in the media and the prominence of foreign affairs in the minds of the public.23 
Challenging the findings of these studies, some scholars have contended more 
recently that public opinion was influenced more by alternate representations of issues 
and the different ways those issues were framed than by mere increased coverage of an 
issue. Many studies evaluated important domestic and foreign policy issues.24  In an 
experimental study, Paul Brewer found that participants who read news articles framing 
other countries as competitors with the United States held less favorable opinions about 
those countries. When they read news articles that depicted other countries as sharing a 
common interest with the United States, however, they viewed those countries 
positively.25 The focus of these studies was mainly to determine whether framing effects 
                                                            
22 Barbara Allen, Paula O' Loughlin, Amy Jasperson, and John L. Sullivan, “The Media 
and the Gulf War: Framing, Priming, and the Spiral of Silence,” Polity 27, 2 (1994): 255–
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23 Stuart N. Soroka, “Media, Public Opinion and Foreign Policy,” The International 
Journal of Press/Politics 8, 1 (2003): 27–48. 
 
24 Fuyuan Chen and Heidi H. Edwards, “Economic Individualism, Humanitarianism, and 
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Communication 55, 4 (2005): 795–809; Donald P. Haider-Markel and Mark R. Joslyn, 
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Issue Frames,” Journal of Politics 63, 2 (2001): 520–543;  Thomas E. Nelson, Zoe M. 
Oxley, and Rosalee A. Clawson, “Towards a Psychology of Framing Effects,” Political 
Behavior 19, 3 (1997): 221–46;  James N. Druckman, “Evaluating Framing Effects,” 
Journal of Economic Psychology 22, 1 (2001): 91–101; Sean Aday, J. Cluverius, and S. 
Livingston, “As Goes the Statue, So Goes the War: The Emergence of the Victory Frame 
in Television Coverage of the Iraq War,” Journal of Broadcasting and Electronic Media 
49 (2005): 314–32 . 
25 Paul R. Brewer, “National Interest Frames and Public Opinion about World Affairs,” 
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had a substantial effect on individuals’ opinions when the individuals were exposed to 
only one type of frame. Most of these studies were conducted as controlled laboratory 
experiments. All subjects were assumed to be roughly equal at the beginning of the 
experiment. Subjects were randomly assigned rival frames (for example, either the 
positive or negative frame) but were not exposed to both frames and changes in responses 
(relative to their original views on the subject) were then assessed. The rival frames were 
supposed to push public opinion in opposing directions, and the framing effects were 
expected to be contrasts. The two different groups were expected to respond differently 
from each other. For example, in a study on land development dispute, the issue was 
framed as either an economic development issue or an issue of environmental concern. 
Individuals exposed to the developmental frame were significantly more likely to view 
developmental concerns as important and consequently allow the project to continue 
(compared to individuals who received the environmental frame). 26  Presumably, the 
subjects' overall opinions about the project were based on the increased importance they 
attached to economic development as a result of the frame.27 
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In these studies, subjects were exposed to single frames. Thus, the experimenters 
were not able to determine what kinds of reactions would be evoked if subjects were 
exposed to dual or multiple frames at the same time, as usually happens in the real world. 
These studies, therefore, were unable to establish which kinds of frames were more 
powerful or influential in determining public preference for one frame over the other.28 In 
response to this concern, scholars such as Paul Sniderman and Sean Theriault studied 
framing in competitive environments in which individuals were exposed to dual frames in 
equal quantities in controlled laboratory experiments. These scholars set out to prove that 
exposure to more than one frame would neutralize or cancel the effect of the other 
frame.29 Norris, Aldrich, and Griffin extended this idea of competitive framing to the 
study of foreign policy. Aldrich and Griffin focused on different frames used by George 
Bush and John Kerry regarding the Iraq war.30 While George Bush framed the Iraq war as 
a war on terrorism, John Kerry framed it as a distraction from fighting terrorism. Aldrich 
and Griffin found an even balance of public opinion. This occurred because the presence 
of competing frames mitigated the impact of the opposing frame. These studies, however, 
                                                            
28 James N. Druckman, “What‘s It All About?: Framing in Political Science,” in 
Perspectives in Framing, ed. Gedion Keren (New York: Taylor and Francis, 2011), 279-
302. 
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Nelson (Washington D.C.: Congressional Quarterly Press, 2003), 239–56; Pippa Norris, 
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failed to explain why in some cases one frame could be more influential than another. 
The studies also were conducted as laboratory experiments and thus were subject to the 
same criticisms of external validity. They failed to capture the effects of the manifold, 
more complex and variegated framing environments that citizens face in the real world.31 
In more recent studies, subjects were exposed to multiple frames in varying 
quantities at the same time.32 These studies were conducted either in an experimental 
setting or in a non-experimental setting like focus groups or by combining content 
analysis of news reports with survey research in order to understand the effects of 
framing on public attitudes.33 In one such study, Wise and Brewer found that competitive 
framing of an issue such as a ban on trans fat mitigated framing effects of any single 
frame.34 Other studies showed that in such a competitive environment, some frames were 
more persuasive than others and not all frames were successful in changing public 
opinion.35 These findings, however, indicated that in a very competitive environment, 
                                                            
31 Donald R. Kinder, “Curmudgeonly Advice,” Journal of Communication 57, 1 (2007): 
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framing results were not as powerful as they were when subjects were exposed to single 
frames in laboratory settings. 
There is no consensus among scholars about which frames will appeal most to the 
public and why some frames are more successful in persuading audiences when presented 
as part of multiple frames.36 James Druckman recently pointed out that “work on how 
competition influences information processing and preference formation continues to be 
in its infancy” and “understanding what strengthens a frame is perhaps the most pressing 
question in framing research.” 37  Scholars also have shown that frames may not 
necessarily be oppositional in nature and that audiences may adopt only a portion of 
frames.38 In other words, they might embrace mixed frames. 
Some scholars, including Shanto Iyenger, emphasize that the loudest or most 
prominent frames are most effective.39 Iyengar defined prominent or the loudest frames 
as those frames that received the most coverage. Thus, they are more accessible and 
therefore more effective in influencing public opinion. Other researchers concluded that 
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framing effects depended on the strength of the frames rather than on their frequency. 
These scholars argued that some frames were stronger and more persuasive and thus had 
more impact than weak frames.40 However, the definition of a strong frame varies. 
Iyengar made another important contribution to the study of framing effects by 
distinguishing between “episodic” and “thematic” media frames. He found the former 
(which focused on individual cases rather than on broader social, economic, or political 
forces) to be more powerful in influencing public opinion.41 Many scholars have used this 
typology to understand framing effects.42 For example, a recent study of HIV/AIDS 
concluded that episodic framing of HIV/AIDS stimulates a positive response from 
African American men towards policies designed to fight AIDS.43 
Still others concluded that the frame from the most credible source had the most 
impact on public opinion.44 Most of these authors suggest that messages from sources 
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perceived as trustworthy, knowledgeable, and having a good political reputation were 
viewed more favorably by the audience. In their influential work, Lupia and McCubbins 
lay out the conditions under which uninformed subjects will be able to rely on cues from 
better informed speakers so as to express “informed” views.45 In the field of foreign 
policy and international relations, many studies have concluded that on foreign policy 
issues of war and intervention, the President and his staff are perceived to be the most 
credible source. There is, however, a problem with this literature. Sometimes the views of 
the ruling elite are dismissed and less known organizations can frame issues and make 
them look more purposive. 
While the President and his advisers often have an initial edge in controlling 
frames of foreign policy, they may lose it as the public becomes aware of realities of 
issues such as war.46 Scholars of communication studies have also assessed the impact of 
on public opinion, of news channels, that are perceived to be more trustworthy, compared 
with less trustworthy news channels. In his study of public opinion on the war with Iraq, 
                                                                                                                                                                                 
Implications from the Nexus of Psychology and Rational Choice Theory,” in Political 
Psychology, ed. James H. Kuklinski (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2000), 51-
88. Joanne M. Miller and Jon A. Krosnick, “News Media Impact on the Ingredients of 
Presidential Evaluations: Politically Knowledgeable Citizens are Guided by a Trusted 
Source,” American Journal of Political Science 44, 2 (2000): 295–309; Jeffrey J. 
Mondak, “Source Cues and Policy Approval: The Cognitive Dynamics of Public Support 
for the Reagan Agenda,” American Journal of Political Science 37, 1 (1993): 186–212. 
45Arthur Lupia and Mathew C. McCubbins, The Democratic Dilemma: Can Citizens 
Learn What They Need to Know? (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998), 1–
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Baum concluded that the audience was more likely to believe in the same news from 
Cable News Network than from Fox News Channel, as the latter was supposed to be 
biased towards the Republican view point and thereby was seen as less credible.47 Some 
studies on framing effects have concluded that people agree more with messages coming 
from the political parties (perceived as credible sources) with which they identify.48 Even 
here, however, the authors conclude that people support the party frame only if it is 
consistent with their own beliefs. 
Most scholars of framing studies believe that frames with moral valence, such as 
equality, compassion, and humanitarianism, or values in democratic societies, such as 
freedom, individualism, and capitalism, are most accepted by the audience.49 Framing of 
issues such as gay rights, welfare reform, stem cell research, and foreign aid as value 
frames have been studied by scholars such as David Domke, Dhavan Shah, Thomas 
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Nelson, and Donald Kinder. A value frame was defined by Paul Brewer as a type of 
frame that draws an association between a value and an issue that carries an evaluative 
implication: It presents one position on an issue as being right (and others as wrong) by 
linking that position to a specific core value.50  
Most of these studies were conducted as laboratory experiments, although some 
involved focus groups.51 These studies again had several flaws. First, when conducted as 
laboratory experiments, they lacked external validity. Most of these experiments were 
performed in single sessions, making it impossible to assess changes over a long period 
of time; however, the temporal component is important, as the same messages may not 
hold as much sway as they did when they were first exposed to frames.52  Second, 
respondents often use their own moral values rather than taking their cue from frames. 
Findings from a recent study about public support for the war in Afghanistan contradict 
the previously understood relationship between frames and the moral valence ascribed to 
public issues. The study sought to understand audience support for the war in 
Afghanistan, when exposed to multidimensional war/crime frames, in the aftermath of 
                                                            
50 Paul R. Brewer, “Value Words and Lizard Brains: Do Citizens Deliberate About 
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the 9/11 attacks in the United States. The study revealed that “respondents may use their 
own moral compasses to evaluate and combine frame elements instead of deriving moral 
valences from the frames.”53 
Some scholars believe that frames consistent with people’s existing beliefs and 
predispositions are more likely to find favor with the audience.54 Many people reject a 
frame that contradicts their existing predispositions, be it on gay rights or race issues.55 
The problem with this observation lies in the difficulty of measuring existing beliefs and 
the values, especially when the dependent variable is public opinion measured in public 
opinion surveys. Other studies on persuasiveness of frames claim that frames have more 
impact if they highlight specific emotions.56 Framing scholars like Dennis Chong and 
James Druckman argue that even in competitive environments certain messages are able 
to influence opinion in the desired direction. Along similar lines, a recent work on frame 
strength argues that a political argument is more persuasive “if it frames a problem and 
its proposed solution in a way that resonates with people’s cognitive biases-loss aversion 
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and in group bias.”57 Still other scholars have concluded that news frames are persuasive 
if they are “culturally congruent,” which means they use “words and images highly 
salient in the culture, which is to say noticeable, understandable and emotionally 
charged.”58  Associated to this is Edy’s conclusion that frames are very powerful in 
influencing public opinion if they have been used in the past or are part of a “collective 
memory.”59 
Another group of scholars concluded that those frames that resonated with 
people’s personal experiences were more influential in influencing their attitudes. Graber 
concluded that the media impact depended on the importance of issues to the individual.60 
Gamson studied issues such as nuclear power, the Arab–Israeli conflict, affirmative 
action, and troubles in industry. He concluded that while media frames do play an 
important role, people “evaluate news in light of past learning and determine how well it 
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squares with the reality that they have experienced directly or vicariously.”61 Iyengar 
reached similar conclusions in his research on television news and agenda setting. 
According to his study, “personal experience and media agendas may interactively shape 
citizens’ personal concerns.”62 Studies on emphasis framing in the field of foreign studies 
have consistently shown that the American public responds positively to frames that 
show “national interest” or promote “victory frames.”63 Bliech, who studied support for 
United States spending on HIV/AIDS, reached similar conclusions: Americans did not 
support spending on HIV/AIDS related projects (to prevent, treat and tackle the disease) 
for developing countries when the funding was framed as “foreign aid.”64 She concluded 
that the United States does not see other countries’ problems as their own. Overall, 
support for funding for programs to tackle HIV/AIDS in developing countries was likely 
to improve only if more Americans were personally affected by the disease. 
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3.3. Research Design 
 
The above review indicates there is no consensus among scholars if any particular  
frame is  effective in all situations, and some feel that only an “operational approach of 
asking people directly to evaluate the relative strength of various frames” will  allow 
assessment of frame strength.65 Previous research on framing effects when participants 
are exposed to multiple frames points to two things: unequal effect of frames and that 
while framing has a substantial impact in influencing public opinion, it cannot be used as 
a tool to change public opinion in the desired direction in all situations.  
I pose the following research questions. Does it matter if the framing of infectious 
diseases stresses medical dangers, economic costs, human rights infringement, or 
strategic threats? If it does, which issue frame is the most compelling or persuasive in 
influencing public perception of threat and concern over the disease? Previous research 
indicates that two factors may greatly enhance the impact of a frame. First, repeated 
exposure to a frame may enhance its accessibility and make it more persuasive. Second, 
perceived relevance of an issue frame may also increase its influence. Frames that are 
more directly related to the United States, for example, may have the effect of increasing 
public anxiety. Consistent with this, and building on previous research the following 
hypotheses were tested: 
Hypothesis 1. Frames represented prominently in the media will tend to mobilize 
public support for policies associated with those frames. Increased repetition of the frame 
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will enhance its effect. Frequent exposure to the frame will increase the accessibility and 
thereby the relevance of the issue and people will pay more attention to considerations 
underlying the issue. This claim relies on the accessibility and memory-based model of 
public opinion formation. 
Hypothesis 2. When the medical and economic frames dominate media coverage, 
which is the most common scenario, people will be worried about the disease. They will 
be likely to support potentially inconvenient policies intended to address the dangers of 
the disease. On the other hand, when security and human rights frames dominate, which 
should be less often, people will be less worried and concerned about the spread of 
disease. In this case, people would be less likely to support inconvenient public policies 
because they will view these frames as less personally relevant.  
To test these hypotheses, a content analysis of newspaper reports about infectious 
diseases was used to determine which frame was more prevalent at different times. 
Qualitative content analysis of health frames and a brief historical discussion of the 
resulting public opinion supplement this analysis. Public opinion poll data are used to 
present a measure of the public reaction to these frames.  
Using Lexis-Nexis, I collected newspaper reports about three infectious diseases 
(HIV/AIDS, SARS, and avian flu) from The New York Times and The Washington Post. 
These newspapers were chosen as sources for three major reasons. First, newspapers are 
still a major source of information for millions of people in the United States.66 Second, 
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these newspapers devote substantial resources to coverage of national and international 
affairs and have a large reporting staff with expertise in science, technology, and medical 
issues. 67  Third, some national news sources like The New York Times and The 
Washington Post are considered the “gatekeeper” or “elite” sources of news, in that they 
influence news coverage made in other national and regional newspapers.68 Analysis of 
these two newspapers gives an indication of reporting trends likely to be followed in 
other news reports. 
The most prominent frames identified in the articles were the biomedical, 
economic, security, and human rights frames. In fact, the choice of these four frames 
emerges, in part, from pre-test content analysis showing that they are the most prominent 
infectious disease frames. Other frames, such as entertainment, political, and 
humanitarian, were not as common in the news stories. A fellow student was given ten 
percent of the stories (randomly selected) to code, and she recorded the data on a separate 
coding sheet. This test of inter-coder reliability showed an overall level of 86% 
agreement between me and the other student. Such reliability figures are considered to be 
acceptable by most communications scholars.69 
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The following themes were considered when coding for the biomedical frame: 
transmission and epidemiology of the disease; the possibility of it taking the form of an 
epidemic or pandemic; focus on different strains of viruses that caused these infectious 
diseases; diagnosis and symptoms of disease; cure, rehabilitation, and biophysical issues 
surrounding the disease; treatment/medication related to the disease; and employment of 
quarantine and isolation as intervention strategies to contain the disease. With regards to 
HIV/AIDS, debates about prevention and treatment (i.e., needle exchange, use of 
condoms, abstinence only, and blood transfusion) were considered. The role of the World 
Health Organization, Centers for disease Control and Prevention, National Institutes of 
Health, doctors, health care professionals, virologists, and scientists in relation to the 
disease was also indicators of the biomedical frame. 
To measure the security frame, news reports were coded for mention of threat to 
the state’s capacity (i.e., its military and peacekeeping forces, threat to state borders, and 
state institutions) due to the pandemic of HIV/AIDS, SARS, or avian flu. Mention of 
deliberate use of microbes to inflict bioterrorism was also included in the security frame. 
The following themes defined the economic frame: indications that the spread of 
disease caused financial losses, decline in investments, investments, decline of gross 
domestic product, loss of exports, losses to manufacturing units, loss of trade and 
commerce, and decline in tourism; references to absenteeism at work, loss of skilled 
workers, and health insurance payments as a result of the disease; and mention of costs 
and expenses to the federal and state governments or global funds to fight the disease and 
financial costs of vaccine research and production incurred by pharmaceutical industries. 
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Economic factors leading to the spread of disease were also coded, including: smuggling 
of uninspected meat/chicken to avoid custom duties; prostitution or forced sex on 
women; poverty causing people to sell blood infected with HIV in poor countries where 
blood often is not screened for infection; slums, squalor, urbanization, and nutritional 
deficiencies leading to the spread of infectious diseases; and changes in land use or 
economic development associated with disease transmission. Finally, stories about 
economic activities such as human encroachment on forests, which can bring humans 
into closer contact with insects and animals carrying disease, and stories that mentioned a 
mention of lack of infrastructure (e.g., roads) and higher tariffs (if they are a hurdle in the 
shipment and transfer of medicine to poorer countries), were also coded for the economic 
frame.  
The key words in the human rights frame for HIV/AIDS were stigmatization and 
discrimination against people infected with the disease. Also coded were stories about 
protests by the homosexual population of the United States against mandatory screening 
of blood when donating blood; protests against the “partner notification program” in the 
case of HIV/AIDS, as it was seen as a violation of a person’s right to privacy and 
confidentiality; and protests by patients and their families about being denied 
access/privileges to public amenities, education opportunities, housing, and employment.  
The human rights issues debated in the media regarding SARS and avian flu 
differed somewhat from those surrounding HIV/AIDS. Demands for freedom of the press 
and against censorship by countries (like China) that censored news about the outbreak of 
disease in their country were voiced. As immigrants and travelers were screened at 
airports, many of them protested that their privacy was being violated. Human rights 
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groups protested mandatory quarantine and isolation in some countries as infringement of 
peoples’ civil and political rights. In the case of avian flu, the issue of compensation to 
farmers whose poultry was culled was raised by many private and international 
organizations. Coverage of issues such as these was also coded for the human rights 
frame. 
 
3.4. Conclusion 
 
This study seeks to enhance our understanding of public attitudes and public 
opinion towards infectious diseases and the policies that people are likely to support. By 
relying on content analysis and public opinion data, it also addresses some of the 
limitations of past laboratory studies.70 Beyond the well known external validity problem, 
laboratory experiments used in the study of framing effects also tend to rely on a single 
exposure to a single frame, whereas people are exposed to multiple frames over an 
extended period of time, from various sources, in real world settings.  
This study will shed light on how public opinion is activated by different frames. 
It contributes to the growing literature on understanding the strength of frames in 
competitive settings. This study also seeks to improve our understanding of the 
relationship between public opinion and domestic and foreign policy. It addresses the 
extent to which the public is capable of making informed choices when presented with 
information on issues that are of concern to both domestic and foreign policy makers. 
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The next three chapters focus on three infectious diseases (HIV/AID, SARS, and avian 
flu) as test cases to study the impact of media frames on public opinion.  
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IV. CASE STUDY: SEVERE ACUTE RESPIRATORY SYNDROME 
 On March 15, 2003, the World Health Organization (WHO) issued a global alert 
and emergency guidelines for airlines and travelers about a new atypical pneumonia of 
unknown etiology affecting people in China, Hong Kong, and Vietnam. 1  It was 
considered a deadly respiratory disease with the potential of developing rapidly into a 
global pandemic. By March 24, 2003, the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention 
(CDC) confirmed that Severe Acute Respiratory Syndrome (SARS) was caused by a new 
strain of virus (the corona virus) most frequently associated with upper respiratory 
infections.2  Both the local and international media reported extensively on the disease. 
According to the WHO, 8,098 people worldwide became sick with SARS during the 
2003 outbreak, and 774 of those affected died. In the United States, only 8 people had 
laboratory evidence of SARS-corona virus infection. All of these people had traveled to 
other parts of the world where SARS was present.3  By the end of June 2003, no new 
cases were reported, and the WHO declared the global outbreak to be over. “With the last 
known chain of transmission interrupted in Taiwan, the whole world can breathe an 
initial sigh of relief,” said Dr David Heymann, the WHO executive director for the 
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Fact Sheet: Basic Facts about SARS. May 3, 2005. Available online at 
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Communicable Diseases Cluster. 4  The number of newspaper stories about SARS 
decreased when the WHO withdrew its travel alerts towards the end of June. 
            Throughout the outbreak, the media reported on the biomedical aspects, economic 
consequences, security concerns, and human rights issues related to the disease. SARS 
was recognized by the WHO as the first severe infectious disease to emerge in the 
twenty-first century.5 In an age of travel and increased global trade, it spread at an 
alarming rate from Asia to other parts of the world.6 It was seen as a mysterious disease 
that spread very efficiently from person to person, and there was no known vaccine or 
cure for the disease. As leading laboratories and public health practitioners devoted 
themselves to understanding the cause of SARS and to studying the genetic sequence of 
the corona virus that was thought to cause it, newspapers reported overwhelmingly on the 
biomedical aspects of the disease and the prospects for a cure. Medical news was notably 
dominant throughout the outbreak. Certain events, such as the WHO’s global health alert 
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and advisories against traveling to many countries, led to increased news reporting. The 
following news story, which appeared on April 7, 2003 in The New York Times, 
discusses the medical aspects of the disease: 
Public anxiety about SARS appears to be increasing, with a hotline at the 
federal Centers for Disease Control and Prevention in Atlanta receiving 
more than 1,000 calls a day late last week. People of all ages have caught 
SARS. The illness typically starts like any other acute respiratory 
infection: with a fever, chills, headache, malaise and dry cough. Chest X-
rays tend to show what doctors call "atypical pneumonia" in a lower lobe 
of a lung. In the following days, a victim may develop difficulty breathing 
as the pneumonia spreads to another lobe.  
 
About five to seven days after onset, the symptoms improve in about 80 to 
90 percent of patients and worsen in the remainder. Many of the sickest 
patients require intensive care, even to the point of being connected to a 
respirator. Why some people improve and others die is not known. So far, 
it appears that people most susceptible to severe symptoms are 40 or older 
and those who have had a chronic disease in the past. Aside from regular 
nursing care and help in breathing, there is no effective treatment, and 
recovery seems to depend on a patient's own immune system. No one is 
certain what causes SARS, but a microbe known as a corona virus is the 
chief suspect, most likely a new strain that originated in Guangdong 
province.7 
 
At that time, there was no vaccine or treatment for SARS, and the disease was 
extremely contagious. There were reports in the newspapers of people stigmatizing and 
discriminating against people infected by SARS. Such stories were reported mainly from 
countries such as Hong Kong, China, and Canada, where SARS was more widespread.8 
In the United States, debates about the linkage between human rights and SARS centered 
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on the issue of isolation and quarantine.9 In the absence of a vaccine and a definite cure 
for SARS, the media in the United States widely endorsed the views of the CDC and the 
WHO that the best way to stop the spread of this contagious disease was to practice 
isolation and quarantine.10 On April 4, 2003, United States President George W. Bush 
issued an executive order that added SARS to the CDC’s list of quarantinable diseases. 
This order gave the CDC the authority to isolate persons who might have been exposed to 
the disease.11 This drew protest from civil rights activists, who argued that such laws 
might curtail peoples’ civil liberties. The following news story that appeared in The New 
York Times is illustrative of the debate that ensued: 
A lesson of the SARS outbreak is that we in the United States need to 
compromise on civil liberties to confront health risks more effectively. 
After 9/11, the Bush administration wisely pushed a Model Emergency 
Health Powers Act as a template for legislation by the states. Such 
legislation would permit governors to respond to health crises with a state 
of emergency in which they could impose quarantines, order vaccinations 
and the destruction of dangerous property, limit people's movements and 
ration medicine, and seize anything from dead bodies to private hospitals. 
The steps are tough and sobering, but would apply only in desperate 
circumstances and within safeguards. So far only 22 states have passed 
this kind of law, and California, New York and Texas have all spurned it. 
One main obstacle has been shrieks of protest by civil libertarians, whom 
I'm usually sympathetic to — but not this time. Aside from terrorism, 30 
new diseases have popped up in the last quarter-century, from avian flu to 
AIDS. This is an age of global disease, when viruses flit across continents. 
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If you disagree, how about if I visit your neighborhood the next time I'm 
back from an Ebola outbreak in Congo and feeling feverish?12  
 
According to the CDC website, because there was limited transmission of the SARS 
virus, neither individual- nor population-based quarantine was recommended. Therefore, 
the issue of SARS as a threat to human rights was not as prominent as the biomedical and 
economic news about SARS. 
 As SARS hit Asia and Canada in June 2003, there was tremendous economic 
fallout, as these countries had extensive commercial links with the rest of the world. The 
spread of SARS disrupted retail, manufacturing, trade, tourism, and travel.13 The media 
reported extensively on the economic consequences of the disease both during the 
outbreak and in the period following the outbreak: 
SARS is not just a health problem. As fear and shutdowns curtail travel, it 
is devastating the Asian economy. It may seem heartless to look at a 
terrifying disease, for which there is neither a vaccine nor a cure, through 
the lens of cash. But as widespread suffering has failed to persuade leaders 
in both poor and rich countries to finance public health, perhaps an 
economic argument will carry more weight.14 
 
In fact, in the two months after the SARS outbreak, the economic frame became 
the dominant frame. Newspapers reported extensively on losses suffered by airlines and 
the retail and manufacturing sectors. In October, there was a renewed interest in SARS in 
the media because it was anticipated that SARS might reemerge during the influenza 
                                                            
12 Nicholas D. Kristof, “Lock Them Up,” The New York Times, May 2, 2003. 
 
13 National Intelligence Council, “SARS: Down but Still a Threat,” Intelligence 
Community Assessment, Washington, D.C. 2003. Available online at 
http://www.dni.gov/nic/PDF_GIF_otherprod/sarsthreat/56797book.pdf, last accessed 
October 2, 2010. 
 
14 Editorial, “The Cost of SARS,” The New York Times, May 1, 2003.  
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season. News stories that gave information on preparedness efforts of the CDC, the 
WHO, virologists, and laboratories around the world were published in newspapers. At 
this point in time, there was a renewed emphasis on the discussion on SARS with a focus 
on scientific and medical issues. 
             SARS emerged in the aftermath of the events of September 11, 2011, the anthrax 
scare, and growing concern among policy makers in the United States about the 
malevolent use of microbes by rogue states and terrorist groups. The security frame, 
however, was not one of the dominant frames during or after the SARS outbreak. 
Newspapers published a few news stories that called SARS a threat to regional and 
national security in Asia, and in the United States some public health officials and 
scientists raised fears about bioterrorism. 15  Some news reports called for greater 
surveillance “to protect against the growing danger of potentially devastating pandemics, 
either occurring naturally or because of bioterrorism.”16 According to the Washington-
based Jamestown Foundation, at least one Russian scientist has suggested a link between 
SARS and bio-war, but the mainstream media did not pick up this story.17 In other words, 
                                                            
15 Donald A. Henderson, “Bioterrorism as a Public Health Threat,” Emerging Infectious    
Diseases 4, 3 (1998): 488-92. 
 
16 Rob Stein, “SARS Prompts WHO to Seek More Power to Fight Disease; Proposals 
Include Visits to Nations Threatened by an Epidemic,” The Washington Post, May18, 
2003. 
 
17 Allan Cantwell Jr., “SARS, Bioterrorism and the Media,” New Dawn 79 (2003): 
79.Available online at 
http://www.newdawnmagazine.com/articles/SARS,%20Bioterrorism%20and%20the%20
Media.html, last accessed October 10, 2010. 
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the mainstream media in the United States did not link SARS with bioterrorism. In fact, 
there were only a few stories that framed SARS as a security threat. For example: 
SARS, a respiratory infection with an overall death rate of 11 
percent and one 50 percent or higher among people 60 and older, is 
of paramount concern. The longstanding threat of bioterrorism 
turned real with the deliberate release of anthrax spores in 2001. 
When SARS suddenly appeared, there was speculation that it was 
bioterrorism. Experts dismissed that. No one was "smart enough to 
invent a SARS from scratch," said Dr. Joshua Lederberg, a Nobel 
Prize-winning microbiologist. Now, he said, "SARS may end up 
being a biological weapon. No one knows when or where the next 
plague may be from a newly discovered infectious agent or a 
natural mutation that produces a new version of an old microbe. It 
may even escape from a laboratory."18 
 
 The examples from news reports cited above show that the media not only 
extensively covered the SARS outbreak but it also framed SARS in different ways. The 
volume and nature of media messages therefore needs to be examined to understand its 
impact on public perception and awareness of SARS. The remainder of this chapter is 
divided into four parts: The first part presents the results of the content analysis of 
newspaper reports on SARS. The second presents an analysis of public opinion data 
collected by the Harvard School of Public Health (project on the Public and Biological 
Security) and the Robert Wood Johnson Foundation. These data were retrieved from the 
Kaiser Family Foundation’s Health Poll Search database. Additional data were collected 
from surveys conducted by the Pew Research Foundation. The third section reports 
correlation analysis of media coverage about SARS with survey data. Finally, the fourth 
                                                            
18 Lawrence K. Altman, “Where is the Next Plague?” The New York Times, November 
14, 2003. 
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section discusses the effects of agenda setting and framing on the public’s evaluation of 
different frames relevant to SARS.  
  
4.1. Content Analysis of Newspaper Reports 
 
        To investigate in detail the prominence and content of news coverage of SARS, I 
conducted a content analysis of news stories about SARS published in The New York 
Times and The Washington Post. Using the Lexis-Nexis academic database, I collected 
news articles between March 1, 2003 and December 30, 2004. The search stipulated that 
the term “SARS” must be present in the “headline or lead paragraph” with “at least three 
occurrences” in the article to ensure that SARS was the focus of the article. Obituaries 
were excluded from the search process. The New York Times returned 550 stories in the 
time period March 16, 2003 and June 26, 2004, and The Washington Post returned 370 
stories between March 20, 2003 and May 5, 2004. Because the stories returned by Lexis-
Nexis were not ordered in any way other than by date, every fourth story was included in 
the pool. A total of 224 news stories were coded. The stories were identified, sampled, 
and coded for different frames (biomedical, economic, human rights, and security) 
included in the stories. Table 4.1 shows the total number of articles (coded) for each 
newspaper and for the two newspapers combined. In further analysis, news data from 
both newspapers were combined. 
  Each news articles was coded at the sentence level. Each frame was considered to 
be a variable and was assigned a numerical value based on the number of times the frame 
was mentioned in a given news article. For example, if the biomedical frame was 
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mentioned twice, it was given a score of 2. This numerical score was then converted into 
a weighted measure for each frame, which is defined as the ratio of the number of times a 
given frame is mentioned in the news article and the total number of sentences in the 
news article. The weighted measure was used primarily for two reasons: 1) to normalize 
the measure so that it is comparable across news articles of varying lengths, and 2) to 
allow comparison of the relative scores across frames in a given news article. 
 
Table 4.1: Data Sources and Overall Coverage 
Newspaper Number of Articles Start date End date 
The New York Times 136 3/16/03 6/26/04 
The Washington Post 88 3/20/03 5/1/04 
Overall  224 3/16/03 6/26/04 
              
The stories also were coded as follows for the region or country that was the focus 
of the story: USA, countries other than USA, global impact, or geographic region not 
mentioned. As SARS spread to different geographic regions of the world, local and 
international media covered the epidemic. Table 4.2 shows the frequency of the analyzed 
articles that were related to each geographic location. Both newspapers published more 
stories about the impact of SARS on Asia and countries other than the United States to 
which SARS had spread than about its impact on the United States. This fact is important 
in understanding the public reaction to SARS in the United States. More than half the 
stories in both the newspapers discussed the impact of the spread of SARS in Asia and 
Canada. Only 26% of the total coverage discussed the impact of SARS on the United 
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States. Seventeen percent of the total news coverage, however, discussed the global 
impact of SARS in an increasingly interconnected world. 
 
Table 4.2:  Frequency of News Content by Geographic Location 
Newspaper 
Geographic Location 
United 
States 
Other 
countries 
Global 
impact 
Not 
mentioned 
Start 
date 
End 
date 
The New York 
Times 
36 
(25.2%) 
83 
(58.0%) 
22 
(15.4%) 2 (1.4%) 3/16/03 6/26/04 
 The Washington 
Post 
24 
(28.9%) 
41 
(49.4%) 
18 
(21.7%) 0 (0.0%) 3/20/03 5/1/04 
Overall 60 (26.5%) 
124 
(54.9%) 
40 
(17.7%) 2 (0.9%) 3/16/03 6/26/04 
 
 4.2. Data Analysis: The Mean Ratios of Four Coverage Types/Newspapers   
 
The data were analyzed using descriptive statistics as well as comparative 
statistics such as Analysis of Variance (ANOVA). All analyses were conducted using 
Excel and SPSS. The data were analyzed in great detail to evaluate the pattern of 
coverage and to understand changes in media coverage over time. News data overall (The 
New York Times + The Washington Post) were analyzed for type of coverage (Table 
4.3), mean ratios of coverage type for regions coded (Table 4.4), and comparison of 
coverage during and after the outbreak (Table 4.5). To investigate the monthly and 
weekly trends in newspaper coverage of SARS, the data were further analyzed using 
monthly (Appendix Table A4.1; Figure 4.1) and weekly intervals (Appendix Table A4.2; 
Figure 4.2; Table 4.6). 
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           Because the news articles were coded for content or type of coverage and 
weighted for length, the news data were further analyzed with a focus on different types 
of coverage. Table 4.3 displays the mean ratios for all four types of coverage. The 
biomedical and economic frames were the most prominent in news reports about SARS. 
 
Table 4.3: Mean Ratios for Each Coverage Type in both Newspapers Combined 
Number of 
Articles 
Frame   
Biomedical Economic Security Human Rights Start date End date 
224 0.366 0.154 0.040 0.026 3/16/03 6/26/04 
 
Mean ratios of the four coverage types also were computed for each region for the 
overall sampled period (Table 4.4). The biomedical frame was the dominant frame in 
news reports that discussed the impact of SARS on the United States and on other 
countries. The economic frame was the second most prominent frame. The security and 
human rights frames were less important.  
 
 Table 4.4: Mean Ratios for Coverage Type by Region   
Region Biomedical Economic Security Human Rights 
Time Interval 
USA 0.27 0.17 0.05 0.06 3/16/03–6/26/04 
Other 
countries 0.36 0.19 0.04 0.02 
3/20/03–
5/1/04 
Global 
impact 0.46 0.09 0.04 0.00 
3/16/03–
6/26/04 
Not 
mentioned 0.67 0.00 0.00 0.00 
3/16/03–
6/26/04 
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Further analysis of the media data on SARS included comparing the four frames 
over the entire time period to determine whether the media coverage focused primarily on 
one of the four frames or on a few or all of the four frames and determining if there was a 
difference in the relative weight of these four frames during the SARS outbreak and after 
it was over. The analysis was performed by breaking the total sampling period into two 
phases: the period of outbreak (March 16–June 30, 2003) and the period after the 
outbreak (July 1, 2003–June 26, 2004). 
A one-way ANOVA was used to test for differences in the ratios among the four 
frames over the entire sampling period, during the outbreak, and after the outbreak (Table 
4.5). During the entire sampling period, the least squares mean values were 0.37, 0.15, 
0.04, and 0.03 for the biomedical, economic, security, and human rights ratios, 
respectively. The least squares mean is the best linear-unbiased estimate of the 
subpopulation means (i.e., the means for each frame). It thus represents the relative 
weight of each frame in media coverage. Comparison among the least square means 
values of the four frames revealed that the biomedical ratio was the most prominent 
frame (p < 0.0001). The economic ratio was the second highest, and it was significantly 
higher than the security and human rights ratios (p < 0.0001). Thus, all pairwise 
comparisons are significant at the p<0001 level except for the comparison of the amount 
of human rights and security coverage (which did not differ significantly) and the 
medical and economic coverage (which differed with a significance level of p<.002).  
The human rights ratio and security ratios did not significantly differ, and both were 
minimal compared to the economic and biomedical ratios. 
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Table 4.5: Comparison of the Four Frames over the Entire Sampling Period 
 
Least Square Mean of the Four Frames 
Sampled Period Economic Human Right Medical Security
Entire Sampled Period 3/16/03-6/26/04 0.15 0.03 0.37 0.04 
During Outbreak (3/16/03-6/30/03) 0.15 0.03 0.38 0.05 
Post Outbreak (7/1/03-6/26/04) 0.18 0.00 0.32 0.02 
 
To determine whether the relative weight of these four frames in media coverage 
showed similar patterns during the SARS outbreak and after it, the analysis was 
performed separately for these two periods. During the SARS outbreak (March 16, 2003–
June 6, 2003) the least squares  mean values of the biomedical, economic, security, and 
human rights ratios were 0.38, 0.15, 0.05, and 0.03, respectively. The biomedical frame 
again was the dominant frame, and its ratio was significantly higher than those of the 
other three frames (p < 0.0001). The economic ratio was the second highest, and it was 
significantly higher than the security and human rights ratios. The security and human 
rights ratios were both minimal and did not differ significantly. During the post-outbreak 
period (July 1, 2003–June 24, 2004), the same relative ranks were maintained. The only 
difference in the post-outbreak period was that the least squares mean value for the 
biomedical frame decreased slightly (from 0.38 to 0.32) and the value for the economic 
ratio increased slightly (from 0.15 to 0.18). These changes in value occurred because 
media coverage shifted from the biomedical issues to the economic fallout of the disease 
as estimates of losses were made after the outbreak. 
Overall, for both phases the biomedical frame was the predominant frame, 
followed by the economic frame. Both security and human rights frames were less 
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significant in the news coverage of SARS, with the human rights ratio being the smallest 
among the four frames. 
 
4.3. Changes in Media Coverage over Time 
 
 The changes in media coverage in terms of the number of articles published 
(including ratios of the four frames) were summarized using monthly and weekly 
intervals over the course of the outbreak period to examine the trends at a much more 
detailed level. During the entire sampling period, there were on average five articles 
about SARS per week. The period from April 13 to May 24, 2003 was one of “saturation 
coverage.”19 During this period, the level of coverage jumped to four times the average 
level, with each newspaper publishing as many as 25 articles about the spread of SARS. 
           Figure 4.1 show the monthly trend of changes in frames. The SARS timeline of 
key events is also plotted in the graph to show the key events that triggered a change in 
the nature of media coverage. The figure illustrates that the biomedical and economic 
frames were the two dominant frames in media coverage. In contrast, the security and 
human rights frames were much less prominent in the media coverage. On March 12, 
2003, the WHO issued its first global alert about SARS. At the same time, the biomedical 
frame dominated about half of the media coverage (ratio = 0.48) over the entire month. 
                                                            
19 Daniel Drache and Seth Feldman, “Media Coverage of the 2003 Toronto SARS 
Outbreak: A Report on the Role of Press in a Public Crisis,” in Robarts Centre Research 
Papers (Toronto: York University Press, 2003), 1–18. Available online at 
http://www.yorku.ca/robarts/projects/global/papers/gcf_mediacoverageSARSto.pdf, last 
accessed October 10, 2010. 
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When news about the biomedical aspects of the disease declined, the economic impact 
and the losses incurred by countries due to SARS began to be widely reported. By the 
beginning of June, the economic frame exceeded the biomedical frame and became the 
prominent frame for about 2 months. After the beginning of August 2003, the biomedical 
frame again exceeded the economic frame and remained the dominant frame throughout 
the remainder of the study period. The monthly average of the biomedical, economic, 
security, and human rights ratios were 0.11–0.52, 0.00–0.43, 0.00–0.08, and 0.00–0.04, 
respectively. Notably, the biomedical ratio was at its lowest levels when the economic 
ratio climbed to its highest levels during one month beginning on July 16, 2003. The 
decline in SARS-related biomedical news could have been triggered by the WHO’s 
announcement in July that SARS had officially been contained worldwide and that no 
new cases were being reported. As SARS was no longer a health emergency, the media 
coverage shifted its focus from biomedical coverage to the economic impact of the 
disease. 
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        Figure 4.1: Changes in Media Coverage over Time at Monthly Intervals 
    
   The same analysis was conducted at weekly intervals, and the change over time 
plot (Figure 4.2) clearly shows three sub-periods (Appendix Table A4.2). The first phase 
encompassed the period of intense outbreak and rapid spread of the disease from Asia to 
other parts of the world. The biomedical frame was the dominant frame during this entire 
period. The second phase took place from the second week of June to the end of August. 
During this time period, both the CDC and the WHO began to lift their travel advisories 
against countries in Asia, as no new SARS cases were reported. Despite the lack of new 
cases, the media continued to actively report on SARS, particularly the economic and 
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political impact of the disease. During this phase, there was a shift in media framing and 
the economic frame became the dominant one. In this phase, the mean ratio for the 
economic frame was the highest, and it exceeded the biomedical frame. In both the first 
and second phases, few stories reinforced the human rights and disease linkage or framed 
SARS as a security issue. The third phase in this analysis began around the end of August 
2003 and ended in June 2004. During this period, biomedical issues once again 
dominated the media stories about SARS. This is because most media stories discussed 
the efforts of the WHO, the CDC, and scientific committees around the world to be 
prepared in case SARS returned in the winter to coincide with influenza.20 
 
                                                            
20 Karen S. Monaghan, SARS: Down but Still a Threat, National Intelligence Council. 
August 2003.Available online at, http://www.odci.gov/nic, last accessed July 12, 2009; 
WHO Scientific Research Advisory Committee on Severe Acute Respiratory Syndrome 
(SARS); Report of the First Meeting, Geneva, Switzerland, 20-21, October, 2003. 
Available online at  http://www.who.int/csr/resources/publications/SRAC-
CDSCSRGAR2004_16.pdf, last Accessed August 10, 2010; Stacey Knobler, Adel A. F. 
Mahmoud, Alison  Mack, Laura  Sivitz,  and Kelly Oberholtzer, eds, Learning from 
SARS: Preparing for the Next Disease Outbreak, Workshop Summary, Board on Global 
Health, Institute of Medicine (Washington D.C.: National Academies Press, 2004).  
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Figure 4.2: Changes in Media Coverage over Time at Weekly Intervals 
 
 
The media coverage over time (weekly trend) was further analyzed using ANOVA 
followed by Tukey’s test. The test indicated that the biomedical frame was the dominant 
frame during the first phase (Table 4.6). The economic and biomedical frames were 
equally prominent during the second sub-period, as no significant differences were found 
between them (p = 0.7194); the least squares mean value for the economic frame, 
however, was higher than that for the biomedical frame (0.32 vs. 0.25). Significant 
differences existed between each pairwise comparison, except for security versus human 
rights.  
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 Table 4.6: Comparison of Four Frames during the Three Phases (Weekly Trend) 
Least Square Mean of the Four Frames 
Sampled Period Economic Human Right Biomedical Security 
Sub-Period 1 (3/16–6/7/03) 0.13 0.04 0.38 0.05 
Sub-Period 2 (6/8/03–
8/30/03) 0.32 0.00 0.25 0.01 
Sub-Period 3 (8/30/03–
6/26/04) 0.13 0.00 0.36 0.02 
 
 
4.4. Public Opinion Analysis 
 
The public opinion surveys were drawn from a secondary database corresponding 
to the time period in which these news stories were published. Public opinion data were 
collected mainly from the I Poll data bank, Polling the Nation, and the Health Poll Search 
of the Kaiser Family Foundation. All three are databases contain polling data on health-
related issues from major polling organizations such as Gallup, The Pew Research 
Center, and the Harvard School of Public Health. All survey results are based on 
representative national samples of adults aged 18 or older. With very few exceptions, the 
sample sizes of these surveys were at least 1,000 respondents. Shifts in public opinion 
towards infectious diseases were assessed by considering exact and similarly worded 
questions about issues related to SARS.21 Specifically, these questions measured the 
                                                            
21 Shirley Ho, Dominique Brossard, and Dietram A. Scheufele, “The Polls—Trends 
Public Reactions to Global Health Threats and Infectious Diseases,” Public Opinion 
Quarterly 71, 4 (2007): 671-92. 
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following: a) willingness to support harsh public health measures such as quarantine to 
curb the spread of disease; b) precautionary steps taken and behavioral changes made in 
personal lives due to fear of the disease; and c) concerns about the spread and likelihood 
of contracting the disease. Positive responses to these questions would indicate a higher 
level of awareness and concern about the disease in response to media coverage of 
SARS. 
 The data were analyzed using descriptive statistics. A z-test was used to compare 
the proportion of subjects who responded positively or negatively in each survey. Survey 
responses were grouped together to form positive or negative responses. For example, 
survey responses such as “very worried” and “somewhat worried” or “extremely likely” 
and “very likely” were grouped together. All analyses were carried out using Excel and 
SPSS. Z-test scores > the absolute value of 1.96 at the 95% confidence interval were 
considered to be statistically significant. 
 Four sets of questions (see Appendix Table A4.3) were examined in the category 
of willingness to change behavior and support quarantine. All four surveys were 
conducted in April 2003 and repeated in May 2003. Three sets of questions were about 
the public’s willingness to support quarantine. More than 90% of the surveyed population 
supported quarantine and over 80% of the sampled population did not see it as a threat to 
their personal rights. Moreover, the percentage of responses (positive or negative) did not 
vary much when the surveys were repeated in May (± 2%). In the fourth survey, 
respondents were asked specifically if they were more likely to seek medical help if they 
or their families experienced flu-like symptoms. Sixty-nine percent of the surveyed 
population gave a positive response. According to z-test results, a significant number of 
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people supported quarantine. This likely is related to the increased news coverage 
presenting SARS as a highly infectious disease both prior to and at the time the surveys 
were conducted. 
  Nine survey questions (see Appendix Table A4.4) related to actual behavioral 
changes made also were examined. The respondents were surveyed between April 11 and 
13, 2003. The same sets of questions were repeated in another survey conducted between 
May 2 and 6, 2003. The average percentage of positive responses dropped from 12% to 
8%, and the average percentage of negative responses increased from 87% to 91% 
between surveys in April and May. A significantly higher percentage of people did not 
change their behavior. Thus, news of the spread of SARS did not bring about changes in 
the daily behavior of people. This may be partly attributed to the fact that news of the 
SARS outbreak was reported mainly in China, Southeast Asia, and Canada. In the United 
States, only eight people were confirmed to have SARS based on laboratory tests, and no 
one died from it. Thus, very few people in the United States contracted SARS. This was 
in sharp contrast to the large number of reported cases in other countries. 
Three sets of questions (see Appendix Table A4.5) were examined to evaluate the 
concern among Americans about the spread of SARS. The first set of questions asked 
respondents if they were worried that they or someone in their family would be exposed 
to SARS. The first survey was conducted between April 5 and 6, 2003, and it was 
repeated every subsequent week in the months of April and May. The surveys conducted 
in April and May showed that on average 32% of the population was worried about being 
exposed to SARS. This indicates a reasonably high level of concern. Another survey with 
very similar wording was repeated in November 2003, and it indicated that 40% of 
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people were worried. By this time media reporting about SARS had dropped 
considerably. However, this survey coincided with the influenza season and people were 
concerned about the return of SARS or a related illness. 
The second set of survey responses analyzed came from surveys conducted in 
December 2003 and repeated in November 2004. The surveys asked people if they were 
concerned that they or members of their family would be exposed to SARS. 28% of 
respondents feared SARS in December 2003. However, the numbers declined to 14% in 
the December 2004 survey. Both of these surveys were conducted when the coverage of 
SARS had declined considerably. 
A third set of questions was studied to assess changes in perception about the 
threat posed by the new disease from Asia. Respondents were questioned about the 
likelihood that they or their families might actually be exposed to SARS. The first set of 
surveys was conducted between April 11 and 15, 2003. In this survey, 25% of the people 
felt that SARS was likely to spread. The percentage of positive responses declined 
steadily to 14% (April 25–30, 2003), 16% (May 2–3, 2003), 8% (June 18– to July2, 
2003), 8% (January 7–11, 2004), and 7% (August 25–29, 2004). The high level of initial 
concern can be attributed to the media reports of people dying from SARS in Asia and 
that there was no cure or vaccine to protect people from SARS. The numbers would have 
been significantly higher had the disease spread to the United States and infected a large 
number of people. 
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4.5. Relationship between Media Coverage and Public Opinion 
 
To understand the relationship between changes in media coverage of SARS and 
changes in public opinion, further correlation analyses were conducted. The three public 
opinion measures studied were willingness to support harsh public health measures, 
actual behavioral changes made, and recognition of SARS as a threat. 
            Public opinion polls that asked people whether or not they were willing to support 
harsh public health measures such as quarantine were first conducted in April 2003 and 
repeated in May 2003. To examine the correlation between media frames and public 
opinion, news coverage data from the corresponding time period (March 16, 2003 to June 
5, 2003) were included in the analysis. A 5-day interval was chosen to examine the 
changes over time in the two sets of data. The percentage of positive responses within the 
four frames of media coverage is shown in Figure 4.3(also see Appendix A4.6). There 
was no change in public opinion when the survey was repeated in May. As far as the 
media coverage is concerned, the biomedical ratio decreased from 0.53 to 0.37. The 
economic ratio showed a modest increase between April and May but then dropped to its 
original level of 0.11. The human rights and security ratios were very small and changed 
very little. These results show that changes in frames did not correlate with changes in 
public opinion. The overall support, however, for harsh measures such as quarantine and 
isolation was very high and stable at 95% during the sampled period. Thus, the total ratio 
of coverage with a focus on biomedical aspects and economic implications of the disease 
seems to have influenced public opinion. 
112 
 
 
Note: Q1. Suppose you were exposed to someone who had SARS but you didn't know if 
you had the disease. Would you be willing to be quarantined in your home for 10 days in 
order to prevent spreading the disease? Q2. Suppose you were exposed to someone who 
had SARS but you didn't know if you had the disease. Would you be willing to be 
quarantined for 2 or 3 weeks in a health care facility to prevent spreading the disease? 
Q3. Recently, President George W. Bush signed an executive order adding SARS to the 
list of diseases for which people can be quarantined. Do you think this order threatens 
your personal rights and freedoms? Q4. Having heard about SARS, would you say you 
are much more likely to seek medical help, a little more likely to seek help, or it has not 
affected whether you would seek help if you or a family member got flu-like symptoms? 
 
Figure 4.3: Changes in Media Coverage and Willingness to Change Behavior 
 
 
            To examine the relationship between media coverage and public opinion data 
about actual behavioral changes made in response to SARS, a total of nine survey 
questions were analyzed. A table was constructed displaying mean ratios from media 
coverage and mean percentage of positive/negative responses in 5-day intervals 
(Appendix Table A4.7 and Figure 4.4). The questions asked respondents if they had taken 
any precautionary measures or made changes in their behavior to prevent SARS. For 
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seven out of nine questions, the mean percentage of “yes” answers dropped from 12% to 
8% between April and May when the surveys were administered. During the same time 
period, the biomedical ratio decreased from 0.53 to 0.37. The economic ratio first 
increased and then dropped to the original level of 0.11. The human rights and security 
ratios were very small and showed very little change. Changes in public opinion seemed 
to correspond to a decrease in biomedical news, as it was the dominant frame when the 
first round of survey questions was administered. Moreover, all nine questions were 
largely related to health and biomedical issues. It is reasonable to conclude, therefore, 
that the public response to these questions reflected the change in the biomedical ratio.  
To examine the relationship between media coverage and public perception of 
SARS as a threat, a table of mean ratios from media coverage and mean percentage of 
positive responses in the threat category at weekly intervals was constructed (Appendix 
Table A4.8). The Pearson correlation coefficient was computed for the first question in 
the “threat” category for the period between March 30 and May 24, 2003 because many 
surveys were administered during this period. None of the correlations was significant. 
The percentage of positive responses regarding worry over being exposed to SARS, 
however, had the highest correlation with the economic ratio. The level of worry showed 
a very small negative correlation with the biomedical frame (Table 4.7 and Figure 4.5). 
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Note: Q1. Have you avoided international air travel? Q2. Have you avoided people you 
think may have recently visited Asia? Q3. Have you avoided Asian restaurants or stores? 
Q4. Have you used a disinfectant at home or at work to protect against SARS? Q5. Have 
you talked with your doctor about health issues related to SARS? Q6. Have you avoided 
public events? Q7. Have you consulted a website for information about how to protect 
yourself against SARS? Q8. Have you or someone in the family purchased a face mask? 
Q9. Have you carried something to clean any object you think might have come in 
contact with someone who has SARS? 
 
Figure 4.4: Changes in Media Coverage and Behavioral Changes Made  
 
                   
Table 4.7: Correlation between Worry about Exposure to SARS and Media Coverage 
Frame                                                            Pearson correlation coefficients (p-
value) 
Biomedical –0.2087 (p = 0.6534) 
Economic 0.6542 (p = 0.1109) 
Security 0.40198 (p = 0.3714) 
Human Rights  –0.21427 (p = 0.6445) 
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Note: Q1. How worried are you that you or someone in your family will be exposed to 
SARS? Q2. How worried are you that you or someone in your family will be exposed to 
SARS? Q3. Do you think that SARS is very likely to affect you or someone in your 
immediate family in the next 12 months? 
 
Figure 4.5: Changes in Media Coverage and Perception of SARS as a Threat 
 
 
 4.6. Relationship between Media Coverage and Public Opinion (Coverage on United 
States)         
The above analysis did not reveal any significant correlation between changes in 
media coverage and public response to SARS. To determine if news coverage about 
SARS that focused on its impact on the United States had a higher correlation with the 
survey question assessing perception of the threat from SARS, Pearson correlation 
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coefficients were computed ( see Appendix Table A4.9). None of the correlations were 
significant. The percentage of positive responses indicating the level of worry about 
being exposed to SARS, however, showed a small positive correlation with the 
biomedical frame (r = 0.2456) and the economic frame (r = 0.2267) and a small negative 
correlation with the human rights frame (Table 4.8 ). 
 
Table 4.8: Correlation between Worry about Exposure to SARS and Media Reports of the 
Impact of SARS on the United States 
Frame                                                              Pearson correlation coefficients (p-value) 
Biomedical  0.2456 
(p = 0.5956) 
Economic 0.2267 
(p = 0.6250) 
Security 0.0793 
(p = 0.8658) 
Human Rights –0.2317 
(p = 0.6172) 
 
 
4.7. Discussion and Conclusion 
 
 In this study, I assessed whether news coverage during and after the outbreak of 
SARS increased the anxiety of Americans about the disease and led to support for 
measures such as quarantine.22 In March and the beginning of April in 2003, the story 
                                                            
22 Robert J. Blendon and John M. Benson, “The Public’s Response to SARS in Toronto 
and United States,” Clinical Infectious Diseases 38 (2004): 925–31; Robert J. Blendon, 
C.M. DesRoches, John M. Benson, M.J. Herrmann, E. Mackie, and K.J. Weldon, 
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was developing and being brought to the attention of the public. Extensive reporting 
about how SARS had affected various parts of the world evoked public concern about the 
disease, and this concern was evident in many surveys administered in April 2003. One-
third of the respondents were gravely concerned about the disease. The responses 
(willingness to support quarantine and perception of threat) did not change much between 
when the surveys were first administered in April 2003 and when they were repeated in 
May 2003.23 While high percentages of people were worried in May, the number of 
positive responses did not increase in May. The time period from April to May was one 
of “saturation coverage.” There was a steady decline both in news coverage and in public 
perception of threat of the disease after that time. 
In this study I also sought to understand if certain ways of representing or framing 
the disease evoked greater concern among the public, which in turn would lead them to 
make behavioral changes in their personal lives and support harsher public health 
measures such as quarantine. The results of the analysis substantiate the hypothesis that 
frames represented predominantly in the media will influence public opinion. The 
correlation analysis revealed a correlation between the economic frame and the 
percentage of positive responses expressing worry about being exposed to SARS. SARS 
caused significant economic losses in Asia and in countries linked commercially to Asia 
and Canada. The economic frame was the second most prevalent frame throughout the 
                                                                                                                                                                                 
Working Papers Project on the Public and Biological Security Harvard School of Public 
Health: Americans’ response to SARS (I), April 29, 2003. Available online at 
http://www.hsph.harvard.edu/research/horp/files/WP9SARSUS1.pdf, last accessed 
October 11, 2010. 
 
23Ibid. 
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sampled period (Tables 4.5 and 4.6). A very small negative correlation was found 
between the biomedical frame (predominant frame) and overall worry about the disease. 
This can be attributed to the fact that the actual number of people infected with SARS 
was very low in the United States. According to the CDC website, from November 2002 
through July 2003 a total of 8,098 people worldwide became sick with SARS that was 
accompanied by either pneumonia or respiratory distress syndrome (probable cases).24 
Through July 2003, 192 cases had been reported in the United States, including 159 
suspected and 33 probable cases.25 Of the 33 probable cases, only 8 were confirmed in 
the laboratory as SARS infections. There were no reported cases of SARS-related deaths 
in the United States. Another explanation for why the biomedical frame did not increase 
worry about the disease could be that while the media reported a lot on the biomedical 
aspects of the disease, it also described how the United States public health system was 
equipped and well prepared to control the disease following the distribution of anthrax-
tainted mail in 2001.26 Table 4.2 clearly shows that close to 50% of total stories focused 
on the impact of SARS on countries outside the United States; only 26% of the total 
coverage discussed the possible and actual impact on the United States. 
                                                            
24 Centers for Disease Control and Prevention. Fact Sheet: Basic information about 
SARS. May 3, 2005. Available online at http://www.cdc.gov/ncidod/sars/factsheet.htm, 
last accessed August 10, 2009. 
 
25 Ibid. 
 
26 World Health Organization. SARS: Status of the Outbreak and Lessons for Immediate 
Future, Communicable Disease Surveillance and Response. Geneva, Switzerland. May 
20, 2003. Available online at http://www.who.int/csr/media/sars_wha.pdf, last accessed 
September 27, 2009. 
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 A separate correlation analysis was conducted for stories that discussed the 
impact of SARS in the United States and levels of worry about the disease (Table 4.8). In 
this analysis both the biomedical and economic frames showed a small positive 
correlation with people’s worry that they or their families might be exposed to SARS. 
This finding further confirms the second hypothesis that biomedical and economic frames, 
when predominant, will influence people to support inconvenient measures such as 
quarantine and isolation. This is because these issues are of personal relevance to them. 
Peoples’ worry about being exposed to the disease will make them support quarantine. 
Public opinion polls indicated strong public support for the use of quarantine when 
required. The overall support for harsh biomedical intervention strategies such as 
quarantine and isolation was very high and stable at 95% during the sampling period 
(Appendix Table A4.3). The news media emphasized the severity of the highly infectious 
disease and its consequences to human health. When respondents were asked if they had 
made changes in their behavior or taken precautionary steps to prevent SARS, the 
responses were mixed. Few Americans purchased face masks or consulted a doctor. 
However, many consulted a website, used disinfectant at home, and avoided international 
travel and contact with people who they thought had traveled to Asia. These responses 
appeared to follow changes in the biomedical frame (Appendix Table A4.4). Although 
SARS did not become a public health crisis in the United States, the country experienced 
an economic impact of the outbreak. Not only were the direct costs of quarantine, and 
screening at airports significant, but many airlines, tour operators, and companies that 
had offshore offices and manufacturing units in Asia suffered considerable economic 
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losses.27 The economic coverage became more prominent as these losses mounted, and in 
turn a corresponding worry and increased concern over the disease occurred. The security 
and human rights frames were not prominent and people did not see them as relevant.  
Thus, I conclude that framing and agenda setting are important in bringing the 
public’s attention to issues and in creating an initial awareness of the issue. However, it 
seems likely that the public's response is mediated by perceptions of relevance. In this 
case, successful efforts to limit the spread of SARS in the United States may have 
reduced Americans' perceptions that the biomedical frame was relevant, compared with 
the economic frame. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                            
27 Karen S. Monaghan, Intelligence Community Assessment: SARS Down but Still a 
Threat. Office of the Director of National Intelligence. August 23, 2003. Available online 
at http://ww.dni.gov/nic/special_sarsthreat.html, last accessed August 10, 2010. 
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V. CASE STUDY: AVIAN FLU 
While Severe Acute Respiratory Syndrome (SARS) received immense media 
coverage because it was new and had tremendous potential for human-to-human 
transmission, another more lethal virus, avian influenza A (also called H5N1), and its 
potential to cause a human influenza pandemic garnered considerable media attention 
between 2004 and 2007. H5N1 is particularly contagious among birds and therefore is 
also known as bird flu. H5N1 was first identified in poultry in Guangdong Province, 
China in 1996 and in humans in Hong Kong in 1997.1 It was only at the end of 2003 and 
in early 2004 that the virus was reported in poultry, wild birds, cats, and some other 
mammals in other countries.2 In several countries in Southeast Asia and China, cases of 
human infections were also reported.3 Most infections in humans, however, resulted from 
direct contact with infected poultry, and no human-to-human transmission of the virus 
occurred.4 By the summer of 2005, H5N1 began spreading beyond Asia.5 Although the 
                                                            
1 WHO, Global Alert and Response (GAR): H5N1 Avian Influenza: Timeline of Major 
Events. Available online at 
http://www.who.int/csr/disease/avian_influenza/2010_10_20_h5n1_avian_influenza_tim
eline_updates.pdf, last accessed November 11, 2010. 
 
2 Ibid. 
 
3 Ibid. 
 
4 CDC: Key Facts about Avian Influenza (Bird Flu) and Avian Influenza A (H5N1) 
Virus. Available online at http://www.cdc.gov/flu/avian/gen-info/facts.htm, last accessed 
August 9, 2011. 
 
5 WHO Global Alert and Response (GAR): H5N1 avian Influenza: Timeline of Major 
events. Available online at 
http://www.who.int/csr/disease/avian_influenza/2010_10_20_h5n1_avian_influenza_tim
eline_updates.pdf, last accessed November 8, 2010. 
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United States experienced only few incidents, scientists and public health officials in the 
United States feared that if the virus mutated to allow for transmission among humans, it 
could have devastating results.6 The big worry was that H5N1 might have the capacity to 
undergo antigenic shift, which refers to the swapping of genetic material with human 
influenza viruses to produce a highly pathogenic microbe transmissible from person to 
person.7  The potential for antigenic shift was real, because influenza viruses mutate 
rapidly and can acquire genes from viruses that infect other animal species.8 Laboratory 
analysis of the H5N1 virus samples from 2004 from Vietnam showed that they were 
different from virus samples from 1997 and 2003 from Hong Kong, which indicates that 
the virus had mutated.9 The experience with SARS had shown the public that in an 
increasingly interconnected world, the next infectious disease could travel fast from one 
country to another. Both the print and visual media covered stories about avian flu and 
shaped public perception about it. 
                                                            
6 Julian Palmore, “A Clear and Present Danger to International Security: Highly 
Pathogenic Avian Influenza,” Defense and Security Analysis 22, 2 (2006): 111-21. 
 
7 Eileen Salinsky, “Tick–Tock: Preparing for the Next Influenza Pandemic,” National 
Health Policy forum, Background Paper, August 24, 2004: 3-22. This information is also 
available in a WHO Fact sheet for Avian Influenza, available online at 
http://www.who.int/mediacentre/factsheets/avian_influenza/en/, last accessed November 
11, 2010. 
 
8 Ibid. 
 
9WHO, Global Alert and Response (GAR): Avian Influenza A (H5N1) Infection in 
Humans: Urgent Need to Eliminate the Animal Reservoir-Update 5, January 22, 2004. 
Available online at http://www.who.int/csr/don/2004_01_22/en/index.html, last accessed 
August 22, 2011. 
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Content analysis of media reports has shown that news about avian flu was 
framed in several ways, including biomedical aspects, economic consequences, security 
concerns, and human rights issues. In the initial phase of the outbreak, the biomedical 
frame was dominant in the news media. In the year 2004, bird flu was found in many 
countries in Asia. As it continued its geographic expansion, it was also “undergoing 
genetic diversity expansion.”10 The public health agencies in the United States began 
monitoring it very closely, and the media in the United States began extensive reporting 
on the subject. The media reports sought to understand the general biomedical aspects of 
the disease and urged the development of flu vaccines and preparedness against the 
disease: 
Health authorities in Vietnam are investigating 30 suspected cases 
of bird flu in people. Fourteen have died, most of them children 
under age 1. In six cases, laboratory testing identified a strain of 
avian influenza designated H5N1. The H and N denote two 
proteins, hemagglutinin and neuraminidase, that sit on the outer 
shell of the virus. Together, they provide a virus's chemical 
appearance to the immune system. The particular combination of H 
and N is the key to a strain's identity and the first hint of whether it 
might be a danger to people. There are 15 forms of hemagglutinin 
and nine of neuraminidase in the most populous class of flu viruses 
— influenza A. The less common and less dangerous influenza B 
has only one type of H and N. When a virus with a new H-N 
combination appears, immunity built up to older ones is no help. 
What follows can be a worldwide epidemic — assuming the virus 
also grows well in people and is spread easily in coughs and 
sneezes. Virologists once believed these "reassortments" occurred 
only in pigs, because that species is capable of being infected by 
both human and avian flu. With the 1997 Hong Kong cases, 
                                                            
10 Mark Henderson, “Bird Flu Mutation Adds to Threat of Human Pandemic',” The 
Sunday Times, March 21, 2006. 
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however, it was clear reassortments might also occur in a person 
simultaneously infected by both. The chance of that occurring 
depends on how much avian flu is around. What scares scientists 
this winter is that it is all over the place —- in flocks in Japan, 
Vietnam, and South Korea and now in Thailand. "It is an 
unprecedented situation with H5N1 virus in so many countries 
around Asia," Webster said. "The extent of the spread of this virus 
has not been seen before.11 
 
As avian flu spread throughout Asia in late 2003 and in 2004, economic losses to 
the poultry industry became apparent, and the implications of the spread of avian flu to 
the poultry industry began to get some media coverage. During the weeks of February 
11–17, 2004, March 10–16, 2004, and April 7–13, 2004 (Table 5.8, Figure 5.3), the 
economic issues were dominant in the media. This was the time when small outbreaks of 
low pathogenicity avian influenza were reported in flocks of chickens in Texas, 
Delaware, Pennsylvania, and Maryland and in live markets in New Jersey in the United 
States. 12  This had a big impact on the poultry trade in the United States, as many 
countries announced bans on imports from the United States.13 The government and 
poultry industry officials decided to invest in expanding testing for bird flu to cover most 
of the poultry raised in the United States.14 Similar bans were applied by other countries 
                                                            
11 David Brown, “A Horror Script for Health Officials; Bird Flu Poses Global Epidemic 
Threat,” The Washington Post, January 24, 2004.  
 
12 Michelle Garcia, “In New Jersey, Bird Flu Appears in Live Market,” The Washington 
Post, February 13, 2004.  
 
13 Nurith C. Aizenman, and Nelson Hernandez, “Avian Flu Cases Strike Fear in 
Delmarva; Delaware Outbreak Imperils Farms; Bans Imposed on U.S. Poultry,” The 
Washington Post, February 11, 2004.  
 
14 AP, “Officials Seek Approval to Begin Wider Testing for Bird Flu,” The New York 
Times, March 14, 2004. 
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on poultry imports from Asian countries that experienced outbreaks of avian flu. The 
following news story that appeared in The New York Times in April 2005 dealt with the 
economic fallout of the disease: 
What is striking in the last two months, though, is the prominence with 
which avian flu, often called bird flu, is being mentioned as a risk as well.  
CLSA Asia-Pacific Markets, the Asian investment banking arm of Cr?t 
Agricore of France, estimated in a report on Monday that the disease had 
already cost Asian nations $8 billion to $12 billion, mostly from the deaths 
or destruction of 140 million chickens and other poultry. But the cost 
would be greater if the disease gained the ability to spread easily from 
person to person, a possibility that is not factored into current stock and 
other asset prices, said Christopher Wood, CLSA's chief equity strategist. 
It would be a regional panic and potentially a global panic,'' he said, 
adding, ''There's no way markets can discount this.15 
 
Fears about the spread of bird flu increased in 2005, as avian flu spread from Asia 
to the bird populations in Europe and the Middle East. At the same time, new scientific 
research also increased concerns about the capacity of H5N1 to set off an influenza 
pandemic. Researchers found that the influenza virus that caused the 1918–1919 
pandemic appeared to have been an avian-like virus that adapted to humans.16 A study 
published in January 2005 indicated that the case of a girl passing on the virus to her 
mother may be the first published account of human-to-human transmission.17 Scientists 
and public health officials had been stating for years that prevention of the spread of 
avian influenza was paramount to protecting both public and human health. As the virus 
                                                            
15 Keith Bradsher, “International Business; Some Asian Bankers Worry about the 
Economic Toll from Bird Flu,” The New York Times, April 4, 2005. 
 
16 Jeffery K. Taubenberger et al., “Characterization of the 1918 Influenza Virus 
Polymerase Genes,” Nature 437 (2005): 889-93. 
 
17 Kumnuam Ungchusak et al., “Probable Person-To-Person Transmission of Avian 
Influenza A (H5N1),” New England Journal of Medicine 352, 4 (2005): 333-40.  
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spread at an unprecedented rate to many countries outside Asia in the middle of 2005, the 
United States Congress, the President, and public health specialists became actively 
engaged in the fight against bird flu.18  
In the first week of June 2005, the security frame gained prominence as some 
public health specialists lobbied for a Manhattan Project for the 21st century: to defend 
against destruction caused by infectious disease and biological weapons.19 During the 
weeks of October 19–25, 2005 and November 2–15, 2005 (Table 5.10), both the security 
and economic frames were more prominent in the media than the biomedical frame. 
President Bush announced the International Partnership on Avian and Pandemic 
Influenza (IPAPI) at the United Nations General Assembly on September 14, 2005. This 
partnership sought to bring together countries that shared a set of core principles to 
generate and coordinate political momentum for addressing avian and pandemic 
influenza.20 In a speech given to the National Institutes of Health in November 2005, 
President Bush issued the National Strategy for Pandemic Influenza and unveiled a $7.1 
billion flu-fighting plan.21 The National Security Strategy (2006) of the United States also 
                                                            
18 Gardiner Harris, “Fear of Flu Outbreak Rattles Washington,” The New York Times, 
October 5, 2005. 
 
19 “Senate Leader Backs Initiative on Biodefense,” The New York Times, June 2, 2005. 
 
20 United States Department of Health and Human Services: HHS Pandemic Influenza 
Plan, November 2005. Available online at 
http://www.hhs.gov/pandemicflu/plan/appendixh.html, last accessed November 11, 2005. 
 
21 Donald G. Mcneil, Jr., “Ideas & Trends; Hitting the Flu at Its Source, Before It Hits 
US,” The New York Times, November 6, 2005. 
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outlined threats from avian flu.22 In December 2006, Congress passed and the President 
signed “The Pandemic and All Hazards Preparedness Act,” which called for the 
establishment of the National Health Security Strategy. This was a period of intense 
reporting on the avian flu. Thus, although biomedical issues remained dominant in 2005 
and 2006, economic and security concerns about the bird flu were also voiced in the 
media. 
Similar trends were seen in 2006. During the weeks of January 18–26, 2006, 
February 15–21, 2006, March 1–14, 2006, March 22–28, 2006, and April 12–18, 2006 ( 
see Appendix Table A5.5), the economic and biomedical frames dominated the media 
reporting. As bird flu spread to different countries, poultry trade all over the world was 
greatly affected.23 The media reported about how economic investment was needed to 
step up public health preparedness, disease surveillance, and research in the development 
and production of vaccines and antiviral drugs. International organizations emphasized 
the need for investment to contain bird flu in poorer farms and backyard kitchens in 
Southeast Asian countries. All of this required international cooperation among countries 
and international agencies. International organizations such as the United Nations Food 
and Agricultural Organization (FAO), the World Health Organization (WHO), and the 
World Organization for Human Health (OIE) called for more international pledges and 
                                                            
22 White House, National Security Strategy of the United States of America (2006) 
Washington (D. C.): White House. Available online at http://georgewbush-
whitehouse.archives.gov/nsc/nss/2006/, last accessed November 1, 2010. 
 
23 Todd Zaun, “Head of Farm in Bird Flu Outbreak Is Found Dead,” The New York 
Times, March 8, 2004. 
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mobilization of resources to help contain the disease.24 The avian flu was framed as a 
threat to national and international security to raise the salience of the issue and to 
mobilize more resources in the fight against avian flu. The news story below is an 
illustration of the security frame:  
When we think of the major threats to our national security, the first to 
come to mind are nuclear proliferation, rogue states and global terrorism. 
But another kind of threat lurks beyond our shores, one from nature, not 
humans — an avian flu pandemic. An outbreak could cause millions of 
deaths, destabilize Southeast Asia (its likely place of origin), and threaten 
the security of governments around the world. So far, H5N1 has not been 
found in the United States. But in an age when you can board planes in 
Bangkok or Hong Kong and arrive in Chicago, Indianapolis or New York 
in hours, we must face the reality that these exotic killer diseases are not 
isolated health problems half a world away, but direct and immediate 
threats to security and prosperity here at home.25 
 
Because the virus did not establish human-to-human transmission and no isolation 
or quarantine was actually enforced, concerns about civil and political rights were not a 
big topic in news reports. Human rights concerns over compensation to farmers for 
destruction of their poultry, however, were raised.26 International organizations such as 
the FAO, the WHO, and the OIE issued a joint statement asking the international 
community to support poor farmers in small countries affected by avian flu. 27  The 
                                                            
24 Keith Bradsher, “Conferees Call for More Money to Fight Bird Flu,” The New York 
Times, January 18, 2006. 
 
25 Barack Obama and Richard Lugar, “Grounding a Pandemic,” The New York Times, 
June 6, 2005. 
 
26 David P. Fidler, “Global Outbreak of Avian Influenza A (H5N1) and International 
Law,” ASIL Insights, January 2004. Available online at 
http://www.asil.org/insigh125.cfm, last accessed November 9, 2011. 
 
27 WHO, Press Release: Unprecedented Spread of Avian Influenza Requires Broad 
Collaboration-FAO/OIE/WHO Call for International Assistance, January 27, 2004. 
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farmers who had to kill their infected and exposed birds and poultry needed to be 
compensated for loss of their property: 
Bird flu has not yet turned into a pandemic, but it is already killing the 
meager hopes of some of the world's poorest people for a marginally 
better life. When poultry become infected with the deadly strain of avian 
influenza (H5N1), it is essential that all birds nearby be culled to prevent 
further spread. 
 
The Indonesian government pledged to pay about $1.50 for each bird 
infected with the H5N1 virus, a sum that may approximate the bird's fair 
market value. But most birds that have been killed under this policy are 
healthy, so their owners, most reports suggest, will receive nothing. 
Families whose birds are found to be infected with the virus may suffer 
even more. People in Cambodia, China and India whose poultry have been 
blamed for avian influenza outbreaks have often been subject to extreme 
stigma and isolation, and there have even been reports of suicides by 
desperate farmers. 
 
Indonesia's avian influenza budget for the coming year is reported to be 
less than $50 million. Clearly, without donor assistance, the government 
cannot afford to compensate families and farmers fairly. Developing a 
program to compensate poor families in countries with limited resources is 
an enormous challenge.28  
 
Another rights issue raised by many developing countries was that of equitable 
access to vaccines. The time period from May 2006 to December 2007 was one of 
increased research on vaccines, antiviral drugs, and public health preparedness by 
governments all over the world, particularly in the United States. The media, therefore, 
reported mainly on biomedical issues such as transmissibility, lethality, virology, public 
                                                                                                                                                                                 
Available online at http://www.who.int/mediacentre/news/releases/2004/pr7/en/, last 
accessed November 11, 2011. 
 
28 Ruth R. Faden, Patrick S. Duggan, and Ruth Karron, “Who Pays to Stop a Pandemic,” 
The New York Times, February 7, 2007.  
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health infrastructure, and epidemiology. Continuing with its efforts to address the threat 
of avian flu, on April 17, 2007, the United States Food and Drug Administration (FDA) 
announced its approval of the first vaccine to prevent human infection with one strain of 
the avian influenza H5N1 virus. 29  This was the time when the media reported on 
Indonesia’s decision to withhold sharing of virus samples from the WHO, alleging that 
Indonesia was not assured of access to vaccines and antiviral drugs if a human pandemic 
of influenza occurred.30 Thailand had raised similar issues in January 2007, and the WHO 
reacted to it with a joint statement between Indonesia and WHO member states, and 
agreed to work 
to assess and develop potential mechanisms, including Material Transfer 
Agreements, that could promote equitable distribution and availability of 
pandemic influenza vaccines developed and produced from these 
viruses.31 
  
In May 2007, the World Health Assembly adopted a resolution about sharing 
influenza viruses and promoting access to vaccines in relation to the avian flu.32 This 
                                                            
29 FDA Approves First U.S. Vaccine for Humans Against the Avian Influenza Virus 
H5N1. April 19, 2007. FDA U.S. Food and Drug Administration. Available online at 
http://www.fda.gov/NewsEvents/Newsroom/PressAnnouncements/2007/ucm108892.htm, 
last accessed October 11, 2010 
 
30 Donald G. Mcneil Jr., “Indonesia May Sell, Not Give, Bird Flu Virus to Scientists,” 
The New York Times, February 7, 2007. 
 
31 Joint Statement from the Ministry of Health, Indonesia and the World Health 
Organization Regarding the Sharing of Avian Influenza Viruses and Pandemic Vaccine 
Production, February 16, 2007, Statement WHO/2. Available online at 
http://www.who.int/mediacentre/news/statements/2007/s02/en/index.html, last accessed 
November 13, 2010. 
 
32 World Health Assembly, “Pandemic Influenza Preparedness: Sharing of Influenza 
Viruses and Access to Vaccines and other Benefits,” WHA60.28, May 23, 2007. Adopted 
at the 60th World Health Assembly (Geneva: World Health Organization, May 23, 2007). 
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issue was further addressed on June 15, 2007, when revised International Health 
Regulations, substantially updated since 1969, took effect. They aimed to help protect the 
world from a host of emerging diseases and health threats, such as pandemic influenza 
and bioterrorism.33  
The excerpts from news reports cited above show that the media not only covered 
the avian flu outbreak extensively but also framed avian flu in different ways. The 
volume and nature of media messages, therefore, can be evaluated to identify the media’s 
impact on public perception and awareness of avian flu. The stories were identified, 
sampled, and coded for four different frames presented in the stories (i.e., biomedical, 
economic, human rights, and security). The prominence of each frame was identified 
over time, and the stories were coded for the region of the world that was the focus of the 
news article. This chapter is divided into four parts. The first part presents the results of 
the content analysis of newspaper reports about avian flu, and the second part describes 
public opinion data collected by the Harvard School of Public Health (Project on the 
Public and Biological Security) and the Robert Wood Johnson Foundation. These data 
were retrieved from the Kaiser Family Foundation and the Health Poll Search data base. 
Additional data were taken from surveys conducted by the Pew Research Foundation and 
polls conducted by the Associated Press and CNN. Public opinion polls also were 
analyzed to determine if shifts in media frames in stories about avian flu influenced 
                                                                                                                                                                                 
Available online at http://www.who.int/gb/ebwha/pdf_files/, last accessed March 25, 
2011; David P. Fidler and Lawrence O’ Gostin, “The WHO Pandemic Influenza 
Preparedness Framework,” JAMA 306, 2 (2011): 200-1. 
 
33 Revision of the International Health Regulations, 58th World Health Assembly, 
WHA58.3, Agenda item 13.1 (May 23, 2005). Available online at 
http://www.who.int/csr/ihr/en/, last accessed November 13, 2010. 
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changes in public behavior and attitudes towards the disease. The third section, presents a 
correlation analysis of media coverage of avian flu with survey data about avian flu 
during the corresponding time period. The final section discusses the evidence supporting 
the premise that agenda setting and framing affected the public’s evaluation of different 
news frames on avian flu. 
 
5.1. Content Analysis of Newspaper Reports 
 
To investigate in detail the prominence and content of news coverage of avian flu, 
I conducted a content analysis of stories about avian flu published in The New York 
Times and The Washington Post. Using the Lexis-Nexis academic database I collected 
news articles between January 1, 2004 and December 12, 2007. The search stipulated that 
the term “bird flu” or “avian flu” be present in the "headline or lead paragraph" with at 
"least three occurrences in the article" to ensure that avian flu was the focus of the article. 
Obituaries were excluded from the search process. The New York Times returned a total 
of 388 articles and The Washington Post returned 263 articles. Because the stories 
returned by Lexis-Nexis were not ordered in any way other than by date, every fourth 
story was included in the pool. Table 5.1 shows the total number of articles for each 
newspaper and for the two newspapers combined. The data from both newspapers were 
combined for further analysis. 
Each news story was coded at the sentence level.  Each frame was considered to 
be a variable and was assigned a numerical value based on the number of times the frame 
was mentioned in a given news article. For example, if the biomedical frame was 
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mentioned twice, it was given a score of 2. This numerical score was then converted into 
a weighted measure for each frame, which is defined as the ratio of the number of times a 
given frame is mentioned and the total number of sentences in the news article. The 
weighted measure was used to normalize the measure so that it would be comparable 
across news articles of varying lengths and so that I could compare the relative scores 
across frames in a given news article. 
 
Table 5.1: Data Sources and Overall Coverage 
Newspaper Number of Articles Time Interval 
The New York Times 99 1/18/04–11/22/07 
The Washington Post 62 1/14/04–12/11/07 
Overall 161 1/14/04–12/11/07 
 
The stories also were coded as follows for the region or country that was the focus 
of the story: United States, countries other than the United States, global impact, or 
geographic region not mentioned. Table 5.2 shows the frequency of articles that were 
analyzed that were related to each geographic location. About half of the articles in each 
newspaper focused on regions other than the United States. There were, however, a 
number of stories that discussed the global impact of avian flu in an increasingly 
interconnected world.  
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Table 5.2: Frequency of News Content by Geographic Location  
Newspaper Geographic Location 
USA Other 
countries 
Global 
impact 
Not 
mentioned 
Time 
Interval 
The New York Times 23  
(21.7%) 
62 
(58.5%) 
17 
(16.0%) 
4  
(3.8%) 
1/18/04 – 
11/22/07 
The Washington Post 26 
(41.9%) 
29 
(46.8%) 
7 
(11.3%) 
0  
(0.0%) 
1/14/04 –
12/11/07 
Overall 49 
(29.2%) 
91 
(54.2%) 
24 
(14.3%) 
4  
(2.4%) 
1/14/04 – 
12/11/07 
 
5.2. Data Analysis: The Mean Ratios of the Four Coverage Types/Newspapers. 
 
The data were analyzed using descriptive statistics as well as comparative 
statistics such as Analysis of Variance (ANOVA). All analyses were conducted using 
Excel and SPSS. The data were analyzed to evaluate the pattern of coverage and to 
understand changes in media coverage over time. News data overall (The New York 
Times + The Washington Post) were also analyzed for type of coverage (Table 5.1). 
Because the news articles were coded for content or type of coverage and 
weighted for length, the news data were further analyzed with a focus on different types 
of coverage. Mean ratios of the four coverage types were computed for each region for 
the overall sampling period (Table 5.3). The biomedical ratio was the highest in all news 
stories in all geographic areas: the United States (0.33), countries other than the United 
States (0.44), and stories that discussed the global impact of the avian flu (0.49). The 
economic ratios were the next most important, followed by the security and human rights 
ratios. 
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Table 5.3: Mean Ratios for Coverage Type by Region  
Region 
Biomedical 
Ratio 
Economic 
Ratio 
Security 
Ratio 
Human 
Rights Ratio 
Time Interval 
United States 0.33 0.25 0.09 0.01 2/5/04–7/11/07 
Other 
countries 0.44 0.15 0.03 0.01 1/14/04–11/22/07 
Global 
impact 0.49 0.26 0.02 0.01 1/25/04–12/11/07 
Not 
mentioned 0.37 0.25 0.03 0.00 10/28/05–8/1/06 
 
Table 5.4 summarizes the mean ratios of the four coverage types. The coverage 
patterns for the two newspapers were similar. Overall, the biomedical ratio was higher 
(0.410) than the economic ratio (0.189), and the security and human rights ratios were 
less than 0.05 during the sampling period. As with SARS, the biomedical frame was 
dominant.  
 
Table 5.4: Mean Ratios for Coverage Type in The New York Times and The Washington 
Post (combined)  
Newspaper 
No. of 
Articles 
Frame   
Bio-
medical Economic Security 
Human 
Rights 
Time 
Interval 
Overall 161 0.410 0.189 0.046 0.011 
1/14/04-
12/11/07 
 
 
A one-way ANOVA followed by Tukey’s post hoc test was used to test for 
differences in ratios among the four frames over the entire sampling period (Table 5.5). 
The least squares mean values were 0.41, 0.19, 0.05, and 0.01, respectively, for the 
biomedical, economic, security, and human rights ratios. The least squares mean value is 
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the best linear-unbiased estimate of the subpopulation means (i.e., the means for each 
frame). It represents the relative weight of each frame in the media coverage. Comparison 
among the least squares mean values of the four frames shows that the biomedical ratio 
was the most prominent, as its value was significantly higher than those of the other three 
frames (p < 0.0001). The economic ratio was the next highest, and it was significantly 
higher than the security and human rights ratios (p < 0.0001). The human rights and 
security ratios did not differ significantly, and they were both minimal (p < 0.05) 
compared to the economic and biomedical ratios. 
 
Table 5.5: Comparison of Four Frames over Entire Sampling Period (1/14/04–12/11/07) 
 
Frame 
Least Squares 
Mean Economic 
Human 
Rights Biomedical Security 
Economic 0.19 ----------- <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 
Human 
Rights 0.01 <.0001 ----------- <.0001 0.3403 
Biomedical 0.41 <.0001 <.0001 ----------- <.0001 
Security 0.05 <.0001 0.3403 <.0001 
----------
- 
 
5.3. Changes in Media Coverage of Avian Flu over Time 
 
The changes in media coverage in terms of the number of articles published and 
the ratios of the four frames were analyzed at quarterly, monthly, and weekly intervals. 
Appendix Table A5.1 and Figure 5.1 show the quarterly averages of the four frames. 
Figure 5.1 also compares the geographic focus of the stories over time. The pie charts 
show changes in the relative proportion of articles focusing on the three different regions 
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over time. In 2004, more than half of the articles focused on countries other than the 
United States. All articles in the second quarter focused entirely on the impact of avian 
flu on countries other than the United States. In 2005 the percentage of articles discussing 
the impact of on avian flu on the United States and the globe increased. The majority of 
the articles, however, focused on the impact of avian flu on other countries. This was true 
because countries in Asia, Europe, and the Middle East were most affected by avian flu. 
The same trend continued in the first three quarters of 2006. In the last quarter of 2006, 
75% of the articles concerned the impact of the disease on the United States. In the 
second quarter of 2007 100% of the articles did focus on United States 
 
Figure 5.1: Changes in Media Coverage over Time at Quarterly Intervals 
 
 
In the first quarter of 2004, 63% of the articles focused on other countries, in the 
second quarter 100% of the articles dealt with the impact of avian flu on the United 
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States, and in the third quarter 67% of news coverage was about other countries. In the 
last quarter of 2007, half of the articles discussed the global impact of avian flu and how 
the Asian economies were affected by the spread of this disease. 
To examine changes over time in a more detailed manner, media coverage data 
were analyzed on monthly and weekly intervals. Figures 5.2–5.5 show weekly changes in 
the four frames over a period of 4 years (see also Tables A5.2, for monthly changes, and 
Tables 5.3-5.6, for weekly changes, in the Appendix). 
 
Figure 5.2: Media Coverage Changes over Time: Weekly Averages of the Four Media 
Frames in 2004 
In 2004, the biomedical frame dominated the media reporting, except from 
January 28 to February 17 (see weeks 3–5 in Appendix Table 5.3, and Figure 5.2) and 
March 10–16 and April 7–13 (weeks 9 and 13 in  Appendix Table 5.3 and Figure 5.2). 
Between January 28 and February 3, the economic ratio exceeded the biomedical ratio. In 
week 5, both the economic and security ratios exceeded the biomedical ratio, and the 
139 
 
economic frame was clearly dominant this week (0.55). Between March 10 and March 
16, the economic ratio was about five times the biomedical ratio, and during the week of 
April 7 to April 13 (0.09 vs. 0.46), the biomedical and economic ratios were both 
prominent (0.20 and 0.24, respectively). Overall, 28 articles related to avian flu were 
published in the two newspapers in 2004, with fewer than three articles published each 
week during this year. A one-way ANOVA followed by Tukey’s post hoc test was used 
to test for differences in ratios among the four frames in 2004 (Table 5.6). Overall, the 
two newspapers devoted on average 31% of the coverage of avian flu to the biomedical 
frame and 24% to the economic frame. There was no significant difference between the 
biomedical and economic ratios and between the security and human rights ratios. The 
biomedical and economic ratios, however, were both significantly higher than the 
security and human rights ratios. This indicates that the economic and biomedical frames 
were the dominant frames in 2004. The news coverage was also focused mainly on 
countries outside the United States. 
 
Table 5.6: Comparisons of the Four Frames in 2004  
Least Squares Mean Values of the Four Frames 
  
Economic Human Rights Biomedical Security 
0.24 0 0.31 0.04 
p-values for Mean Ratio Pair Wise Comparisons among the Four Frames  
  Economic Human Rights Biomedical Security 
Economic Ratio   <.0001 0.4736 0.0003 
Human Rights Ratio <.0001   <.0001 0.8896 
Biomedical Ratio 0.4736 <.0001   <.0001 
Security Ratio 0.0003 0.8896 <.0001   
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Figure 5.3: Media Coverage Changes over Time: Weekly Averages of the Four Media 
Frames in 2005 
 
In 2005 (Appendix Table A5.4 and Figure 5.3), the biomedical frame dominated 
media reporting, except in June 1–7, October 19–25, November 2–11, and November 23–
29. In the first week of June, the security frame was dominant. For October 19–25, 
November 2–11, and November 23–29, the economic ratio exceeded the biomedical 
ratio. For November 9–15, the economic ratio was about 18 times the biomedical ratio, 
and was the dominant frame in the media reporting during this time period. Overall, 
however, the biomedical frame dominated the media coverage in 2005. ANOVA 
followed by Tukey’s test (Table 5.7) showed that the biomedical ratio was significantly 
higher than those of the other three frames, and the economic ratio was significantly 
higher than the security and human rights ratios. There was no significant difference 
between the human rights and security ratios. Overall, there were 25 articles about avian 
flu published in 2005. 
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 Table 5.7: Comparisons of the Four Frames in 2005 
Least Squares Mean Values of the Four Frames 
  Economic Human Rights Biomedical Security 
  0.2 0.02 0.39 0.08 
p-values for Mean Ratio Pair Wise Comparisons among the Four Frames  
  Economic Human Rights Biomedical Security 
Economic Ratio   <.0001 <.0001 0.0044 
Human Rights Ratio <.0001   <.0001 0.373 
Biomedical Ratio <.0001 <.0001   <.0001 
Security Ratio 0.0044 0.373 <.0001   
 
 
 
Figure 5.4: Media Coverage Changes over Time: Weekly Averages of the Four Media 
Frames in 2006 
 
In 2006 (Appendix Table A5.5 and Figure 5.4), the biomedical frame dominated 
the media reporting, except for the periods of January 18–24, February 15–21, March 1–
14, March 22–28, April 12–18, and December 13–19. For January 18–24, February 15–
21, March 1–14, March 22–28, and April 12–18, the economic and biomedical frames 
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were both prominent in the media. Between December 13 and 19, the economic and 
security frames dominated the media reporting. Thus, biomedical and public health issues 
were both prominent in media, except for brief periods between December 13 and 19, 
2006 and between July 11 and 17, 2007. In December 2006, the National Security 
Strategy discussed the threat from avian flu. This provoked some discussions about 
health and security in the media. In July 2007, the state of Virginia banned all live poultry 
sales and shows for the rest of the month after suspected avian flu antibodies were 
discovered in a flock of 54,000 turkeys on a Shenandoah County farm, and this 
dominated the news stories on avian flu at this time.34 Overall, the biomedical frame 
dominated the media coverage in 2006. ANOVA followed by Tukey’s test (Table 5.8) 
revealed that the biomedical ratio was significantly higher than those of the other three 
frames; the economic ratio was significantly higher than the security and human rights 
ratios. There was no significant difference between the human rights and security ratios. 
Overall, 50 articles were published about avian flu in 2006, which was twice the number 
in 2005. 
Table 5.8: Comparisons of the Four Frames in 2006 
Least Squares Mean Values of the Four Frames 
  Economic Human Rights Biomedical Security 
  0.15 0.01 0.42 0.03 
p-values for Mean Ratio Pair Wise Comparisons among the Four Frames  
  Economic Human Rights Biomedical Security 
Economic Ratio   <.0001 <.0001 0.0003 
Human Rights Ratio <.0001   <.0001 0.8264 
Biomedical Ratio <.0001 <.0001   <.0001 
Security Ratio 0.0003 0.8264 <.0001   
                                                            
34 Staff Reporter, “Possible Bird Flu Leads to Live Poultry Sales Ban,” The Washington 
Post, July 7, 2007.  
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Figure 5.5: Media Coverage Changes over Time: Weekly Averages of the Four Media 
Frames in 2007 
 
 In 2007 (Appendix Table A5.6 and Figure 5.5), the weekly average for the 
security ratio was zero. It was, therefore, excluded from Figure 5.5. Between July 11 and 
17,the economic ratio was about three times the biomedical ratio, and between December 
12 and 18, the economic ratio equaled the biomedical ratio. Other than these two weeks, 
the biomedical ratio was dominant throughout the year. There were only 14 articles about 
avian flu published in 2007, indicating a considerable decline in coverage. ANOVA 
followed by Tukey’s test (Table 5.9) showed that the biomedical ratio was significantly 
higher (<.0001) than other three frames. Moreover, there was no significant difference 
among the economic, human rights, and security ratios. 
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Table 5.9: Comparisons of the Four Frames in 2007 
Least Squares Mean Values of the Four Frames 
  Economic Human Rights Biomedical Security 
  0.19 0.02 0.63 0.00 
p-values for Mean Ratio Pairwise Comparisons among the Four Frames  
  Economic Human Right Medical Security 
Economic Ratio   0.2071 <.0001 0.1495 
Human Rights Ratio 0.2071   <.0001 0.9982 
Biomedical Ratio <.0001 <.0001   <.0001 
Security Ratio 0.1495 0.9982 <.0001   
 
ANOVA followed by Tukey’s test with year as a fixed effect was used to 
determine whether coverage for each frame changed significantly over the years 2004–
2007. Table 5.10 gives the least squares mean values for each frame by year and the p-
value for the significance test. No significant difference among years was detected for the 
economic, security, and human rights ratios. The biomedical ratio, however, had 
significantly higher values in 2007 compared to 2004, 2005, and 2006.  
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Table 5.10: Comparisons of Each Frame (2004–2007) 
Least Squares Mean by Year 
Year 
Biomedical 
Ratio 
Economic 
Ratio Security Ratio 
Human 
Rights Ratio 
2004 0.31 0.24 0.04 0.00 
2005 0.39 0.20 0.08 0.02 
2006 0.42 0.15 0.03 0.01 
2007 0.63 0.19 0.00 0.02 
p-value for effect year  (each frame tested individually) 
Biomedical Ratio 2004 2005 2006 2007 
2004   0.5949 0.2922 0.0024 
2005 0.5949   0.9322 0.0185 
2006 0.2922 0.9322   0.0461 
2007 0.0024 0.0185 0.0461   
Economic Ratio 2004 2005 2006 2007 
2004   0.8535 0.3336 0.8985 
2005 0.8535   0.7098 0.9990 
2006 0.3336 0.7098   0.9532 
2007 0.8985 0.9990 0.9532   
Security Ratio 2004 2005 2006 2007 
2004 1 2 3 4 
2005   0.3624 0.9969 0.6287 
2006 0.3624   0.0985 0.0524 
2007 0.9969 0.0985   0.6456 
Human Rights 
Ratio 0.6287 0.0524 0.6456   
2004   0.3174 0.9156 0.7262 
2005 0.3174   0.5202 0.9973 
2006 0.9156 0.5202   0.9136 
2007 0.7262 0.9973 0.9136   
 
 
5.4. Public Opinion Analysis 
 
The public opinion surveys were drawn from a secondary database corresponding 
to the time period during which these news stories were published. Public opinion data 
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were collected mainly from the I Poll data bank, Polling the Nation, and the Health Poll 
Search of the Kaiser Family Foundation. These three databases provide access to more 
than a million surveys on various topics conducted in the United States by different 
survey organizations. The Kaiser Family Foundation is the leading organization for 
health policy analysis, and it routinely conducts surveys on health-related topics. All 
survey results are based on representative national samples of adults aged 18 or older. 
With very few exceptions, the sample sizes of these surveys were at least 1,000 
respondents. Shifts in public opinion towards infectious diseases were reviewed by 
analyzing exact and similarly worded questions about issues related to avian flu. 
Specifically, these questions assessed the following: a) willingness to support harsh 
public health measures such as quarantine and to make changes in daily behavior to curb 
the spread of disease; b) precautionary steps taken and behavioral changes made in 
personal lives due to fear of the disease; c) concerns about the spread of the disease and 
the likelihood of contracting the disease; and d) support for federal funding to improve 
the country's ability to respond to new infectious diseases. 
The data were analyzed using descriptive statistical methods. The z-test was used 
to compare the proportion of subjects who responded positively or negatively in each 
survey. Survey responses were grouped together to form positive or negative responses. 
For example, survey responses such as “very worried” and “somewhat worried” or 
“extremely likely” and “very likely” were grouped together. All analyses were conducted 
using Excel and SPSS/PASW. Z-test scores greater than or equal to the absolute value of 
1.96 at the 95% confidence interval were considered to be statistically significant.  
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Eighteen questions were analyzed in the category of willingness to support harsh 
public health measures, which examined support for quarantine and protective behavior 
(Appendix Table A5.7). The surveys were conducted between August 2005 and April 
2006. The responses were combined to compute the percentage of positive opinion. The 
first set of questions were similarly worded and asked the sampled respondents their 
opinion about quarantine. On average, 82.6% of the public expressed support for 
quarantine (a statistically significant value). The next series of survey questions assessed 
public opinion about willingness to take protective steps (e.g., washing hands more 
frequently, avoiding travel, and wearing masks) if a human case of the avian or bird flu 
was reported in their state. On average, 79.1% of the public expressed their willingness to 
take various protective steps to prevent avian flu.  A higher percentage of subjects 
expressed willingness to take protective measures, except for wearing a mask. Only 52% 
of subjects were willing to wear masks, which was not statistically significant. 
Four sets of survey questions on actual behavioral changes made were examined 
in the second category of questions (Appendix Table A5.8). The respondents were 
surveyed from January to April 2006. A higher percentage of people did not change their 
behavior compared to those who did. News of the spread of avian flu did not bring about 
changes in the daily behavior of people. On average, 80.6% of the sampled population 
denied implementing precautionary behavior.  
Six sets of questions were examined to understand Americans’ concern about the 
spread of the disease (Appendix Table A5.9). The first set of questions asked Americans 
if they were worried that they or someone in their family would be victims of bird flu. 
The first survey was conducted between October 21 and 23, 2005, and it was repeated on 
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December 9–11, 2005, January 12–25, 2006, and March 10–12, 2006. A significantly 
higher percentage of subjects were not worried about actually contracting avian flu. On 
average, only 23.5% of subjects expressed that they were worried they would be victims 
of bird flu. It is likely that the ability of the United States public health system to 
effectively deal with SARS made people confident or “desensitized.”35 The second set of 
questions asked Americans how worried or concerned they were that they or someone in 
their family would be exposed to bird flu. Eight surveys were included in this set. The 
surveys were administered between November 3–6, 2005 and January 18–22, 2007. In 
the first survey, 38% of the respondents were concerned about bird flu. For the first seven 
surveys, on average 34.1% of subjects were worried, whereas in the last survey (January 
18–22, 2007), 60% of subjects were worried A third set of questions assessed the 
perceived likelihood of bird flu striking the United States. Four surveys were included in 
this set. Surveys administered on October 21–23, 2005, March 2–5, 2006, and April 25–
27, 2006 showed that a significantly higher percentage of subjects thought that the bird 
flu virus was likely to strike the United States. An average of 67.7% of subjects chose 
“very likely” or “somewhat likely” when asked about the likelihood of bird flu striking 
the United States. The last survey, which was administered on December 31, 2006, 
showed that 50% of respondents thought bird flu would strike the United States in 2007. 
This illustrates a decrease in concern (from 64% to 50%) from the last survey conducted 
in April 2006. The fourth set of questions also assessed Americans’ concern about the 
disease. These questions were worded differently and asked if Americans were concerned 
                                                            
35 Shirley S. Ho, Dominique Brossard, Dietram A. Scheufele., “The Polls—Trends Public 
Reactions to Global Health Threats and Infectious Diseases,” Public Opinion Quarterly 
71, 4 (2007): 678. 
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that the United States might be part of an avian flu pandemic in the near future. An 
average of 64% of subjects showed concern, and a significantly higher percentage of 
subjects expressed concern compared to expressing no concern at all. The fifth question 
asked a similar question, but it was worded differently: It asked Americans how 
concerned they were about a pandemic outbreak of avian or bird flu. The first survey was 
administered between January 17 and 25, 2006, and it showed that 62% of subjects were 
“very concerned” or “somewhat concerned.” In a survey conducted between June 7 and 
21, 2006, 51% of subjects were “very concerned” or “somewhat concerned,” which was 
not a significantly high value. The sixth set of questions asked how concerned Americans 
were about the spread of bird flu in the United States. All five surveys in this set showed 
that a significantly higher percentage of subjects expressed concern. The last set of 
questions asked Americans if they thought there was more likelihood of cases of avian or 
bird flu among wild birds, chickens, or other farm-raised poultry or among humans in the 
United States during the next 12 months. On average, 58% of Americans thought it was 
very likely or somewhat likely that more cases would occur among wild birds, 43% 
thought it was very likely or somewhat likely that there would be more bird flu cases 
among chickens, and only 34% believed it was very likely or somewhat likely that there 
would be more bird flu cases among humans. 
Four sets of questions were examined to understand Americans’ support for 
funding to fight infectious diseases such as the avian flu (Appendix Table A5.10). The 
first question asked respondents if they supported government investment in the 
development and production of vaccines to prevent avian flu. The mean percentage 
supporting the investment on vaccine research was 92.5% in the two surveys conducted 
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in August 2005 and April 2006. The support for this issue was considerable and high. 
The second set of questions asked Americans if they were worried that the government 
was not doing enough to protect its citizens from infectious diseases. Nationally, 60% of 
respondents felt that the government was not doing enough in January 2005. The 
percentage of people worried about the issue increased to 63% when the poll was 
repeated in January 2006. In both surveys, a significantly higher percentage of people 
expressed that they were “worried” compared to “not worried.” The third set of questions 
also explored public opinion about government spending on avian flu. The questions 
specifically asked the public whether the United States spends too much, too little, or 
about the right amount of money to protect citizens against bird flu. In January 2006, 
only 36% of subjects thought that the United States was spending the right amount. In 
January 2007, 32% felt the United States spent the right amount of money. When asked if 
the United States was spending too much, in January 2006 only 6% agreed. The 
percentage of people who felt the United States government was spending “too much” 
increased to 20% in January 2007 and in the same survey, 24% felt that the government 
was spending “somewhat more” than enough. Between January 2006 and January 2007, 
the sense of urgency about the threat from avian flu seems to have declined. The fourth 
question asked Americans if they thought it was important to improve the country’s 
ability to respond to new infectious diseases such as SARS and the avian flu. The surveys 
were conducted in May 2006 and April 2007. More than 80% of the respondents thought 
this was an extremely or very important thing to do in both the surveys. This was a 
statistically significant positive response. 
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The time period between October 2005 and December 2006 was one of increased 
media reporting on avian flu. The United States government and the media emphasized 
not just the biomedical aspects but also the economic and security concerns that arose due 
to the spread of avian flu. Increased media reporting probably led to the high level of 
support for policies such as quarantine and funding for research on vaccines against avian 
flu. This initial awareness did not, however, lead to increased worry or personal concern 
about respondents and their families being victims of avian flu or being actually infected 
or dying from the disease. As a result, the American public did not make too many 
precautionary changes in their lives to protect themselves from bird flu. 
 
5.5. Relationship between Media Coverage and Public Opinion 
 
To understand the relationship between changes in media coverage of avian flu 
and changes in public opinion, data were analyzed using descriptive statistical methods. 
The correlation coefficient was computed and a test of significance was performed for the 
correlation between media coverage and percentage of positive responses for the 
following survey topics: worry about being the victim of the bird flu virus, worry about 
being exposed to the bird flu, and likelihood of the bird flu virus striking the United 
States. All analyses were performed using Excel and SPSS. 
Public opinion polls that questioned whether people were willing to support 
quarantine were conducted first on August 3–5 2005 and repeated on October 11–12, 
2005, January 17–25, 2006, and April 25–27, 2006. Questions that examined people’s 
willingness to make changes in daily behavior other than quarantine to curb the spread of 
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disease also were included in the analysis. To assess whether changes in the media 
coverage on avian flu had an impact on the percentage of people who were willing to 
make changes in daily behavior, a plot showing news coverage data from the 
corresponding time period (July 2005–April 2006) and percentage of respondents 
supporting quarantine was constructed (Appendix Table A5.12). Questions about 
willingness to avoid travel, wearing a mask, etc. (Q2–Q17, Appendix Table A5.7) were 
not included in the analysis because these questions were not asked repeatedly over a 
period of time. A monthly interval was chosen for the analysis in order to examine the 
changes over time in the two sets of data. The percentage of positive responses was 
plotted for the four frames in media coverage (Figure 5.6). In the survey, the same 
question was repeated with different types of responses. For example, Q1a showed the 
percentage of positive responses calculated as the percentage of “absolutely essential,” 
“very important,” and “somewhat important” responses, and Q1b showed the percentage 
of positive responses calculated as the percentage of “yes” or “favor” responses. There 
was no change in the percentage of positive responses when the survey was repeated in 
October 2005 and April 2006 with response options of “absolutely essential,” “very 
important,” “somewhat important,” “not important,” and “not important at all.” The 
percentage choosing “absolutely important” increased from 25% to 30% (Appendix 
Table A5.7). The percentage increased considerably from 65% to 83% between October 
2005 and January 2006 when the same question was asked with response options of “yes” 
or “no.” As far as the media coverage was concerned, the biomedical ratio decreased 
from 0.65 to 0.38 between August 2005 and April 2006. The economic ratio also 
decreased from 0.42 to 0.16. The human rights and security ratios were very small and 
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changed little. From October 2005 to January 2006, all media coverage had decreased, 
whereas public opinion about supporting quarantine increased from 65% to 83%. In this 
case perhaps less coverage increased concern about the disease. Continuous reporting on 
avian flu increased the publics’ attention and support for quarantine measures, and after 
some time it stabilized. Eighty percent of the sampled population supported quarantine in 
April 2006, which was a very slight decrease from January 2006. Overall support for 
quarantine and isolation measures was high during the sampling period. 
 
 
Note: Q1. Do you agree that quarantining is important to limit the spread of avian flu? 
Figure 5.6: Changes in Media Coverage and Willingness to Change Behavior 
 
Four sets of questions (Appendix Table A5.13) were examined to see if 
Americans made any significant behavioral changes or took any precautionary measures 
to protect themselves against avian flu. The first two sets of questions were asked only 
once. Therefore, change over time could not be assessed. Only the third question was 
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included in the analysis (Figure 5.7). This question asked whether the public had taken 
any steps to prevent contracting the bird flu. The first survey was conducted between 
February 28 and March 3, 2006, and it was repeated between April 18 and 20, 2006. The 
percentage of “yes” responses to the question dropped from 15% to 9%. During the same 
time period, there was not much change in any of the frames, but the number of articles 
on bird flu decreased from 12 to 6. Perhaps the decrease in volume of reporting 
influenced public opinion. From February to March, the economic ratio decreased from 
0.25 to 0.15. Due to the limited number of surveys on this issue, however, it is very 
difficult, if not impossible, to further evaluate how the media coverage shaped public 
opinion on actual behavioral changes made. 
 
Figure 5.7: Changes in Media Coverage and Behavioral Changes Made 
 
Seven questions were used to evaluate the perceived likelihood of the spread of 
avian flu among humans (Appendix Table A5.13 and Figure 5.8). The Pearson 
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correlation coefficient was computed for the first three questions, as surveys were 
continuously collected during this time period (Table 5.11). The percentage of people 
worried about avian flu was significantly correlated (p = 0.0754) with the biomedical 
ratio for Q2 (Appendix Table A5.9). The Pearson correlation coefficient (r = 0.70741) 
was indicative of a positive correlation and shows that the higher the biomedical ratio, the 
higher the level of people’s concern that they would be exposed to avian flu. Positive 
responses about the perceived likelihood that the bird flu virus from other countries 
would strike the United States were significantly correlated with the economic ratio (p = 
0.0666). The Pearson correlation coefficient was –0.85225, which indicates that the 
percentage of respondents who thought that bird flu would strike the United States was 
negatively correlated with the economic ratio (i.e., the more media reported on economic-
related issues, the less likely the public thought it was that avian flu would strike the 
United States). The Pearson correlation coefficient was 0.81839 for the correlation 
between the percent of respondents worried about being a victim of the bird flu virus 
(Q1) and the biomedical ratio. This indicates that the higher the biomedical ratio, the 
higher the level of worry by the general public. Both Q1 and Q2 (Appendix Table A5.9) 
had a positive correlation between the level of worry and the biomedical ratio, and the 
correlation was significant for Q2. 
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Note: Q1. Are you worried that you or someone in your family will be the victim of the 
bird flu virus? Q2. How worried /concerned are you that you or someone in your family 
will be exposed to the bird flu? Q3. How likely do you think it is that the bird flu virus 
will strike the United States? Q4. How concerned are you that the United States will be 
part of an avian flu pandemic? Q5. How concerned are you about a pandemic outbreak of 
avian or bird flu in many countries at the same time? Q6. How concerned are you about 
the spread of bird flu in the United States? Q7. How likely do you think it is that there 
will be cases/more cases of avian or bird flu among in the United States during the next 
12 months?  
 
     Figure 5.8: Changes in Media Coverage and Perception of Avian Flu as a Threat 
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Table 5.11: Correlations between Levels of Worry about Being Exposed to Avian Flu and 
Media Coverage: Pearson Correlation Coefficients (p-value) 
 
Frame 
Q1(worried about 
being a victim of the 
bird flu) 
Q2 (worried 
about being 
exposed to the 
bird flu) 
Q3 (bird flu 
virus will 
likely strike 
the United 
States) 
Biomedical 0.81839 0.70741 0.33591 (p=0.1816) (p=0.0754) (p=0.5805) 
Economic 0.36343 –0.51197 –0.85225 (p=0.6366) (p=0.2401) (p=0.0666) 
Security –0.33907 –0.50173 –0.58353 (p=0.6609) (p=0.2513) (p=0.3017) 
Human Rights –0.21537 0.07355 0.12158 (p=0.7846) (p=0.8755) (p=0.8456) 
 
Four questions were studied to understand public support for federal funding to 
improve the country's ability to respond to new infectious diseases (Appendix Table 
A5.14 and Figure 5.9). The first question asked the public how important it was to invest 
government dollars in the development and production of avian flu vaccines. The 
question was asked in August 2005 and again in April 2006. The percentage of subjects 
responding in the affirmative increased from 61% to 65% over the 8 month. At the same 
time, the biomedical ratio dropped from 0.65 to the lowest point in November (0.28), and 
then it increased to 0.38 in April 2006. The economic ratio dropped and increased several 
times, but overall it dropped from 0.42 to 0.16. The security and human right ratios were 
small and did not change much. It is very difficult to determine how each frame 
influenced public opinion because only two surveys were conducted over this 8 month. 
The slight increase in the percentage of people supporting the production of vaccines may 
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have resulted from the cumulative effect of media reporting over this period of time 
rather than having responded to any particular frame. 
The next question asked whether the public was worried that the United States 
may not be doing enough to prevent contagious diseases such as SARS, lethal flu, and 
mad cow disease that originated in other countries. The question was first asked in June 
2005, and 60% of respondents expressed worry. When the same question was repeated in 
January 2006, the percentage of respondents who were worried had increased slightly to 
63%. At the same time, both the biomedical and economic ratios had dropped and 
increased multiple times. Given the fact that there were only two surveys conducted over 
the 7 month period, it is very difficult to determine how each media frame shaped public 
opinion. The slight increase in overall level of worry that occurred between June 2005 
and January 2006 was similar to the trend seen in the responses to the previous question.  
The third question asked if the United States was spending too much, too little, or 
about the right amount of money to protect the country against avian flu. The percentage 
of respondents supporting investment was 72% in January 2006. When the same question 
was repeated in January 2007, 64% of respondents supported investment. Again, only 
two surveys were conducted to address this issue, which makes it very difficult to 
correlate this change with any media frame. 
The fourth question asked people if they thought it was important to improve the 
country's ability to respond to new infectious diseases such as SARS and avian flu. The 
survey was conducted first in March 2006, and it was repeated in April 2007. The 
responses were roughly the same and overall showed very high support. This result 
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illustrates that most Americans supported the idea of improving the country’s ability to 
respond to new infectious diseases. 
 
 
 
Note: Q1. How important will it be to invest government dollars in the development and 
production of avian flu vaccines? Q2. Are you worried that the United States may not be 
doing enough to prevent contagious diseases such as SARS, lethal flu, and mad cow 
disease that come from other countries? Q3.Do you think the United States is spending 
too much, too little, or about the right amount of money to protect the country against the 
avian or bird flu? Q4. Do you think it is important to improve the country's ability to 
respond to new infectious diseases such as SARS (severe acute respiratory syndrome) 
and avian flu?  
 
   Figure 5.9: Changes in Media Coverage and Public Support for Funding 
 
5.6. Discussion and Conclusion 
 
In this study I assessed whether increased news coverage of avian flu increased 
the worry of Americans about the disease. Public concern about the threat of an avian flu 
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pandemic did increase in the years 2005–2006. The percentage of people worried that 
they or a family member might get sick from avian flu in the next 12 months increased 
from 12% in 2003 to 21% in 2006. 36 This was perhaps in response to increased media 
reporting on the possibility of a pandemic.  This study has also shown that the volume of 
news coverage about avian flu increased in 2005 and 2006 and that news stories focused 
more on the impact of the disease on the United States (Figure 5.1). Until 2004, most 
stories about avian flu discussed its impact on Asia. As in the case of SARS, the 
geographical focus of the story evidently became important in determining people’s 
concerns about the disease. 
This study also sought to determine whether certain ways of framing the disease 
evoked greater concern among people and led them to make behavioral changes in their 
personal lives, support harsher public health measures such as quarantine, and support 
government investment. A trend towards significant positive correlation (r = 0.70741, p = 
0.0754) between an increased biomedical ratio and the level of worry about bird flu was 
detected (Table 5.11). Although avian flu is primarily a disease of birds, scientists and 
public health officials feared that it might mutate in a way that could allow human-to-
human transmission. In October 2005, two research studies warned that there were 
similarities between the deadly Spanish flu virus of 1918 that killed nearly 50 million 
                                                            
36 Robert J. Blendon, John M. Benson, and Kathleen J. Weldon, Pandemic Influenza and 
the Public: Survey Findings, Harvard School of Public Health (HSPH) Project on the 
Public and Biological Security/International Communications Research, Conducted 
January 17–26, 2006. Presented at the Institute of Medicine on October 26, 2006. 
Available online at 
http://www.hsph.harvard.edu/press/releases/blendon/Avian_Flu_Charts.ppt, last accessed 
November 10, 2011. 
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people and the H5N1 strain slowly spreading through Asia.37 This, along with media 
reports of the spread of bird flu to regions outside Asia and the knowledge that no 
vaccine was available to protect against the flu, caused fear and concern among the 
public. Although there were a few infections reported in poultry in February 2004 in the 
United States, the situation did not become an epidemic, as had happened in Asia. Had 
there been human cases of the flu in the United States or a major disruption of the 
economy or the public health system, the numbers might have changed drastically. As a 
reaction to the increased concern about avian flu, most people supported quarantine and 
were willing to take protective measures and change their behavior. 
The percentage of respondents who thought that bird flu would strike the United 
States was negatively correlated with the economic ratio (r = –0.85225, p = 0.0666, Table 
5.11). This can be attributed to the fact that it was mainly the Asian economies that 
suffered losses from the spread of bird flu. The financial cost of culling chickens and 
taking control of the situation was borne by Asian economies. Although the United States 
poultry industry did suffer losses in early 2004, there was no major impact at the macro 
level and the economic losses were very sector specific. In stories centered on the United 
States, the focus was less on actual economic losses and more on preparedness efforts, 
government expenditure, and the financial commitment of the government to address the 
threat of bird flu. IPAPI was announced by President Bush at the United Nations General 
Assembly on September 14, 2005 to improve international surveillance, transparency, 
timeliness, and response capabilities and facilitate sharing of epidemiological information 
                                                            
37 David Brown, “Changes Cited In Bird Flu Virus,” The Washington Post, October 6, 
2005.  
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and samples critical for the response effort. The United States Congress also launched a 
$3.8 billion preparedness effort. President Bush issued the National Strategy for 
Pandemic Influenza on November 1, 2005. The Strategy outlined the coordinated federal 
government effort to prepare for pandemic influenza, and it unveiled a $7.1 billion flu-
fighting plan. This likely instilled confidence in the public about the government’s 
preparedness to fight the avian flu. 
Two hypotheses were tested in this chapter. First, frames represented prominently 
in the media will tend to mobilize public support for policies associated with those frames. 
This study indicates that the biomedical frame was the predominant frame in media 
reports in the sampled period 2004–2007 (Tables 5.4–5.9 and Figure 5.1-5.3). The study 
also highlights a strong correlation between the biomedical frame and the American 
public’s worry about the disease and their concern about the likelihood that the disease 
would strike the United States. The surveys were conducted mainly between December 
2005 and in 2006 and the beginning of 2007. Figure 5.1 clearly indicates that between 
2005 and the second quarter of 2007, the volume of stories that discussed the impact of 
avian flu on the United States and the globe as a whole increased. In the second quarter of 
2007 all articles dealt with the impact of the disease on the United States. In February 
2005, a news story reported that at the national meeting of the American Association for 
the Advancement of Science, scientists stated that they believed it highly likely that a 
virus that has swept through chickens and other poultry in Asia would genetically change 
into a flu that can be transmitted among people.38 At the same time, Cambodia and 
                                                            
38 AP, “CDC chief: Bird flu could become Epidemic,” USA Today February 22, 2005.  
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Indonesia reported their first human cases of avian flu, which turned out to be fatal.39 By 
November 2005, the WHO's official count of human cases of H5N1 reached 122, with 62 
deaths in Vietnam, Thailand, Indonesia, and Cambodia.40 This was followed by news 
reports of the spread of avian flu to countries such as China, the Russian Federation, 
Turkey, Italy, and many other countries around the globe. This was also a time when the 
United States President and Congress launched several initiatives. The Pandemic and All 
Hazards Preparedness Act was adopted by Congress in December 2006. With this law, 
Congress mandated for the first time in United States history that the federal government 
prepare a National Health Security Strategy to guide improvement of the country’s public 
health emergency preparedness and response capabilities.  
The second hypothesis tested was that when the biomedical and economic frames 
dominate media coverage, which is the most common scenario, people will be more 
worried about the disease. They will be likely to support potentially inconvenient policies 
intended to address the dangers of the disease. The survey reports show high support for 
vaccine production and research and willingness on the part of the American public to 
undertake precautionary measures to deal with the disease. The public did not see the 
human rights and security frames as relevant. The security frame was more prominent in 
media stories about bird flu than it was for SARS. It did not, however, show any 
significant correlation with worries about bird flu. The human rights frame was not very 
                                                            
39 WHO, GAR, Cumulative Number of Confirmed Human Cases of Avian Influenza A/ 
(H5N1) Reported to WHO, November 1, 2005. Online available at 
http://www.who.int/csr/disease/avian_influenza/country/en/, last accessed September27, 
2011. 
 
40 Ibid. 
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prominent in news stories about bird flu. Part of the reason for this is that the bird flu did 
not infect humans in the United States, and there were no major issues arising over access 
to antiviral drugs and vaccines or about quarantine and isolation. 
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VI. HUMAN IMMUNE DEFICIENCY VIRUS AND ACQUIRED IMMUNE 
DEFICIENCY SYNDROME 
 Unlike SARS and the avian flu, Human Immune Deficiency Virus/ Acquired 
Immune Deficiency Syndrome (HIV/AIDS) is an infectious disease that became a health 
epidemic in the United States. The media in the United States has been reporting on 
AIDS since it was first identified in 1981, although the nature of coverage has changed 
over time. The media has been an active participant in the efforts of governments and the 
United Nations (UN) to educate people about HIV/AIDS.1 The first known news report 
on what was later known to be AIDS was published on June 5, 1981 in the Centers for 
Disease Control and Prevention’s (CDC) Morbidity Mortality Weekly Report (MMWR).2 
The Los Angeles Times and the Associated Press covered it on the same day. The New 
York Times published its first news report on AIDS on July 3, 1981.3 
In the United States, media coverage of HIV/AIDS in the first 22 years since its 
discovery was focused mainly on its impacts on the United States.4 In the late 1990s, 
however, the media began presenting news about HIV/AIDS with a global perspective. 
                                                            
1 Matt James, Tina Hoff, Julia Davis and Robert Graham, “Leveraging the Power of the 
Media to Combat HIV/AIDS,” Health Affairs 24, 3 (2005): 854-57. 
 
2 Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, “Pneumocystis Pneumonia — Los 
Angeles,” Morbidity and Mortality Weekly Report 30, 21 (1981): 1-3. Available online at 
http://www.cdc.gov/mmwr/preview/mmwrhtml/june_5.htm, last accessed July 12, 2011. 
3 Kaiser Family Foundation, Global HIV/AIDS Time line. Available online at 
http://www.kff.org/hivaids/timeline/hivtimeline.cfm, last accessed, December 11, 2010. 
 
4 Mollyann Brodie, Elizabeth Hamel, Lee Ann Brady, Jennifer Kates, and Drew E. 
Altman, “AIDS at 21: Media Coverage of the HIV Epidemic 1981-2002,” Columbia 
Journalism Review Supplement, March/April (2004): 1-18. Available online at 
http://www.kff.org/kaiserpolls/upload/AIDS-at-21-Media-Coverage-of-the-HIV-
Epidemic-1981-2002-Supplement-to-the-March-April-2004-issue-of-CJR.pdf, last 
accessed September 21, 2011. 
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Not only did the geographic focus of the news stories widen, but the topics of stories also 
changed to reflect changes in policy debates, both on the domestic and international 
fronts. Until about 1999, the media served to educate the public about HIV/AIDS. 
Foremost were the stories on HIV prevention and testing. 5  Stories discussed the 
epidemiology of the disease and the efforts that were needed to prevent transmission. 
Next followed news reports about research on HIV drugs, protease inhibitors, treatment, 
and vaccine research. A number of stories focused on the origin of AIDS.6 Stories about 
these issues and the various health agencies involved in the research continuously 
appeared in the media in the years that followed. Medical advances, debates about the 
association between HIV and AIDS, and the scientific breakthrough involving 
antiretroviral drugs were highlighted.7 Once antiretroviral drugs (ARVs) were available, 
research on side effects of the drug and their administration was conducted. Because 
these drugs were not a complete cure, research on vaccines was always emphasized. As 
AIDS spread around the globe, with more and more infections being reported every year, 
stories about prevention, transmission, and treatment remained dominant in the 1980s and 
1990s period. The following news story is typical of media reports about HIV/AIDS:  
As it invades the body, the virus that causes AIDS unleashes a domino 
effect of destruction at the molecular level within immune system cells, 
                                                            
5 Ibid. 
 
6 David Brown, “Chimps Tested in Quest for AIDS Virus Origin; Animals Sampled 
Without Human Contact,” The Washington Post, January 18, 2002. 
 
7 Karen E. Johnson, “AIDS as a National Security Threat; Media Effects and 
Geographical Imagination,” Feminist Media Studies 2, 1 (2002): 81-96; Timothy E. Cook 
and David C. Colby, “The Man Mediated Epidemic: The Politics of AIDS on National 
Network News,” in AIDS: The Making of a Chronic Disease, eds. Elizabeth Fee and 
Daniel M. Fox (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1992), 84-122. 
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ultimately leading to cellular suicide. Now researchers from the University 
of California at San Diego have used sophisticated technology to track 
with unprecedented precision the progression of cellular damage that 
follows infection with H.I.V. 
 
They revealed the sequence of events and the mechanisms employed by 
the virus to kill the very cells charged with defending the body against 
such invaders: immune cells called CD4 T-cells. ''They are like the 
conductor of the immune response,'' said Dr. Jacques Corbeil, an assistant 
professor of medicine at the university's School of Medicine and the lead 
author of the study, which was reported last week in the journal Genome 
Research. 
 
H.I.V. invades and swiftly overpowers the immune cells' DNA, inserting 
its own viral blueprints into the cellular machinery, poisoning genes and 
altering the cellular energy source, the researchers reported. It then 
suppresses the immune cells' DNA repair mechanisms and induces the cell 
suicide process called apoptosis, they said.'' When we looked at the data, 
we realized how much H.I.V. packs a punch,'' Dr. Corbeil said. The 
destruction of the immune cells robs the body of its ability to defend itself, 
eventually leading to the collapse of the immune system.8 
 
Beginning in 2000, media attention shifted to the growing HIV crisis outside the 
United States, especially in Africa. Several reports were published that stressed the idea 
that new and emerging infectious diseases such as HIV posed a threat to citizens of the 
United States at home and abroad, threatened the United States armed forces deployed 
overseas, and accentuated social and political instability in key regions where the United 
States had significant interests.9 At this time, the political community in the United States 
                                                            
8 “Tracking H.I.V.'s Lightning Attack on Cells,” The  New York Times, June 19, 2001. 
 
9 David F. Gordon, The Global Infectious Disease Threat and Its Implications for the 
United States, NIE 99 17-D (Washington D.C.: National Intelligence Council, 2000), 1-
58. Available online at 
http://www.dni.gov/nic/PDF_GIF_otherprod/infectiousdisease/infectiousdiseases.pdf, 
last accessed January 11, 2011. 
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framed HIV/AIDS as a national security threat. It was reported as a security threat widely 
in the media. The first such news article appeared in The Washington Post: 
Convinced that the global spread of AIDS is reaching catastrophic 
dimensions, the Clinton administration has formally designated the disease 
for the first time as a threat to U.S. national security that could topple 
foreign governments, touch off ethnic wars and undo decades of work in 
building free-market democracies abroad.10 
 
Conceptualization of HIV/AIDS as a threat to national and international security by 
policy makers in Washington D.C. generated a debate both in academia and in policy 
circles. There were some who disagreed: 
That terming the disease a national security threat seems alarmist, even 
selfish. The United States should be part of the global battle against AIDS, 
even lead if necessary, but it should do so out of a sense of humanity, not 
fear.11 
Framing of HIV/AIDS as a security threat helped mobilize financial resources and 
attract much needed attention from the international community to the catastrophic 
impact of HIV and AIDS throughout the world.12  Political leaders and international 
organizations around the world began to recognize the frightening dimensions and 
enormous costs of the global AIDS epidemic.13 Economic issues were discussed even 
prior to the year 2000. Most stories, however, dealt with funding and financing the 
                                                            
10 Gellman Barton, “AIDS is Declared Threat to Security,” The Washington Post, April 
30, 2000. 
 
11 Editorial, “Right Crusade, Wrong Reason,” Denver Rocky Mountain News, May 2, 
2000. 
 
12 Stephen Elbe, “Should HIV/AIDS Be Securitized? The Ethical Dilemmas of Linking 
HIV/AIDS and Security,” International Studies Quarterly 50, 1 (2006): 119–44. 
 
13 Editorial, “The Global Plague of AIDS,” The New York Times, April 23, 2000. 
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domestic battle against AIDS, costs of prescription drugs, and philanthropic fundraising 
efforts.14 After 2000, the economic impact of AIDS began to be emphasized in news 
stories. More funds were needed to combat the growing AIDS epidemic. The following 
news story published in The Washington Post is illustrative of such sentiments: 
Last year AIDS killed almost 3 million people around the world. More 
than 5 million were newly infected with HIV in 2000, nearly 4 million of 
them in Africa. In Eastern Europe and South and Southeast Asia, there is 
evidence that the disease is taking deadly hold. Closer to home, AIDS has 
become the major cause of death among men in the Caribbean under 45. 
 
As world finance and development ministers gather in Washington this 
weekend for key meetings with the World Bank, International Monetary 
Fund and the Group of Seven, these facts should command their attention.  
What they underscore is that HIV/AIDS is no longer just a health problem 
but a global development problem, threatening to reverse many of the 
development gains made over the past half-century. More than that, it is an 
international security problem.  As Kofi Annan and others have said, what 
we need is a war chest and a war strategy. 
  
 Money alone will not solve the problem, but it is a vital part of the 
solution. Total global support for HIV/AIDS in developing countries last 
year was probably under $ 1 billion, less than a third of the estimated need 
in Africa alone.  
 
For this reason, the bank supports the calls for the establishment of a 
global fund to address prevention, care and treatment of HIV/AIDS, TB, 
malaria and other infectious diseases within the context of meeting a series 
of key targets known as the international development goals.  Rich 
countries must set an example by putting up funds and offering help to 
those who speak out.  Let us join with the G-7 and the U.N. system to 
                                                            
14 Mollyann Brodie. Elizabeth Hamel, Lee Ann Brady, Jennifer Kates, and Drew E. 
Altman, “AIDS at 21: Media Coverage of the HIV Epidemic 1981-2002,” Columbia 
Journalism Review Supplement, March/April (2004): 1-18. Available online at 
http://www.kff.org/kaiserpolls/upload/AIDS-at-21-Media-Coverage-of-the-HIV-
Epidemic-1981-2002-Supplement-to-the-March-April-2004-issue-of-CJR.pdf, last 
accessed September 21, 2011. 
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commit to a global fund. Let us make this a pivotal moment in the fight 
against HIV/AIDS.15  
 
Compared to the previous case studies of SARS and the avian flu, for which 
human rights issue were not paramount, linkages between human rights and HIV/AIDS 
have been the focus of media stories since the 1980s. From 1981 to 1999, the media 
published stories about discrimination against homosexuals in job settings and housing in 
the United States. Stories about various domestic organizations, such as the AIDS 
Coalition to Unleash Power (ACT UP), rallying for availability of treatment and reduced 
prices for drugs for people living with AIDS within the United States also were 
covered.16  Since 1999, news stories began to cover debates over reduced prices for 
prescription drugs and access to ARVs at the global level.17 Stories about the plight of 
minorities, women, drug users, prostitutes, and AIDS orphans, who were stigmatized and 
often had no access to treatment and education about prevention, also were published.18 
For example: 
Access for All, the theme of next month's International AIDS Conference 
in Bangkok, sets an appropriately high standard for the world's response to 
the pandemic. Unfortunately, all too many prevention and treatment 
programs fail to address the needs of most of those living with the virus, 
especially in Africa: women and girls. It's time to design programs 
targeted to the risks that women and girls face in a world of AIDS. 
                                                            
15 David Brown, “Global Push against 3 Diseases Urged; WHO Calls on Rich Nations to 
Fund AIDS, Tuberculosis, Malaria Fight,” The Washington Post January 31, 2002. 
16 James D. Wolfensohn, “A War Chest to Fight AIDS,” The Washington Post, April 28, 
2001. 
 
17 Ethan Kapstein and Joshua W. Busby, “Making Markets for Merit Goods: The 
Political Economy of Antiretrovirals,” Global Policy 1, 1 (2009): 75‐90. 
 
18 Editorial, “The Feminization of AIDS,” The New York Times, December 13, 2004. 
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Most prevention messages, and certainly those favored by the Bush 
administration, focus on the "ABC" approach to fighting HIV-AIDS: 
abstinence, be faithful, and use condoms. While important messages, these 
things are often not within women's power to control.  
 
Sixty percent of those living with HIV in sub-Saharan Africa are women 
and girls. Girls between the ages of 15 and 19 are infected at rates as much 
as five times higher than boys their age. This disproportionate impact is 
linked to social and economic factors that severely undermine women's 
control over their sexual lives. In a climate where sexual abuse and 
exploitation of women and girls are widespread and usually goes 
unreported, how can they practice abstinence? When married women, 
many of whom were child brides, have been faithful to the    husbands 
who are infecting them, how do messages about monogamy help them 
protect themselves?19 
 
The news stories mentioned above indicate that HIV/AIDS has been framed in 
different ways and that many groups and institutions besides the community of scientists, 
epidemiologists, and public health professionals have been able to push the global 
scourge of HIV/AIDS onto the political and public agenda in the United States. Epistemic 
communities and civil society organizations have taken up the issue of pharmaceuticals 
and treatment access for all. The UN and the World Health Organization (WHO) have 
also emphasized the economic, security, and human rights dimension of AIDS. 
To help understand the changing nature of media coverage of AIDS, I conducted 
content analysis of media reports (1999–2007); the results are presented in the first part 
of this chapter. National surveys conducted by various organizations have shown that 
news media is the major source of information about HIV/AIDS for the public. 
According to national surveys conducted in the United States in 2003, 72% of Americans 
                                                            
19 Janet Fleischman, “Beyond 'ABC': Helping Women Fight AIDS,” The Washington 
Post, June 29, 2004. 
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identified print and visual media as their primary source of information about 
HIV/AIDS.20 In 2004, 71% of respondents got information about HIV/AIDS from the 
media.21  In 2006, 61% of respondents identified the media as the major source of news 
about HIV/AIDS.22  In a survey conducted in June 2011, media remained the top source 
of information about HIV/AIDS across racial/ethnic and all age groups. The second part 
of this chapter presents an analysis of public opinion polls to determine whether shifts in 
media framing of HIV/AIDS led to changes in public behavior and attitudes towards the 
disease. Public opinion data were collected by the Harvard School of Public Health 
(Project on Public and Biological Security) and the Robert Wood Johnson Foundation. 
These data were retrieved from the Kaiser Family Foundation’s Health Poll Search 
database. Additional data were collected from surveys conducted by the Pew Research 
Foundation and polls conducted by the Associated Press and CNN. The third section of 
the chapter describes a correlation analysis of media coverage of HIV/AIDS versus 
survey data about HIV/AIDS during the corresponding time period. The fourth section 
discusses the effects of agenda setting and framing on the public’s evaluation of different 
frames relevant to HIV/AIDS. 
                                                            
20 The Henry Kaiser Family Foundation, The Media and HIV/AIDS: Making a 
Difference (Geneva: Joint United Nation Program on HIV/AIDS: 2004), 1-25. Available 
online at http://www.kff.org/hivaids/upload/The-Media-and-HIV-AIDS-Making-a-
Difference.pdf, last accessed July 11, 2011. 
 
21 Henry J. Kaiser Family Foundation, "Survey of Americans on HIV/AIDS—Part One: 
Global HIV/AIDS," June 2004. Available online at 
www.kff.org/kaiserpolls/pomr060204pkg.cfm, last accessed August 17, 2011. 
 
22 Henry J. Kaiser Family Foundation, “Survey of Americans on HIV/AIDS,” May 2006. 
Available online at http://www.kff.org/kaiserpolls/upload/7513.pdf, last accessed August 
11, 2011. 
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6.1. Content Analysis of Newspaper Reports 
 
Using the Lexis-Nexis academic database, samples for this study were drawn 
from two major national newspapers (The New York Times and The Washington Post) 
between June 1, 1999 and June 30, 2007. The search process was different for this case 
study than in the cases of SARS and avian flu. The process was refined to obtain the most 
relevant results, as more than 3,000 stories were found during the original search. The 
term HIV/AIDS was added to the controlled vocabulary search, in addition to the 
requirement that it be present in the “headline or lead paragraph” and in at “least five 
occurrences in the article.” Obituaries and letters to the editor were excluded from the 
search. In the initial search of The New York Times returned 1,088 stories, and that of 
The Washington Post returned 972 stories. Because the stories returned by Lexis-Nexis 
were not ordered in any way other than the date, every fourth story was included in the 
pool (Table 6.1). Four frames (biomedical, economic, human rights, and security) were 
identified in the news stories. Coding criteria similar to those used for SARS and avian 
flu were used for HIV/AIDS.  
 
6.2. Data Analysis: The Mean Ratios of Four Coverage Types/Newspapers 
 
The data were analyzed using descriptive statistics as well as comparative 
statistics such as Analysis of Variance (ANOVA). All analyses were conducted using 
Excel and SPSS. The overall level of coverage was first examined in terms of number of 
articles. Table 6.1 shows the total number of articles for each newspaper and for the two 
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newspapers combined during the sampling period of June 1, 1999 through June 30, 2007. 
The two newspapers had similar numbers of articles published and similar average word 
counts.  
Table 6.1: Data Sources and Overall Coverage 
Newspaper 
Number 
of 
Articles Start date End date 
The New York Times 243 6/22/1999 6/30/2007 
The Washington Post 296 6/1/2009 6/29/2007 
Overall 539 6/1/2009 6/30/2007 
 
As HIV spread to different geographic regions, local and international media 
covered these stories. Each of the news stories on HIV from The New York Times and 
The Washington Post was coded as follows for the region or country that was the focus of 
the story: USA, countries other than USA, global impact, or geographic region not 
mentioned. Table 6.2 shows the frequency of articles relevant to each geographic 
location.  
Table 6.2:  Frequency of News Content by Geographic Location. 
Newspaper 
Geographic Location 
USA 
Other 
countries 
Global 
impact 
Not 
mentioned Start date End date 
New York 
Times 
101 
(39.0%) 
124 
(47.9%) 
30 
(11.6%) 3 (1.5%) 6/22/1999 6/30/2007
The 
Washington 
Post 
106 
(34.6%) 
140 
(45.8%) 
46 
(15.0%) 14 (4.6%) 6/1/2009 6/29/2007
Overall 
207 
(36.6%) 
264 
(46.7%) 
76 
(13.5%) 18 (3.2%) 6/1/2009 6/30/2007
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About half of the articles in each newspaper focused on regions other than the 
United States. A higher percentage of stories focusing on the United States were 
published in The New York Times than in The Washington Post. There were also a 
number of stories that discussed the global impact of HIV in an increasingly 
interconnected world. 
Because the news articles were coded for content or type of coverage and 
weighted for length, the news data were further analyzed with a focus on different types 
of coverage. Mean ratios of the four coverage types were computed for each region and 
are listed in the Table 6.3. The biomedical ratio was highest (0.30) in articles focused on 
the impact of HIV/AIDS on the United States, whereas the biomedical ratio was lowest 
(0.19) in articles focused on other countries. The mean biomedical ratio was 0.25 for the 
global impact context. The mean economic ratio was lowest (0.13) in articles focused on 
the United States, and the articles that focused on other countries and the overall global 
impact had similar economic ratios (0.25–0.26). The mean human rights ratio was similar 
for all three geographic categories (0.08–0.11), and the mean security ratio was very 
small for all three categories (< 0.05). 
Table 6.3: Mean Ratios for Coverage Type by Region  
Region Biomedical Ratio 
Economic 
Ratio 
Security 
Ratio 
Human 
Rights 
Ratio 
Start date End date 
USA 0.30 0.13 0.01 0.11 6/1/1999 6/30/2007
Other 
countries 0.19 0.26 0.01 0.10 6/19/1999 6/18/2007
Global 
impact 0.25 0.25 0.04 0.08 8/19/1999 6/29/2007
Not 
mentioned 0.25 0.20 0.01 0.10 7/1/1999 6/30/2007
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Table 6.4 summarizes the mean ratios for the four coverage types. The coverage 
patterns for the two newspapers were similar. Overall, the biomedical ratio was highest 
(0.26), the mean economic ratio was 0.20, the mean human rights ratio was 0.10, and the 
security ratio was very small (0.01). 
Table 6.4: Mean Ratios for Coverage Type in The New York Times and The 
Washington Post 
Newspaper 
Number 
of 
Articles 
Frame 
Time 
Interval Biomedical 
Ratio 
Economic
Ratio 
Security 
Ratio 
Human 
Rights 
Ratio 
The New 
York Times 243 0.27 0.23 0.01 0.11 
6/22/1999-
6/30/2007 
The 
Washington 
Post 
296 0.25 0.17 0.01 0.08 6/1/1999-6/29/2007 
Overall 539 0.26 0.20 0.01 0.10 6/1/1999-6/30/2007 
                      
  A one-way ANOVA followed by Tukey’s test was used to test for differences in 
ratios among the four frames over the entire sampling period. Overall, the two newspaper 
sampled devoted on average 26.0% (Table 6.5) of their coverage to the biomedical frame. 
The biomedical frame remained a central focus throughout the entire sampling period, 
and it had significantly higher coverage than the other three frames (p < 0.0001). The 
economic frame had the second highest coverage (20.0%), and it was significantly higher 
than those of the security and human rights frames (p < 0.0001). The human rights frame 
had the next highest coverage (10.0%), and it was significantly higher than that of the 
security frame (p < 0.0001). 
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Table 6.5: Comparison of the Four Frames over the Entire Sampling Period  
P-values for Mean Ratio Pairwise Comparisons Among the Four Frames (HIV) 
Entire 
Sampling 
Period 
Frame 
Least 
Square 
Mean 
Economic Human Rights Biomedical Security 
6/1/99–
6/30/07 
Economic 0.20 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 
Human 
Rights 0.10 <.0001  <.0001 <.0001 
Biomedical 0.26 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 
Security 0.01 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 
 
6.3. Changes in Media Coverage over Time 
 
The changes in media coverage in terms of the number of articles published and 
the ratios of the four frames were summarized over semiannual and quarterly intervals. 
Appendix Table 6.1 and Figure 6.1 show semiannual averages of the four frames, and 
Appendix Table 6.2 and Figure 6.2 show quarterly averages of the four frames. 
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Figure 6.1: Changes in Media Coverage over Time at Quarterly Intervals 
 
 
   
Figure 6.2: Changes in Media Coverage over Time at Semiannual Intervals  
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On a semiannual basis, the biomedical ratio gradually increased from the second 
half of 1999 until the second half of 2001. It dropped slightly at the beginning of 2001 
and then increased to the highest level at the beginning of 2002. It dipped again to the 
lowest level during the second half of 2002. Over the time interval studied, the 
biomedical ratio increased and decreased four times until the first half of 2007. Overall, 
the highest level was 0.34 during the first few months of 2002 and the lowest level was 
0.17 during the second half of 2002. The economic ratio was lowest (0.12) during the 
first half of 1999, and then it increased during the second half of 1999 though the first 
half of 2001. It reached its peak value (0.29) three times: at the beginning of 2001, during 
the second half of 2002, and during the second half of 2003. The human rights ratio was 
highest (0.16) during the second half of 1999, and then it went up and down multiple 
times. The lowest level (0.04) was recorded during the second half of 2005. The security 
ratio was always small. Its peak (0.07) occurred during the first half of 2001; otherwise it 
was always less than 0.05.  
The data analysis at quarterly intervals (Appendix Table A6.2 and Appendix 
Figure 6.1) further revealed that the biomedical ratio was the highest among the frames 
studied throughout the entire sampling period, with the exception of April–June and 
October–December, 1999; April–June, 2001; October–December, 2002; October–
December, 2003; July–September, 2004; and April–September, 2005. During April–June, 
1999, both the economic and human rights ratios were higher than the biomedical ratio. 
In October–December, 1999, the human rights ratio was the highest, and in April–June, 
2001, October–December, 2002, October–December, 2003, July–September, 2004, and 
April–September, 2005, the economic ratio was highest among the frames studied.  
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A closer look at these data tables illustrates that biomedical issues were always 
dominant. The security frame also was prominent in 2001. It is important that the 
economic frame was dominant in the second half of 1999 and in 2001, 2002, 2003, and 
2005 because one of the arguments given for declaring HIV a security threat was that it 
posed grave economic consequences. HIV was securitized in 2000–2001. This galvanized 
the attention of policy makers in the United States and of international organizations, 
which pledged huge amounts of money and also called for more economic funds to fight 
the disease. This was also the time when several news stories focused on the economic 
causes of the disease (e.g., why poor and uneducated women and men were infected by 
the disease). This was also the time when biomedical issues were less prominent and 
security and economic framings of the disease were dominant in media stories. The 
human rights issue peaked at the time when ARVs went on the market and then remained 
a constant issue in the human rights debate linked to HIV. Effective treatment against 
these infectious diseases required development of new drugs and vaccines, and 
widespread access of these drugs and medicines. However, there was a conflict between 
these two objectives.23 The development of new drugs required heavy investment in 
research by pharmaceuticals. Often it took more than twelve years to pass through all the 
stages of drug development and the only way for them to recover these high costs were to 
patent these drugs and charge high prices for these drugs. These drugs were often 
unaffordable by poor countries, and this issue brought health advocacy groups and many 
                                                            
23 Carsten Fink, “Intellectual Property and Public Health: An Overview of The Debate 
With A Focus on U.S. Policy,” Working Paper Number146, June 2008, Center For 
Global Development. Online available at 
http://www.cgdev.org/files/16228_file_IP_and_Public_Health_FINAL.pdf, last accessed 
September2, 2011. 
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non state actors campaigning for universal access to treatment and drugs in direct 
confrontation with the pharmaceutical industries.  
To examine the media volume (number of articles published) and the relative 
proportion of articles focusing on each geographic region, a bar chart was constructed at 
semiannual intervals (Figure 6.3). On average, 34 articles were published in each half 
year, out of which 13 articles focused on the United States, 17 articles focused on other 
regions, and 5 articles focused on the global impact of the disease. Since 2000, the media 
has covered the impact of HIV/AIDS on countries outside the United States. This does 
not mean, however, that reports about HIV in the United States declined. HIV continued 
to be an important health topic in news reports. 
 
Figure 6.3: Number of Articles Focusing on the Impact of HIV/AIDS on different 
Geographic Regions over Time at Semiannual Intervals. 
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6.4. Public Opinion Analysis 
 
The public opinion survey data were drawn from a secondary database 
corresponding to the time period during which these news stories were published. Public 
opinion data were collected mainly from the I Poll data bank, Polling the Nation, and the 
Health Poll Search of the Kaiser Family Foundation. All survey results are based on 
representative national samples of adults aged 18 or older. With very few exceptions, the 
sample sizes of these surveys were at least 1,000 respondents. Shifts in public opinion 
about infectious diseases were evaluated by analyzing exact and similarly worded 
questions about issues related to HIV. 24  Specifically, these questions assessed: 
a) willingness to support harsh public health measures such as quarantine and to make 
changes in daily behavior to curb the spread of disease; b) precautionary steps taken and 
behavioral changes made in personal lives due to fear of the 
disease; c) concerns about the spread of the disease and likelihood of contracting the 
disease; and d) support for federal funding to improve the country's ability to respond to 
new infectious diseases. 
The data were analyzed using descriptive statistical methods. The z-test was used 
to compare the proportion of subjects who responded positively or negatively in each 
survey. Survey responses were grouped together to form positive or negative responses. 
For example, survey responses such as “very worried” and “somewhat worried” or 
“extremely likely” and “very likely” were grouped together. All analyses were carried out 
                                                            
24 Shirley S. Ho, Dominique Brossard, and Dietram A. Scheufele, “The Polls—Trends 
Public Reactions to Global Health Threats and Infectious Diseases,” Public Opinion 
Quarterly 71, 4 (2007): 671-92. 
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using Excel and SPSS/PASW. Z-test scores > the absolute value of 1.96 at the 95% 
confidence interval were considered to be statistically significant. 
Five survey questions were examined to determine if Americans were willing to 
make changes in their behavior to avoid risk of infection with HIV/AIDS (Appendix 
Table A6.3). The surveys were conducted between August 2002 and April 2006. 
Participants were asked if they needed more information about how to use condoms, how 
to talk with children about HIV, where to get tested for HIV, how to talk with a doctor or 
health care provider about HIV, and how to talk with a partner about HIV. On average, 
75% of respondents answered “no,” which is significantly higher than the percentage of 
subjects choosing “yes.” The average percentage of subjects who thought they needed 
more information about how to talk with children about HIV was approximately 39% and 
that for where to get tested for HIV was about 28%. The percentage of respondents, 
asking for more information about how to use condoms, and how to talk with doctors or 
partners was rather low (about 14–19%). 
Four sets of questions were examined to determine if Americans had undertaken 
precautionary steps to prevent contracting HIV/AIDS (Appendix Table A6.4). These 
surveys were conducted between February 2000 and April 2006. The first set of questions 
asked whether the subjects had been tested for HIV. The questions were worded in 
slightly different ways (i.e., if people had ever been tested, whether they had been tested 
within the past 12 months or within the past 2 years). All surveys except the one 
conducted between December 10, 2002 and January 19, 2003 showed that a significantly 
higher percentage of respondents had never been tested for HIV (on average ~35% 
answered “Yes”). In the survey conducted between December 10, 2002 and January 19, 
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2003, a significantly higher percentage of respondents had been tested for HIV (~64% 
answered “Yes”). The second question asked whether the subjects had ever talked with a 
doctor or health care provider about HIV and AIDS. A similar trend was observed for this 
question: A higher percentage of subjects answered “Yes” (50%) in the survey conducted 
between December 10, 2002 and January 19, 2003, whereas in the three surveys 
conducted between August 14 and October 26, 2000, March 15 and May 11, 2004, and 
March 24 and April 18, 2006, a significantly higher percentage of subjects answered “no” 
average, only ~35% answered “Yes”). The third question asked whether the respondents 
and their partners ever had a conversation about whether to get tested for HIV/AIDS. In 
the survey conducted between December 10, 2002 and January 19, 2003, 51% of 
respondents answered “Yes” and 49% answered “No.” In the March 15–May 11, 2004 
survey, a higher percentage of subjects answered “No” (~54%). The last question asked 
participants whether they had ever talked about HIV or AIDS with (their) children. All 
three surveys showed a significantly higher percentage of subjects responding positively. 
This is indicative of the public’s concerns about HIV as far as children are concerned. 
This response is consistent with responses to the second question in the “willingness to 
change behavior” category, which asked parents if they needed more information about 
talking with children about AIDS. 
  Ten sets of questions were evaluated to examine concern about the spread of the 
disease and the perceived likelihood of being exposed to HIV/AIDS (Appendix Table 
A6.5). The surveys were conducted between September 1997 and May 2007. The first set 
of questions asked whether HIV was a more urgent problem or a less urgent problem for 
the United States than it was a few years ago. The surveys were worded slightly 
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differently. Respondents were asked if the problem was more urgent, a bigger problem, 
or if the number of HIV infections had increased. On average, about 50% of subjects 
agreed that HIV was a more urgent or a bigger problem. More respondents thought HIV 
infections had increased than decreased in the survey conducted between March 24 and 
April 18, 2006. A significantly higher percentage of subjects thought the HIV problem 
was the same or a lesser problem in the survey conducted between April 23 and May 6, 
2007.  
The second question asked subjects if they thought the United States today was 
making progress or losing ground as far as the problem of HIV was concerned. The first 
survey was conducted from June 13 to June 23, 2002.  No significant difference was 
found between subjects who thought the country was making progress vs. not making 
progress. When the same question was asked between March 15 and May 11, 2004, 
October 4 and October 9, 2005, and March 24 and April 18, 2006, a significantly higher 
percent of subjects did not think the United States was making progress. The third 
question sought public opinion about the magnitude of the HIV problem. A significantly 
higher percentage of subjects thought HIV was a very big or a moderately big problem. A 
lesser percentage of subjects thought HIV was a small problem or not a problem at all. 
The fourth question asked whether respondents were personally worried or 
concerned about HIV. A significantly higher percentage of subjects chose “not too 
concerned” or “not concerned at all” compared to the percentage of subjects who were 
“very concerned” or “somewhat concerned” for the question asked at 10 different times. 
On average, 32% of subjects chose “very concerned” or “somewhat concerned.” The fifth 
question asked whether parents were concerned about their sons or daughters being 
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infected with HIV. On average, 66% of subjects were very concerned or concerned or 
thought that the HIV problem was a major problem for teens. The percentage of people 
who were “very concerned” and “concerned” or thought  HIV was a “major problem” 
was significantly higher than the percentage of respondents who were “not concerned,” 
“not concerned at all,” or considered it a “minor problem” and “not a problem at all.”  
The sixth question asked Americans about the most urgent health problem facing 
this nation today. On average, 19% stated that HIV was the most urgent health problem. 
In the survey conducted in 2000, HIV was ranked second to cancer. In 2002, it was 
ranked fourth in order of urgency. HIV was seen as the second most urgent health 
problem in surveys in 2004 and 2005. In a 2006 survey, it was ranked as the third biggest 
health problem facing the nation. The seventh question asked respondents if they viewed 
HIV as a serious issue. On average, 95% of respondents thought HIV was a very serious 
or somewhat serious issue.  
The final three sets of questions sought public opinion about HIV in countries 
outside the United States. The eighth question examined public opinion about the most 
urgent health problem facing the world today. In 2000, HIV was viewed as the most 
urgent health problem facing the world. In subsequent surveys conducted in 2002, 2004, 
and 2006, it was ranked as the second most urgent problem facing the world. On average, 
38% of subjects chose HIV as the most urgent health problem. The percentage of subjects 
who chose HIV as the most urgent problem was highest in the survey conducted between 
July 18 and July 21, 2002. In this survey, about half of respondents chose HIV as the 
most urgent health problem among the major health problems listed. The ninth question 
sought to determine if the public viewed HIV as an epidemic in countries outside the 
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United States. On average, 69% of respondents viewed HIV as an epidemic, and this was 
a statistically significant result. The last question asked the public whether they thought 
the world was making progress or losing ground in the fight against HIV/AIDS. A 
significantly higher percentage of subjects thought the world was at about the same place 
or losing ground compared to the percentage of subjects who thought the world was 
making progress on HIV. 
Four sets of questions were examined to assess support for federal spending on 
programs aimed at prevention and treatment of HIV (Appendix Table A6.6). These 
surveys were conducted between September 1997 and April 2007. The first question 
sought to compare the amount of money the federal government spends on HIV/AIDS to 
the amount spent on other health problems, such as heart disease and cancer. On average, 
39% of subjects thought the federal government spent too little money on HIV. The 
second question asked about public opinion on federal funding for AIDS prevention and 
treatment in general. On average, 48% of subjects thought that the federal government 
spent too little. The percentage of people who supported more spending increased 
steadily from 39% in 2002 to 52% in 2004 and to 63% in 2006.25 The third question 
asked whether spending more money on HIV/AIDS prevention in the United States 
would lead to meaningful progress in slowing the epidemic. A significantly higher 
percentage of respondents (about 60%) in surveys conducted between March 15 and May 
11, 2004 and March 24 and April 18, 2006 thought that spending money would lead to 
meaningful progress, whereas in the survey conducted between October 4 and October 9, 
                                                            
25 Henry J. Kaiser Family Foundation, “Survey of Americans on HIV/AIDS,” May 2006. 
Available online at http://www.kff.org/kaiserpolls/upload/7513.pdf, last accessed August 
11, 2011. 
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2005, a significantly higher percentage (about 56%) of subjects thought spending money 
“would not make much difference.”  The fourth question assessed the importance that the 
public attached to improving treatment and prevention of HIV and AIDS. The majority of 
subjects (approximately 96%) thought it was important (“extremely important,” “very 
important,” and “somewhat important”) for all surveys conducted between March 30 and 
April 3, 2005, March 31 and April 4, 2006, and April 11 and April 15, 2007. 
 
6.5. Relationship between Media Coverage and Public Opinion (Overall Samples) 
 
 In this part of the analysis, the relationship between the media coverage and 
public opinion was examined through graphs and Pearson correlation analysis. I have 
included the data from time period when both media coverage and public opinion data 
were available and divided the common time period into monthly, weekly or quarterly 
intervals, as appropriate. The mean ratios for the four frames from media coverage and 
the mean percentage of positive responses were computed within each time section and 
both mean values were plotted in the same graph with line chart (media coverage) and 
scatter plot (public opinion). The key events in the HIV/AIDS time line were also plotted 
in the graph to help interpret the trend of change in both media coverage and public 
opinion both qualitatively and quantitatively. The Pearson correlation coefficient was 
computed whenever appropriate in order to determine whether a significant correlation 
between one of the media frames and public opinion exists.  All analysis was done on 
Excel and SPSS. All four measures of public opinion were examined in relation to media 
coverage a) willingness to take precautionary measures, b) actual behavior changes made, 
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c) perception of HIV/AIDS as threat, and d) support for federal funding on prevention 
and treatment of HIV/AIDS. 
Surveys were conducted to assess people’s willingness to undertake 
precautionary measures or make behavioral changes as a way of preventing HIV/AIDS. 
Respondents were questioned (Appendix Table A6.7) about whether they needed more 
information about five issues (Q1: how to use condoms, Q2: how to talk with children 
about HIV/AIDS; Q3: where to get tested for HIV; Q4: how to talk with a doctor or 
health care provider; Q5: how to talk with a partner about HIV and AIDS). Surveys were 
conducted between August 14 and October 26, 2000 and March 15 and May 11, 2004. 
Additionally, Q3 and Q5 were repeated between March 24 and April 18, 2006. To assess 
whether changes in media coverage of HIV had an impact on the percentage of people 
who needed more information about these aspects of HIV, a plot of news coverage data 
versus percentage of people requiring more information (i.e., those who answered “yes”) 
was constructed. A semiannual interval was used in order to examine the change over 
time in the two sets of data (See Appendix Table A6.7 and Figure 6.6).  
The first question asked whether the public needed more information about how 
to use condoms. The percentage of respondents who answered “yes” to this question did 
not change from 2000 to 2004 (both 14%). The percentage of people who answered “yes” 
to the other four questions was lower in 2004 compared to 2000. In particular, the 
percentage of respondents needing more information about how to talk with children 
about HIV/AIDS dropped from 44% to 33%. During the same period, the biomedical 
ratio increased from 0.24 to 0.32 and the economic ratio increased from 0.15 to 0.27, 
whereas the security and human rights ratios both declined (from 0.05 to 0.00 and from 
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0.10 to 0.03, respectively). During the survey conducted between March 24 and April 18, 
2006, both Q3 and Q5 had the highest percentage of “Yes” responses among the three 
surveys. The percentage of people who answered “Yes” to the need for more information 
on testing for HIV was rather low (< 20%) in the surveys. In contrast, Americans felt that 
they needed more information about how to talk to children about HIV/AIDS. There was 
also an increase in media reports that infections among teenagers was on the rise in the 
United States between 2004, and 2007.26 The percentage of “yes” answers about how to 
talk to a partner about the disease was low (< 20%) during the first two surveys, but it 
increased to 31% during the third survey conducted in 2006. 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                            
26 Sewell Chan, “Rise Seen in H.I.V. Infections among Young Men,” The New York 
Times  September11, 2007; Susan Levine, “D.C. Criticized for Not Treating AIDS as a 
Citywide Health Crisis; Report Describes Problem as Epidemic, Response as Anemic,” 
The Washington Post August10, 2005. 
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Note: Q1.Do you need more information about how to use condoms to protect 
against HIV? Q2.Do you need more information about how to talk with children about 
HIV? Q3.Do you need more information about where to go to get tested for HIV? Q4.Do 
you need more information about how to talk with your doctor or health care provider 
about HIV? Q5. Do you need more information about how to talk with your partner about 
HIV? 
Figure 6.4: Change in Media Coverage over Time and Public Opinion about 
Willingness to Change Behavior 
 
 A total of four questions were analyzed to examine actual behavioral changes 
made by the American public to prevent infection from HIV (Appendix Table A6.8). 
These questions asked respondents if they had ever been tested for HIV or talked about 
HIV with their doctors, partners, or children. The highest percentage of “yes” answers to 
the first three questions (been tested, talked to a doctor, or talked to a partner) occurred in 
the survey conducted between December 10, 2002 and January 19, 2003. The fourth 
question asked whether the respondents had ever talked to their children about HIV, and 
the highest percentage of “yes” answered occurred in the survey conducted between 
September 29 and October 23, 2003. The observed changes in public opinion do not seem 
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to correspond strongly to any changes in media reports over time, as the media coverage 
was relatively stable over the years. The public opinion data are too limited to reveal 
correlations because the survey duration was rather long (e.g., February 7 to September 4, 
2000) and the time interval between surveys was rather large (> 1 year). It is only 
possible to examine the relationship between media coverage and public opinion if more 
public opinion data collected over a shorter time interval (for example, every month or 
quarter of the year) become available.  
 
 Note: Q1. Have you, yourself, ever been tested for HIV? Q2. Have you ever talked with 
a doctor or health care provider about HIV and AIDS? Q3. Have you and your partner 
ever had a conversation about whether to get tested for HIV/AIDS? Q4. Have you 
personally ever personally talked about HIV or AIDS with (your) child or not?  
 
  Figure 6.5: Changes in Media Coverage over Time and Public Opinion about Actual 
Behavioral Changes over Time  
 
Ten questions were used to examine how concerned Americans were about HIV 
(Appendix Table A6.9 and Figure 6.8). Question 3 was excluded from the correlation 
analysis because only one survey was conducted in 1998 and no media data were 
available for 1998. On average, about half of the respondents considered HIV an urgent 
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problem for United States during the entire sampling period. The percentage of positive 
responses does not appear to correspond to changes in the media frame, as the media 
coverage was relatively stable over the sampling years.  
The second question asked respondents if the United States was making progress 
in controlling HIV or was losing ground. The question was repeated four times in June 
13–June 23, 2002, March 15–May 11, 2004, October 4–October 9, 2005 and March 24–
April 18, 2006. The highest percentage of positive response (making progress) was found 
during survey conducted in 2002 (49%), and then this percentage continuously remained 
consistent, during the surveys conducted in 2004 (47%), 2005 (41%), and 2006 (40%). 
During the same period of time, the biomedical ratio also dropped from 0.34 in the first 
half of 2002, to 0.28 in the first half of 2004, to 0.23 in the second half of 2005, and 
finally to 0.22 in the first half of 2006. At this time, the economic, security, and human 
rights ratios increased or dropped multiple times. Correlation analysis showed a positive 
significant correlation between the biomedical ratio and percentage of positive responses 
to perceived progress on the disease. (r = 0.9621, p = 0.0379, Table 6.8).  
The third question asked the respondents if they saw the spread of HIV and other 
infectious diseases as a big or small problem. The question was asked twice during 
August 19–September 8, 2002 and April 23–May 6, 2007. In the first survey, 83% of 
respondents thought HIV was a very big or moderately big problem, and in the second 
survey 81% of respondents thought HIV was a very big or moderately big problem. 
During the same period of time, the security and human rights exhibited a very minor 
change, but the biomedical ratio was higher and the economic ratio was lower during the 
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second survey period. Because only two surveys were conducted within a time interval of 
~5 five years, the data are too limited to safely draw any conclusion about the correlation.  
The fourth question asked the respondents if they were personally concerned 
about HIV. The survey was repeated between September 17 and October 19, 1997, 
February 7 and September 4, 2000, August 14 and October 26, 2000, January 25 and 
January 28, 2001, June 13 and June 23, 2002, November 3 and November 5, 2003, March 
15 and May 11, 2004, March 15 and May 11, 2004, July 19 and July 21, 2004, and March 
24 and April 18, 2006. On average, 32% of respondents indicated that they were very 
concerned or somewhat concerned about HIV. The percentage of positive responses, 
especially in surveys in 2000 and 2001 was significantly positively correlated with the 
security ratio (r = 0.7410, p = 0.0354, Table 6.8).  
The fifth question asked how concerned the respondents were about a son or 
daughter becoming infected with HIV. The question was repeated in surveys 
administered between August 14 and October 26, 2000, September 29 and October 23, 
2003, March 15 and May 11, 2004, and March 24 and April 18, 2006. The highest 
percentage of “very concerned” and “somewhat concerned” responses occurred during 
the first survey conducted in 2000. On average, 66% of subjects chose “very concerned” 
or “somewhat concerned” in this series of surveys.  
The sixth question asked Americans what they perceived as the most urgent 
health problem facing the United States today. The question was repeated in surveys 
conducted between August 14 and October 26, 2000, June 13 and June 23, 2002, March 
15 and May 11, 2004, October 4 and October 9, 2005, and March 24 and April 18, 2006. 
The highest percentage of respondents choosing HIV as the most urgent problem 
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occurred in the survey conducted in 2000. Although statistical analysis did not show any 
significant correlation between public opinion and media coverage for the fifth and sixth 
questions, framing of HIV in Africa as a threat to security in the United States by policy 
makers and academia highlighted the urgency of the situation to the public in 2000. There 
has however been a steady decline in public naming HIV/AIDS as the most urgent 
problem facing United States. Data on HIV/AIDS by ethnicity and race has however 
shown that Latinos and Black Americans are more likely than White Americans to see 
HIV/AIDS as a more urgent health problem in the country.27 
 The seventh question asked respondents how serious a problem they thought 
HIV/AIDS was in the United States. Despite perceptions of progress in treatment of HIV, 
many Americans still recognize the seriousness of HIV as a disease. The question was 
asked between July 13 and July 17, 2001, July 10 and July 11, 2002, July 19 and July 21, 
2004, May 10 and May 16, 2004, and June 23 and June 28, 2005. In all of the surveys, 
the percentage of positive responses was very high (94–96%). No significant correlation 
was found between public opinion and any particular media frame for this question.  
However, the high percentage of positive responses suggests that the high volume of 
media coverage of economic, security, and human rights aspects of HIV highlighted the 
seriousness of the issue.  
The eighth question asked the respondents what they perceived as the most urgent 
health problem facing the world today. The question was repeated from August 14 to 
                                                            
27 The  Henry J. Kaiser Family Foundation , HIV/AIDS at 30: A Public Opinion 
Perspective, A Report Base on Kaiser Family’s Foundation’s 2011 Survey of Americans 
on HIV/AIDS,” June 2011. Available online at 
http://www.kff.org/kaiserpolls/upload/8186.pdf, last accessed September 25, 2011. 
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October 26, 2000, June 13 to June 23, 2002, July 18 to July 21, 2002, March 15 to May 
11, 2004, and March 24 to April 18, 2006. On average, 37% of subjects chose HIV as the 
most urgent health problem. The highest percentage of respondents choosing HIV was 
42% in the 2002 survey, and the lowest was 34% in the 2006 survey. Statistically, no 
significant correlation was found between public opinion and any particular media frame 
for this question. However, a significant amount of media coverage about the spread of 
HIV/AIDS around the globe seemed to have influenced public opinion in the United 
States.  
The ninth question asked Americans if they viewed the HIV problem worldwide 
as an epidemic or as a pandemic. The question was asked first between June 13 and June 
23, 2002, and it was repeated in a survey conducted between March 15 and May 11, 
2004. In 2002 and 2004, 67% and 70% of the respondents surveyed viewed HIV as an 
epidemic. No significant correlation was found between public opinion and media 
coverage for this question. The last question asked the public if they thought the world 
today was making progress on controlling the spread of HIV. The question was repeated 
in surveys conducted from June 13 to June 23, 2002, March 15 to May 11, 2004, and 
March 24 to April 18, 2006. The percentage of positive responses (more urgent problem 
in the world) increased significantly between 2000 and 2002. Conceptualizing of 
HIV/AIDs as a security threat could have influenced the public in United States. In all 
three surveys, only 35–38% of the respondents thought that the world was making 
progress.  More than 50% of respondents felt that the situation in the world was about the 
same or not improving. No significant correlation was found between public opinion and 
changes in media coverage for this question. Once again, however, the increased media 
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coverage of HIV/AIDS around the world seems to have influenced public opinion about 
the worsening HIV situation in the world. 
 
Note: Q1.Do you think HIV is a more urgent problem or a less urgent problem, or is it the 
same for this country, than it was a few years ago? Q2.Thinking about the way the 
problem of HIV/AIDS affects the United States today; do you think the problem is about 
the same as it has been, that the U.S. today is making progress in this area, or that the 
U.S. today is losing ground? Q3.Please tell me if you think it is a very big problem, a 
moderately big problem, a small problem or not a problem at all, the spread of HIV/AIDS 
and other infectious diseases. Q4. Bearing in mind the different ways people can be 
infected with HIV--how concerned are you personally about becoming infected with 
HIV? Q5.How concerned are you about a son or daughter becoming infected with HIV? 
Q6.What do you think is the most urgent health problem facing this nation today? Q7. 
How serious a problem would you say HIV/AIDS is? Q8. What do you think is the most 
urgent health problem facing the world today? Q9 .Which one of the following two 
statements comes closer to your views? The HIV/AIDS problem worldwide is best 
described as 'an epidemic.' HIV/AIDS is a serious problem, but it is an exaggeration to 
call it 'a pandemic.' Q10.Do you think the problem of HIV/AIDS is about the same as it 
has been, that the world today is making progress in this area, or that the world today is 
losing ground? 
Figure 6.6: Changes in Media Coverage and Public Opinion about HIV as a Threat  
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Table 6.6: Correlation Analysis Results for Media Coverage and Percentage of Positive 
Responses  
Correlation between 
percentage of positive 
responses vs. media 
coverage (Pearson 
correlation coefficients (p-
value)) 
Q2 (Is the United States 
making progress on the 
HIV problem?) 
Q4 (How concerned are 
you about the HIV 
problem?)  
Biomedical 0.9621 0.02756 (p=0.0379) (p=0.9484) 
Economic 0.48849 -0.33981 (p=0.5115) (p=0.4102) 
Security -0.48961 0.7410 (p=0.5104) (p=0.0354) 
Human Rights -0.0803 -0.34711 (p=0.9197) (p=0.3996) 
Note: Only questions with at least one significant correlation with media coverage are 
shown. 
 
 Four sets of questions asked between 1999 and 2007 were examined to study 
changes in public support for federal funding on programs aimed at treatment and 
prevention of HIV (Appendix Table A6.10). The first two questions asked respondents if 
they supported spending on HIV prevention and treatment. The third question asked if 
respondents thought that spending more money on HIV would lead to meaningful 
progress in slowing the epidemic. The fourth question asked respondents if improving 
treatment and prevention of HIV and AIDS was important. The highest percentage of 
positive responses for the first three questions occurred in the survey conducted during 
the first half of 2006. The second highest percentage of positive responses for the first 
and third questions occurred during the first half of 2004. The fourth question was 
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repeated three times during the first half of 2005, 2006, and 2007. More than 96% of 
responses were positive in all three surveys. This indicates that the general public favored 
funding of HIV/AIDS treatment and prevention programs. Because the time interval 
between surveys is rather large and the media coverage remained stable over the years, 
there is no clear correlation between media coverage and opinion.  
 
Note: Q1.Do you think federal spending on AIDS is too high, low or about right 
compared to other diseases? Q2. Do you think the federal government spends too much 
money on AIDS, too little money, or about the right amount? Q3.Do you think that 
spending more money on HIV/AIDS prevention in the United States will lead to 
meaningful progress in slowing the epidemic, or that spending more money won't make 
much difference? Q4.Do you think improving treatment and prevention of HIV and 
AIDS is important national priority? 
Figure 6.7:  Changes in Media Coverage over Time and Public Support for Funding  
 
6.6. Relationship between Media Coverage and Public Opinion (Coverage of the United 
States)  
A similar correlation analysis was performed to examine the impact of media 
coverage of HIV/AIDS within the United States on public opinion (Table 6.6). A separate 
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analysis was conducted to assess whether media coverage that focused only on HIV 
within the United States had a different impact on public opinion. This analysis was done 
to test the hypothesis that the public in the United States is more concerned about any 
infectious disease if it is shown to affect the United States and its people in many 
different ways. 207 of the 565 articles focused on the impact of HIV on the United States. 
  Correlation analysis was conducted for question, assessing American perception 
of threat from the disease. Only three questions showed a significant correlation. 
Responses to Q3 (Appendix Table A6.5), which asked respondents, “Will spending more 
money on HIV/AIDS prevention in the United States lead to meaningful progress in 
slowing the epidemic?” were  positively correlated with the human rights ratio.  
Responses to Q7 (Appendix Table A6.5), which asked the public, “How serious a 
problem would you say HIV/AIDS is in the United States?” was negatively correlated 
with the human rights ratio. This could be attributed to the fact that most stories that 
addressed the rights issue in the United States were about the rights of black women and 
homosexuals. Responses to Q 8 (Appendix Table A6.5), which asked Americans, “What 
is the most urgent health problem facing the world today?” were positively correlated 
with the economic ratio. This could be due to the fact that most of the stories with an 
economic frame focused on developing countries.  
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Table 6.7: Correlation Analysis for Changes in Media Coverage (United States) only and 
Percentage of Positive Responses.  
Correlation 
between % of 
positive responses 
vs. media 
coverage (Pearson 
Correlation 
Coefficients (p-
value)) 
Q7: How serious 
a problem would 
you say 
HIV/AIDS is as a 
public health 
problem in United 
States? 
Q8. What do 
you think is 
the most 
urgent health 
problem 
facing the 
world today? 
Q3.Do you think that 
spending more money on 
HIV/AIDS prevention in 
the United States will 
lead to meaningful 
progress in slowing the 
epidemic, or that 
spending more money 
won't make much 
difference? 
Biomedical 0.84957 –0.54918 0.03683 (p=0.0684) (p=0.4508) (p=0.9765) 
Economic –0.70965 0.97061 –0.08352 (p=0.1794 (p=0.0294) (p=0.9468) 
Security 0.17678 0.57132 NA (p=0.7761 (p=0.4287) NA 
Human Rights -0.92825 0.63864 0.99854 (p=0.0228) (p=0.3614) (p=0.0344) 
 Note: Questions repeated at least thrice were included in the analysis. NA: security ratio 
was zero 
 
6.7. Discussion and Conclusion   
 
This study assessed whether increased news coverage of HIV/AIDS influenced 
Americans’ perception, awareness, and concern about the disease. The detailed analysis 
of various surveys presented above confirms that the public is concerned about the 
disease and sees it as a serious public health issue, both in the United States and around 
the globe. One thing that has remained consistently high is the public’s support for 
funding of treatment and prevention programs on HIV. Since 1997, the majority of the 
American public feels that American domestic spending on fighting HIV/AIDS epidemic 
202 
 
is too low. Even when asked if federal spending on HIV/AIDS was too low compared to 
money spent on other diseases, the percentage of respondents who viewed it as too low 
has never dipped below 50%.28 Between 2004 and 2006, the percentage saying that the 
federal government spends too little money on HIV/AIDS in general increased from 52% 
to 63%, and the share saying spending on HIV/AIDS is too low compared with other 
diseases increased from 42% to 48% (Appendix Table A6.6). Americans are also 
supportive of funding for HIV prevention and treatment overseas and at home. This study 
also sought to understand whether certain ways of representing or “framing” the disease 
evoked greater concern and led people to make behavioral changes in their personal lives 
and support government funding on research on AIDS vaccine, treatment and prevention 
programs on the disease domestically and globally. Two hypotheses were proposed in 
this context.  First, the frames represented prominently in the media will tend to mobilize 
public support for policies associated with those frames. In this study the biomedical 
frame was the dominant frame throughout the sampled period, followed by the economic 
frame. Statistical analysis revealed a positive correlation between increased coverage of 
biomedical news about HIV and perceived sense of progress in treatment of disease 
(Table 6.6). This is in contrast to the findings on studies of SARS and avian flu. This can 
be attributed to the fact that most biomedical coverage of HIV/AIDS since 1999 has 
focused on discovery of ARVs and how they can increase the longevity of patients living 
                                                            
28 Kaiser Family Foundation, “Public Opinion on the HIV/AIDS Epidemic in the United 
States,” Spotlight, August 2006. Available online at 
http://www.kff.org/spotlight/hivus/upload/HIV_US_Epidemic_outline.pdf, last accessed 
January 1, 2011. 
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with HIV.29 As news focused more and more on the growing epidemic in Asia, Eastern 
Europe, and Africa, Americans at home felt more and more that AIDS was a less urgent 
biomedical problem for them.30 The HIV/AIDS epidemic has hit African Americans and 
Latinos much more than whites, and thus the former are more likely to view this disease 
as an urgent problem. Survey data have shown, however, that while the share of African 
Americans and Latinos who consider HIV/AIDS to be the most urgent health problem 
facing the nation is higher than that for whites, the percentage of African Americans and 
Latinos who believe HIV/AIDS is an urgent health problem has also declined over time. 
This is despite the fact that CDC estimates that there are 50,000 new infections in the 
United States and more than 50% of these are among Black men and women in United 
States.31 Blacks accounted for 57% of deaths due to HIV in 2007, whereas 13% of 
Latinos died of AIDS in 2007.32  Despite rising figures of HIV infections, even the 
African Americans and Latino population in the United States see the nation as making 
progress on AIDS.33 Advances in treatment of AIDS have greatly reduced AIDS related 
mortality, and perinatal transmission, and people in United States now live with AIDS 
                                                            
 
29 Editorial, “AIDS: The Perils of Progress,” The Washington Post, June 10, 2002. 
30 Lawrence K. Altman, “Spread of AIDS Fast Outpacing Response,” The New York 
Times, November 26, 2003; Nicholas Eberstadt, “The Future of AIDS,” Foreign Affairs 
81, 6 (2002): 22-45. 
 
31 Irene H. Hall, Ruiguang Song, and Philip Rhodes, “Estimation of HIV incidence in the 
United States,” JAMA 300, 5(2008): 520-29. 
 
32 Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, “HIV Surveillance- United States 1998-
2008,” Morbidity and Mortality Weekly Report 21, 60(2011): 689-98. 
 
33 Editorial, “AIDS Won't Wait,” The Washington Post, April 30, 2003.  
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much longer than they did in 1980s.34 In fact there were reports of Americans resorting to 
risky sexual behavior as they feared the disease even less.35 Thus, the biomedical frame 
did not lead people to undertake significantly high behavioral changes. The concern 
among parents of teenagers among all Americans has however, remained high.  
The second hypothesis proposed that Americans will see security and human 
rights frames as less relevant, compared to biomedical and economic frames (which will 
be more dominant in news reports). This analysis, however, revealed a positive 
correlation between the security frame and the level of personal concern about HIV/AIDS 
among Americans (Table 6.6). Though security frame was not the dominant frame in the 
overall sampled period, it was the dominant frame in 2000, and 2001, and all surveys on 
AIDS in these years showed increased worry about the disease. This is a very important 
finding, as it was the first time a disease was framed as a threat to national and 
international security. Until 1999, AIDS was considered a “gay plague” that affected only 
homosexuals in the United States.36 Framing HIV/AIDS as a security concern with grave 
economic consequences had a tremendous impact on Americans. It showed the public 
that in a global world, diseases in any other part of the world could impact Americans at 
home. Thus, while not the most repeated frame, the security frame was understood as 
relevant by the American public.  
                                                            
34 Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, “HIV Surveillance- United States 1998-
2008,” Morbidity and Mortality Weekly Report 21, 60(2011): 689-98. 
35 Opinion, “Complacency amid the AIDS Epidemic,” The New York Times  
September1, 1999. 
 
36 Ceci Connolly, “Choice for AIDS Panel Withdraws After Criticism,” The Washington 
Post, January 24, 2003. 
205 
 
To further test the second hypothesis, a separate correlation analysis was 
conducted using public opinion data about AIDS and media stories that focused 
exclusively on the impact of HIV/AIDS on the United States (Table 6.7). The analysis 
showed a positive correlation between the economic frame and the perception among 
Americans that HIV/AIDS was the most urgent problem facing the world.  Stories with 
an economic focus exhorted developed countries like the United States not to be 
indifferent to AIDS, which was described as the greatest humanitarian crisis of all time.37 
A number of stories debated President Bush’s “abstinence only” funding programs and 
noted how they were unfair to many stigmatized minorities, including sex workers and 
children orphaned by AIDS in developing countries.38 At the same time, several stories 
discussed how the AIDS epidemic had the potential to impact Americans in the United 
States. This also influenced Americans’ views on the urgency of the AIDS problem 
worldwide.39 
                                                            
37 Editorial, “Retreat on Fighting Global HIV/AIDS,” The New York Times, June 21, 
2002; Sebastian Mallaby, “An Optional Catastrophe,” The Washington Post, October 14, 
2002; Caryle Murphy, “McCarrick Enlists Catholics in Fight against HIV/AIDS,” The 
Washington Post, May23, 2003. 
 
38 Peter Slevin and Ceci Connolly, “Powell Urges Condom Use; View Differs From 
Bush's and Irks Conservatives,” The Washington Post, February 15, 2002. 
 
39 According to a survey conducted by the Chicago Council on Foreign Relations in June 
2002 on "a list of possible threats to the vital interest of the United States in the next ten 
years," a very strong 68% rated "AIDS, the Ebola virus, and other potential epidemics" as 
a critical threat (29% said it was "important but not critical," 29% while only 3% said it 
was "not important." Chicago Council of Global Affairs, Public Opinion Surveys: 
Worldview( Chicago: Chicago Council of Global affairs, 2002). Online available at 
http://www.thechicagocouncil.org/UserFiles/File/POS_Topline%20Reports/POS%20200
2/Public%20Topline%20Report%20Worldviews%202002.pdf, last accessed 
September22, 2011. 
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  The analysis also revealed a positive correlation between the human rights frame 
and American support for spending more money on AIDS prevention to slow the 
epidemic in the United States. While news stories that drew linkages between HIV/AIDS 
and human rights in countries outside the United States were about medical patents and 
access to HIV drugs, stories that discussed human rights and AIDS in the context of the 
United States were more about rights of stigmatized minorities such as gays, drug 
addicts, prisoners, homeless people, and black women infected with AIDS.40 Many news 
stories discussed how the stigma surrounding AIDS prevented many people from getting 
tested for the virus.41 This led to increased transmission of infection to newborn babies 
and to men or women who did not know the HIV status of their partners. Emphasis was 
given to preventive efforts such as supplying clean needles and syringes to drug addicts, 
providing routine testing for pregnant women and gay and bisexual men, providing 
greater availability of condoms, and providing sex education and abstinence programs for 
teenagers.42 Several stories described the plight of rural communities that lacked medical 
facilities to treat AIDS patients. 43  Also influencing public opinion were stories that 
                                                            
40 Avram Goldstein, “High Rate of Infection Found in Md. Prisons,” The Washington 
Post, May 7, 2003; Lisa Frazier, “AIDS’s Somber Reminder; Quilt Holds Urgent 
Message for African Americans,” The Washington Post, December 1, 1999.  
 
41 David Brown, “U.S. Recommends Routine Testing For the AIDS Virus,” The 
Washington Post, September22, 2006.Marc Santora, “City AIDS Report Highlights Risk 
to Black Men and Women,” The New York Times, February4, 2006. 
 
42 Ceci Connolly, “CDC Urges Routine HIV Testing; New Screening Procedures Aimed 
Especially at Pregnant Women,” The Washington Post, April 18, 2003; Editorial, 
“Modifying the State laws,” The New York Times, February 6, 2006; Editorial, “Playing 
Games With AIDS,” The New York Times, September 26, 2006. 
 
43 Steven Gray, “Outcasts in the Country,” The Washington Post, June 10, 2000. 
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discussed discrimination in the work places and providing housing for AIDS patients.44 
New stories carried demands made by AIDS advocacy groups for health care and 
scientific research on HIV treatment and prevention in the United States and abroad.45 
Americans supported funding for prevention and treatment from HIV/AIDS, as they 
understood (as reinforced in the human rights frame linked to HIV) that poverty, 
inequality of incomes, stigmatization and discrimination against AIDS patients needed to 
be addressed. Several AIDS activists like Jonathan Mann and his group further framed 
the denial of these rights to HIV patients as an impediment to the realization of HIV 
prevention strategies.46 Thus, the human rights frame had a considerable influence on 
Americans when the frame emphasized the suffering due to AIDS of Americans.  At the 
same time, respondents believed that not all Americans were at risk of contracting the 
disease. Perhaps for this reason, the study showed a negative correlation between the 
human rights ratio and perceived seriousness of the disease among the American public. 
 
  
                                                            
 
44 Sewell Chan, “Metro Briefing New York: Albany: Sate Reverses Housing Decision 
For Tenants With H.I.V.,” The New York Times, February 28, 2007. 
45 Karlyn Barker , “98 Arrested in Capitol Hill AIDS Protest; Marchers Seek More Funds 
for Care, Research,” The Washington Post, May 21, 2004. 
 
46 Sofia Gruskin and Daniel Tarantola, Health and Human Rights in Perspectives on 
Health and Human Rights edited Sofia Gruskin, Michael A. Grodin, George J. Annas, 
Stephen P. Marks(Routledge, New York: 2005), 3-58 
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6.8. Limitations of the Study 
 
The goal of this study was to analyze changes in media coverage about 
HIV/AIDS and the correlation between such changes and the percentage of positive 
responses over time in surveys about the disease. Correlations could not be established 
accurately between some of the variables.  This could be because the HIV issue is far 
more complicated than a simple linear model can explain. The epidemiology and 
transmission routes of HIV infection differ from those of the other infectious diseases 
studied (SARS and avian flu). These differences make the general population feel far less 
vulnerable to HIV infection and shape people’s attitudes about the disease. Unlike SARS 
and avian flu, which took people around the globe by surprise, HIV/AIDS has been 
around for more than 20 years, and a sense of apathy and complacency has arisen among 
many people. The term “AIDS fatigue” has been coined to describe this phenomenon. 
These factors mean that it is not so easy to determine the direct impact of media framing 
on people’s concerns about HIV. 
 A second limitation of the study is that the secondary surveys available covered a 
wide time interval (half a year to one year), which made it difficult to study short-term 
changes in media coverage. If more surveys with a monthly or quarterly interval were 
available, the correlation between media coverage and changes in public opinion could be 
examined in more detail.   
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VII. CONCLUSION 
In this dissertation I investigated whether Americans’ attitudes and opinions about 
infectious diseases were influenced by how the issue was framed. The content analysis of 
news reports about SARS, avian flu, and HIV/AIDS highlighted an evolving debate over 
how to understand the problem of infectious diseases. To examine potential framing 
effects on public reactions to infectious diseases, I studied nationally representative 
surveys about infectious diseases retrieved from survey data banks.  
I posed two main questions in this dissertation: Which frame was the most 
powerful and influential in shaping public opinion about global infectious diseases, and 
what explains varying patterns of responses to framing of three different infectious 
diseases? The two main hypotheses tested were as follows: 1) The frames that are 
represented predominantly in the media will tend to mobilize public support for policies 
associated with those frames, and 2) when economic and biomedical issues are dominant, 
people will be more likely to support inconvenient policies such as quarantine and 
support federal funding of programs aimed at combating infectious diseases because they 
will see these issues as more personally relevant compared to security and human rights 
frames.  
 
7.1. Research Findings 
 
My analysis produced three major findings. First, the biomedical frame was the 
dominant frame in all three case studies, and the economic frame was the second most 
represented frame. The human rights and security frames were less prominent in all the 
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three case studies. Second, framing effects were present, although the degree of the 
respondents’ opinion changes was not particularly large. Finally, different frames seemed 
to evoke a differing pattern of responses about the three different infectious diseases.  
The varying patterns of responses can be explained in several ways. In the case of 
SARS, the biomedical frame dominated in terms of overall coverage during the sampling 
period, but it was the economic frame (the second most represented frame) that was 
positively correlated (r = 0.6542, Table 4.7) with levels of worry about the disease. There 
are two plausible explanations for why the biomedical frame did not evoke a very 
powerful response among Americans. First, while the media reported extensively on the 
biomedical aspects of SARS, it also described how the United States public health system 
was equipped and well prepared to control the disease following the incident of anthrax-
tainted mail in 2001.1 Second, through July 2003, 192 cases had been reported in the 
United States, including 159 suspected and 33 probable cases.2 Of the 33 probable cases, 
only 8 were confirmed in the laboratory as SARS. There were no reported cases of 
SARS-related deaths in the United States. The economic coverage of SARS became more 
prominent in the post-outbreak era as news stories focused on losses to various sectors of 
the economy in an increasingly interconnected world. Stories that framed SARS as an 
economic issue, focused on losses incurred not only by the travel and tourism industry 
but also by other industries and corporations that had offshore and manufacturing units in 
                                                            
1 World Health Organization. SARS: Status of the Outbreak and Lessons for Immediate 
Future, Communicable Disease Surveillance and Response. Geneva, Switzerland. May 
20, 2003. Available online at http://www.who.int/csr/media/sars_wha.pdf, last accessed 
September 27, 2009. 
 
2 Ibid. 
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Asia. 3  News stories also reported approximately $50 billion in losses to the global 
economy, mainly from losses in tourism, trade, and the retail industry.4 Other stories 
reported on disease-related medical costs. The economic frame may not only have raised 
the general level of concern among the American public, therefore, but may also have 
done so in a way to which many Americans saw as personally relevant. 
In the case of avian flu, the biomedical frame was dominant throughout the 
sampled period. Around 50% of the news stories were on biomedical aspects of avian flu. 
Statistically significant correlations were found between increased medical news 
coverage and respondents’ level of worry about being exposed to avian flu. Between 
2005 and 2007, media reports highlighted the spread of avian flu to countries around the 
world and reported on cases of transmission to humans.5 Both The New York Times and 
The Washington Post published many stories stating that avian flu killed 100% of 
                                                            
3 Colin Campbell, “The SARS Epidemic; Economic Impact of New Disease, From Near 
Outbreak to Far Away,” The New York Times, May 18, 2003. 
 
4 Summary of Probable SARS Cases with Onset Illness from 1 November 2002 to 31 
July 2003, (Epidemic and Pandemic Alert and Response (EPR), September 2003). 
Available online at http://www.who.int/csr/sars/country/table2003_09_23/en, last 
accessed March 25, 2006. Also see Asian Development Bank, Assessing the Impact and 
Cost of SARS in Developing Asia. Asian Development Outlook 2003, Update, 2003. 
Available online at http://www.adb.org/documents/books/ado/2003/update/sars.pdf, last 
accessed March 25, 2006. 
 
5 The WHO's official count of human cases of H5N1 reaches 122, with 62 deaths, in 
Vietnam, Thailand, Indonesia, and Cambodia (WHO, Cumulative Number of Confirmed 
Human Cases of Avian Influenza A/(H5N1) Reported to WHO, November 1, 2005.  In 
August 2006 it was reported that 232 people in 10 countries had contracted bird flu and 
134 had died. Online available at Online available at  
http://www.who.int/influenza/resources/documents/TrackingHistoryH5N1_20080131.pdf
, last accessed November6, 2011. 
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infected domesticated chickens and depicting the deadly scenario that would occur if the 
constantly evolving bird flu virus became capable of human-to-human transmission. 
Several studies discussing the possibility that the virus would mutate into a flu that could 
be transmitted among people were published and discussed in the media.6 The scientific 
community and public health specialists were not the only ones highlighting concerns 
over the spread of bird flu. The media reported extensively on the concerns of the 
President of the United States and the United States Congress about avian flu.7 Thus, the 
biomedical frame invoked a general public danger (relevant to all people). Moreover, 
because there was no known cure for avian flu, all people were equally susceptible to it. 
In this sense, media coverage of avian flu contrasts with that of SARS.  In the latter case, 
occurring shortly after the anthrax scare, coverage highlighted the extent of preparation to 
manage the spread of the disease.  In the case of avian flu, after 2005, confidence in such 
preparations had apparently subsided, and the coverage tended to stress the dangers. 
The study of HIV/AIDS revealed different results. As in the other cases, the 
biomedical frame was the most common in media reports. Moreover, the correlation 
between the biomedical frame and the perception of progress in fighting the disease was 
high. One explanation for these results is that HIV/AIDS has been in the news since 1980. 
In the 1980s, a great deal of research was conducted to identify the origins and 
transmission routes of HIV. Over time, HIV/AIDS lost its reputation as a mystery illness 
                                                            
6  Michael Osterholm, “Preparing for the Next Pandemic,” New England Journal of 
Medicine 352(2005): 1839-42. 
 
7 In December 2006, the Congress passed and the President signed “The Pandemic and 
All Hazards Preparedness Act,” which called for the establishment of the National Health 
Security Strategy. 
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for people in the United States. Since 1987, when antiretroviral treatment was approved 
by the FDA and as widespread combination antiretroviral therapy was made more widely 
available to people infected with HIV, the number of people dying from the disease has 
declined substantially. A decade of surveys conducted by the Kaiser Family Foundation 
has shown a decreased sense of concern among people in the United States about the 
disease. In 1987, two-thirds of Americans (68%) surveyed felt that HIV/AIDS was the 
most urgent health problem facing the country.8 The numbers have declined steadily 
since then. In 1990, the share of people naming HIV/AIDS as the most urgent health 
issue declined to 49%. In 2000, the percentage was 25%, and it decreased to 21% in 2004, 
17% in 2005, and 7% in 2009. 9  Although these values are higher for the African 
American community and the Latino community compared to the white community, they 
also have declined over time, even though sections of these communities have been 
severely affected by the disease. As news stories focused on scientific advancements in 
the treatment of HIV and the availability of antiretrovirals to more and more people in the 
United States, a sense of complacency took root. The decreased sense of urgency seems 
to parallel a perceived sense of progress.10 People now view HIV more as a chronic and 
manageable disease than as a death sentence, despite the fact that HIV still cannot be 
cured.  
                                                            
8 The  Henry J. Kaiser Family Foundation , HIV/AIDS at 30: A Public Opinion 
Perspective, A Report Base on Kaiser Family’s Foundation’s 2011 Survey of Americans 
on HIV/AIDS,” June 2011. Available online at 
http://www.kff.org/kaiserpolls/upload/8186.pdf, last accessed September 25, 2011. 
 
9 Ibid. 
 
10 Ibid. 
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HIV/AIDS was presented as a security issue in new stories in 2000 and 2001, and 
this is the time period when surveys revealed an increased concern about the disease 
among Americans in general. The percentage of positive responses to questions on 
personal concern about HIV/AIDS especially in surveys in 2000 and 2001 was positively 
correlated with the increase in security coverage.  According to polls conducted by Kaiser 
Family Foundation (Table A6.5) in January 2001, nearly 26% of the surveyed population 
was personally concerned about HIV, an increase from 19% in 2000, and 24% in 1997. 
Until 1999, AIDS was considered by most Americans to be a “gay plague.”11 Framing 
HIV/AIDS as a security concern with grave economic consequences probably triggered 
increased concern about HIV/AIDS. It showed the public that in a global world, diseases 
in any other part of the world could impact Americans at home. The HIV/AIDS 
pandemic in Africa, which was spreading fast to other countries of the world where the 
United States had strategic interests, was framed as a security threat to Americans at 
home. As university researchers and national and international security agencies sounded 
the alarm, the public responded with increased worry.  
A separate correlation analysis of news stories discussing the impact of 
HIV/AIDS specifically on the United States showed that, unlike the cases of SARS and 
avian flu, framing HIV/AIDS as a human rights issue also evoked powerful responses. 
Human rights activists in the United States took up the issue of civil and political rights 
of homosexuals and protested against stigmatization, marginalization, and discrimination 
of people infected with HIV/AIDS. They pressed the United States government to 
                                                            
11 Ceci Connolly, “Choice for AIDS Panel Withdraws After Criticism,” The Washington 
Post, January 24, 2003. 
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incorporate rights for HIV patients into domestic legislation.12 Slowly, human rights 
concerns became linked to the issue of free and non-discriminatory access to medicines 
and treatment. In the United States, the demographic profile of people with HIV/AIDS 
also changed over time. It no longer affected only white homosexual males but also 
prisoners, injection drug users, African American and Latino women, and people living 
in inner cities and poorer neighborhoods in America. Many news stories discussed how 
stigma surrounding AIDS prevented many people from getting tested for AIDS.13 This 
led to increased transmission of infection to newborn babies and to men or women who 
did not know the HIV status of their partners. Several stories described the plight of rural 
communities that lacked medical facilities to treat AIDS patients.14 These news stories 
produced two contrasting effects. While, Americans sympathized with people suffering 
from HIV/AIDS, and supported increased spending on HIV/AIDS prevention and 
treatment; at the same time most people probably believed that AIDS is a disease caused 
by certain behaviors and that the general population is not at risk of being infected. Media 
coverage dealing with the impact of HIV/AIDS on human rights in the United States was, 
therefore, positively correlated with Americans’ support for increased federal funding for 
HIV/AIDS prevention in the United States, and showed a negative correlation between 
                                                            
12 Lawrence O. Gostin, The AIDS Pandemic (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina 
Press: 2004), 61-89. 
 
13 David Brown, “U.S. Recommends Routine Testing For the AIDS Virus,” The 
Washington Post, September22, 2006.Marc Santora, “City AIDS Report Highlights Risk 
to Black Men and Women,” The New York Times, February4, 2006. 
 
14 Steven Gray, “Outcasts in the Country,” The Washington Post, June 10, 2000. 
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the human rights ratio and perceived seriousness of the disease among the American 
public.15  
The economic frame was positively correlated with the perception that HIV/AIDS 
was the most urgent health problem in the world. After 2000, more than half of the news 
stories on HIV/AIDS in the newspapers were about the spread of HIV in countries 
outside the United States. A number of stories debated President Bush’s “abstinence 
only” funding programs and suggested that they were unfair to stigmatized minorities, 
including sex workers and children orphaned by AIDS in developing countries.16 News 
stories emphasized not only the economic impact of the spread of the disease but also 
how certain economic factors (e.g., poverty, illiteracy, and prostitution) in poor countries 
were responsible for the spread of the disease. International organizations and 
government agencies urged developed countries to make financial contributions to 
prevent the spread of HIV and to provide treatment for poor people affected by the 
disease. At the same time, several stories discussed how the AIDS epidemic had the 
potential to impact Americans in the United States. This might have persuaded 
Americans that HIV/AIDS was the most urgent health problem in the world.  
The three diseases differ in terms of their origins, pattern of transmission, 
consequences for human health, and potential to inflict damage. These differences may 
account for different public health intervention strategies and elicit different responses 
from people. HIV can be transmitted when specific body fluids of an infected person 
                                                            
15 Ibid., Preface 
 
16 Peter Slevin and Ceci Connolly, “Powell Urges Condom Use; View Differs From 
Bush's and Irks Conservatives,” The Washington Post, February 15, 2002. 
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come into direct contact with mucous membranes, damaged tissue, or the blood stream 
(e.g., through exchange of needles, tattoos, blood transfusion) of another person.17 What 
makes HIV different from other infectious diseases is its cultural variation: Certain 
subpopulations (homosexuals, drug addicts, and sex workers and their partners) have 
been most affected by the disease. 18  Public health officials distinguish such 
"communicable" diseases from "contagious" diseases.19 While many human-to-human 
transmissible diseases may be categorized as communicable, diseases such as SARS and 
avian flu are considered to be contagious because they can be transmitted much more 
rapidly through close proximity and/or bodily contact. While anyone and everyone may 
be at risk of being infected with a respiratory disease, only certain behavior and bodily 
contacts can cause the HIV virus to be transmitted. 
Nevertheless, across all three diseases, certain common framing effects emerged. 
The biomedical frame was readily available and accessible to the public, as biomedical 
issues were predominantly displayed and repeated in media reports. Except in the case of 
SARS, this frame was generally associated with greater public worry and more support 
for inconvenient public policies. The economic frame produced a similar effect. And the 
human rights and security frames, in general, had less influence on public opinion, 
perhaps because people found them less personally relevant or perhaps because they were 
                                                            
17 Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, Department of Health and Human 
Services, Facts on HIV Prevention. Available online at 
http://www.cdc.gov/hiv/resources/qa/transmission.htm, last accessed March 25, 2010. 
 
18 Bruce R. Levin, James J. Bull, and Frank M. Stewart, “Epidemiology, Evolution, and 
Future of the HIV Pandemic,” Emerging Infectious Diseases 7, 3 (2001): 505-11. 
 
19 John T. Jacob, “Human Rights and Public Health during Pandemic Influenza,” Indian 
Journal of Medical Ethics, 3, 1 (2006): 2-3. 
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more contested issues. In case of HIV/AIDS, however, security and human rights did 
matter.  
 
7.2. Implications of the Study 
 
 This dissertation uses a research design that studied framing effects (measured by 
changes in responses to survey responses) when respondents were exposed to multiple 
frames over a period of time. Unlike many previous experimental studies of framing 
effects in which respondents were exposed to opposing frames in measured quantities, 
this study sought to understand framing effects when respondents were exposed to 
multiple frames in real world conditions.20  Case studies of three infectious diseases 
explored changes in framing in terms of the number of articles published and the ratios of 
the four frames at quarterly, monthly, and weekly intervals. As hypothesized, some 
frames seemed to invoke more worry and concern over the disease than others. Increased 
prominence (frequency) of some frames also increased public anxiety. This finding 
supports Shanto Iyengar's observation that repeated exposure to a frame, such as 
frequently hearing a news story emphasizing economic losses increases the accessibility 
of the frame and enhances its effect. 21  When any concept is recently or frequently 
                                                            
20 Experimental studies have the built in advantage of controlling the environment in 
which media effects take place and making sure no other factor leads to changes in media 
effects. 
 
21 Shanto Iyengar, “Accessibility Bias in Politics: Television News and Public Opinion,” 
International Journal of Public Opinion Research 2, 1(1990):1-15. 
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repeated, it comes easily to one’s mind when making judgments on a policy.22 Other 
frames, even if they were not the most frequently appearing frames, apparently prompted 
concern over the disease because they were perceived to be more relevant or stronger 
frames.23 In this fashion, the economic frame may have increased public anxiety about 
SARS when coverage pertained specifically to the United States. The findings of this 
study are generally consistent with those of Paul Brewer, David Wise, Paul Sniderman, 
and Sean Theriault, who posited that framing results are not as robust when respondents 
are exposed to dual or multiple frames (compared with single frames). On the other hand, 
this study of infectious disease framing does not support the claim that exposure to 
competing frames necessarily mitigates the impact of any one frame. As Rodger Payne 
puts it:  
No frame is an omnipotent persuasive tool that can be decisively wielded 
and it would be virtually impossible to know in advance if an apparently 
compelling frame in one situation would also prove persuasive when 
applied to an analogous case 24  
 
The analysis of the three case studies suggests that some frames are more powerful and 
persuasive than others. The findings are also consistent, therefore, with the work of James 
                                                            
22 Nira Liberman, Jens Forster, and Tory E. Higgins, “Completed vs. Interrupted Priming: 
Reduced Accessibility from post-Fulfillment Inhibition,” Journal of Experimental Social 
Psychology 43 (2007): 258-64; Susan T. Fiske and Shelley E. Taylor, Social Cognition, 
From Brains to Culture (Boston: McGraw Hill Higher Education, 2008), 1-540. 
 
23 Dennis Chong and James N. Druckman, “Framing Theory,” Annual Review of 
Political Science 10, 1(2007): 103-26. 
 
24 Rodger A. Payne, “Persuasion, Frames and Norm Construction,” European Journal of 
International Relations 7, 1 (2001): 44. 
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Druckman and Dennis Chong, who stated that even when multiple frames are present, 
some frames are likely to be more persuasive than others.  
Most previous studies of the relationship between public opinion and foreign 
policy have focused on issues of war, military intervention, international trade, and 
foreign aid.  These are all domains in which public opinion was not considered to be an 
important determinant in the formulation of government policies. Yet scholars have 
increasingly pointed out that the boundaries between domestic policy and international 
policy have become blurred, particularly in an era of globalization. 25  A better 
understanding of the consequences of issue framing thus has important implications that 
spill across the boundaries separating domestic public health policy and foreign policy.  
Issue framing is likely to be relevant to international agreements about surveillance, 
border controls, immigration issues, and distribution of vaccines and antiviral drugs to 
control transnational diseases.26  Moreover, public support, compliance, and trust are 
extremely important for the effectiveness of policies on naturally occurring infectious 
disease and the threat of a bioterrorist attack on the country. In the case of an epidemic or 
a bioterrorist attack, national governments may have to enforce inconvenient measures 
such as quarantine and increased domestic surveillance. These measures might invite the 
wrath of civil rights activists or other people unwilling to comply. For all of these 
                                                            
25 Jessica Tuchman Matthews, “Redefining Security,” Foreign Affairs 68, 2(1989): 129-
54; Karen T. Litfin, “Advocacy Coalitions along the Domestic- Foreign Frontier: 
Globalization and Canadian Climate Change Policy,” Policy Studies Journal 28, 1(2000): 
236-52. 
 
26 Paul Burstein, “Bringing the Public Back in: Should Sociologists Consider the Impact 
of Public Opinion on Public Policy?” Social Forces 77, 1(1998): 27-62. 
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reasons, it is important to know what kind of media messages or frames appeal most to 
the public.  
 Curiously, security framing in stories about SARS and avian flu was less 
prominent than one might have expected. Since the end of the Cold war, the debate about 
new security threats has dominated the field of security studies. Some scholars have 
argued for widening the field of security studies to include issues such as the environment 
and infectious diseases. Others have been critical of widening the concept of security to 
include non-traditional threats such as infectious diseases.27 The defining moment in this 
debate was the declaration of HIV/AIDS as a threat to international security by the 
United Nations Security Council in 2000. HIV/AIDS was framed as a comprehensive 
threat to citizens, economies, the military, public health, social instability, peacekeeping 
forces, and state institutions. Doing so was an effective means of mobilizing the 
enormous resources and leadership of the United States government and international 
organizations in dealing with this issue. Over the years, security became a contested 
concept, as many schools of thought conceptualize security in a variety of ways.28 For 
example, some AIDS activists were critical of conceptualizing HIV/AIDS as a security 
issue. They felt, “portraying the illness as an overwhelming ‘threat’ works against 
                                                            
27 Daniel Deudney, “The Case Against Linking Environmental Degradation and National 
Security,” Millennium 19, 3 (1990): 461-76. 
 
28 Steve Smith, “The Contested Concept of Security,” in Critical Security Studies in 
World Politics, ed. Ken Booth (Boulder: Lynne  Rienner, 2005), 27-62; Amitav Acharya, 
“Human Security: East versus West,” International Journal 61, 3 (2001): 442-60. 
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ongoing efforts to normalize social perceptions regarding HIV/AIDS.” 29  Some also 
objected that framing certain infectious diseases as security threats would divert 
resources overwhelmingly to research on those diseases at the expense of many other, 
more lethal diseases that affect primarily the poorest countries of the world.30 A decade 
after HIV/AIDS was securitized as a threat to national and international security, several 
academic and policy studies have questioned whether linkages between HIV/AIDS and 
state security may have been overdrawn.31 While these debates played out mainly in 
academia, the absence of a clear security framing effect suggests that the debate never 
gained much public traction.  
In any case, the security frame was not very prominent overall in stories about 
SARS or avian flu. Few news reports drew linkages between SARS and threat to the state 
and its institutions, although many stories discussed SARS as a serious threat in so far as 
it spread rapidly, killed individuals, and caused economic disruption in some of the most 
robust economies of the world. The security frame was somewhat more prominent in 
news coverage about avian flu. Between June 2005 and May 2006, there were several 
news reports framing avian flu as a security threat. The National Security Strategy of the 
United States (2006) outlined threats from pandemic diseases such as avian flu, which 
recognized no borders. President Bush reportedly considered using the military to enforce 
                                                            
29 Stefan Elbe, “Should HIV/AIDS be Securitized? The Ethical Dilemmas of Linking 
HIV/AIDS and Security,” International Studies Quarterly 50, 1(2006): 119-44. 
 
30 Simon Rushton, “Global Health Security:  Security for Whom? Security from Whom?” 
Political Studies 59, 4(2011): 779-96. 
 
31 Colin Mcinnes and Simon Rushton, “HIV, AIDS, and Security: Where are we now?” 
International Affairs 86, 1(2010): 225-45. 
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quarantine in the event of a pandemic.32 The security frame did not, however, have much 
impact on public perception of threat from avian flu. Despite the big debate in the field of 
security studies about expanding the notion of security to include non-traditional security 
threats, the literature on non-traditional security threats published since the end of the 
Cold War does not seem to be securitized in American public opinion. 
One possibility is that an "overdose" of news coverage about other security threats, 
particularly after the 9/11 terrorist attacks, may have led to security fatigue on the part of 
the American people.33 People in the United States seem to understand the importance of 
global infectious disease as a biomedical and economic issue and to support surveillance, 
vaccine research, and quarantine. A similar pattern may exist, moreover, in the 
relationship of climate change and global warming to national security. 34  Despite 
considerable research into the security implications of climate change and global 
warming, which could involve mass climate-driven migration and increased instability in 
states, public opinion surveys have repeatedly shown that the American public is not 
                                                            
32 David Brown, “Military’s Role in a Flu Pandemic,” The Washington Post October 5, 
2005. 
 
33 Susan D. Moeller, Compassion Fatigue: How the Media Sell Disease, Famine, War and 
Death (New York: Routledge, 1999), 7-80. 
 
34 Josh Busby, Climate Change and National Security: an Agenda for Action (New York: 
Council on Foreign Relations, 2007), 1-40; Center For Naval Analyses, National  
Security and the Threat of Climate Change (Virginia: CNA Corporation, 2006). 
Available online at 
http://www.cna.org/sites/default/files/National%20Security%20and%20the%20Threat%2
0of%20Climate%20Change%20-%20Print.pdf, last accessed  November 10, 2011. 
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convinced that climate change is a serious threat to the United States.35 In a Gallup Poll 
survey conducted in 2010, 48% of the population felt that threat from climate change was 
exaggerated; this was an increase from 39% in 2009 and 31% in 1991 when the question 
was first asked by Gallup Poll.36 Such observations have prompted considerable work on 
what kind of frames could influence American public opinion and make issues such as 
global warming and climate change more salient to Americans.37 For example, scholars 
of environmental studies have suggested ways to frame climate change to illustrate a 
more local and regional impact in order to make the frame personally relevant. Other 
scholars have recommended framing climate change as a threat to human security to 
address issue of human vulnerabilities and to raise concern among people about 
environmental issues.38 This study suggests that although framing effects can be powerful, 
even concerted efforts at policy framing, such as those to "securitize" non-traditional 
security issues, can be very difficult to accomplish. 
  
 
                                                            
35 Security Council Holds First-Ever Debate on Impact of Climate Change on Peace, 
Security, Hearing Over 50 Speakers. United Nations, April 17, 2007. Available online 
at   http://www.un.org/News/Press/docs/2007/sc9000.doc.htm, last accessed November 
10, 2011. 
 
36 Lydia Saad, Increased Numbers Think Global Warming is Exaggerated, March 11, 
2009, Gall Up. Online available at http://www.gallup.com/poll/116590/Increased-
Number-Think-Global-Warming-Exaggerated.aspx, last accessed November 9, 2011.  
 
37 George Lakoff “Why it Matters How We Frame the Environment,” Environmental 
Communication 4, 1(2010): 70-81. 
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                                              APPENDIX  
The Appendix has tables that were useful in Chapters 4, 5, and 6. They could not 
be included in the chapters, as they are lengthy and detailed. Nevertheless, they are 
important to understanding the empirical analysis in this dissertation. The tables listed 
below display changes in media coverage for all the three infectious diseases, at weekly, 
monthly, and yearly intervals. 
 Appendix Tables A4.1-A4.2 discusses changes in media coverage about SARS 
over time at monthly and weekly intervals between March15, 2003 and June30, 2004. 
Appendix Tables A5.1 and A5.2 display changes in media coverage on avian flu at 
monthly and quarterly intervals between January 1, 2004 and December 31, 2007. 
Appendix Tables A5.3, A5.4, A5.5 and A5.6 show weekly coverage of media frames in 
2004, 2005, 2006 and 2007 respectively. Appendix TableA6.1 and A6.2 display Changes 
in media coverage on HIV/AIDS over time at Semi Annual and Quarterly Intervals 
between June30, 1999 and December 31, 2007.  
Public Opinion polls were analyzed and studied in great details. The following 
tables have details of survey questions and recorded responses.TablesA4.3, A4.4, A4.5 
contain questions on public support for quarantine, actual behavioral changes made, and 
recognition of SARS as threat respectively. Table A5.7 display a list of questions 
regarding willingness to change behavior in response to news about avian flu. Table A5.8 
has questions about actual behavioral changes made in response to news about avian flu. 
TableA5.9 shows questions about recognition of avian flu as a threat table and Table A 
5.10 lists all questions about support for funding for research on avian flu. 
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  Table A6.3 contains a list of questions regarding willingness to change behavior 
in response to news about HIV/AIDS. Table A6.4 lists questions about actual behavioral 
changes made in response to news about HIV/AIDS. Table A6.5 lists questions about 
recognition of HIV/AIDS as a threat. Table A6.6 lists questions on support for federal 
funding on HIV/AIDS. Figure A6.4: show changes in media coverage over time and 
public opinion on support for funding. Figure A6.3 shows changes in media coverage 
over time and public opinion HIV/AIDS as threat Figure A6.2 shows changes in media 
coverage over and public opinion about actual behavioral changes FigureA6.1 shows 
changes in media coverage over time and public opinion about willingness to change 
Behavior. All the four figures show changes in media coverage in response to news 
stories about impact of HIV/AIDS on United States. 
 
 
Table A4.1: Changes in Media Coverage about SARS over Time 
 (Monthly Intervals) 
 
Time Interval No. of Articles 
Medical 
Ratio 
Economic 
Ratio 
Security 
Ratio 
Human 
Rights 
Ratio 
3/16/03–
4/15/03 37 0.48 0.12 0.03 0.02 
4/16/03–
5/15/03 88 0.35 0.16 0.07 0.04 
5/16/03–
6/15/03 42 0.39 0.11 0.02 0.04 
6/16/03–
7/15/03 12 0.23 0.34 0.00 0.00 
7/16/03–
8/15/03 10 0.11 0.43 0.01 0.00 
8/16/03–
9/15/03 9 0.32 0.12 0.00 0.00 
9/16/03– 5 0.29 0.10 0.05 0.01 
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10/15/03 
10/16/03–
1/15/03 2 0.52 0.11 0.05 0.00 
11/16/03–
2/15/03 9 0.46 0.07 0.01 0.00 
12/16/03–
1/15/04 2 0.47 0.00 0.00 0.00 
1/16/04–
2/15/04 2 0.15 0.11 0.00 0.00 
3/16/04–
4/15/04 4 0.48 0.06 0.03 0.02 
4/16/04–
5/15/04 1 0.42 0.00 0.08 0.00 
5/16/04–
6/15/04 1 0.47 0.00 0.00 0.00 
Note: The ratio for each frame for a given news article was calculated as the 
number of times a given frame was mentioned divided by the total number 
of sentences in that news article, and the mean ratio for each frame in a 
given monthly interval was calculated as the average of the ratios for all 
news articles published in the monthly interval.  
 
 
 
 
Table A4.2: Changes in Media Coverage about SARS over Time 
 (Weekly Intervals) 
 
Time Interval No. of Articles 
Medical 
Ratio 
Economic 
Ratio 
Security 
Ratio 
Human 
Rights 
Ratio 
3/16/03–3/22/03 4 0.46 0.01 0.02 0.00 
3/23/03–3/29/03 4 0.60 0.00 0.03 0.00 
3/30/03–4/5/03 9 0.37 0.18 0.06 0.02 
4/6/03-4/12/03 11 0.43 0.19 0.02 0.03 
4/13/03–4/19/03 15 0.52 0.09 0.03 0.01 
4/20/03–4/26/03 27 0.40 0.18 0.07 0.02 
4/27/03–5/3/03 25 0.27 0.19 0.06 0.01 
5/4/03–5/10/03 21 0.33 0.14 0.08 0.06 
5/11/03–5/17/03 14 0.33 0.11 0.08 0.08 
5/18/03–5/24/03 18 0.39 0.08 0.02 0.08 
5/25/03–5/31/03 8 0.44 0.07 0.01 0.00 
6/1/03–6/7/03 5 0.40 0.07 0.05 0.03 
6/8/03–6/14/03 6 0.43 0.31 0.01 0.00 
6/15/03–6/21/03 2 0.13 0.59 0.00 0.00 
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6/22/03–6/28/03 4 0.29 0.18 0.00 0.00 
6/29/03–7/5/03 3 0.17 0.12 0.01 0.00 
7/6/03–7/12/03 2 0.32 0.58 0.00 0.00 
7/13/03–7/19/03 4 0.18 0.23 0.00 0.00 
7/20/03–7/26/03 1 0.00 1.00 0.00 0.00 
7/27/03–8/2/03 3 0.15 0.29 0.04 0.00 
8/3/03–8/9/03 1 0.00 1.00 0.00 0.00 
8/10/03–8/16/03 2 0.07 0.55 0.00 0.00 
8/17/03–8/23/03 3 0.30 0.07 0.00 0.00 
8/24/03–8/30/03 1 0.00 0.50 0.00 0.00 
9/7/03–9/13/03 3 0.50 0.01 0.01 0.00 
9/21/02–9/27/03 1 0.45 0.00 0.00 0.00 
10/12/03–10/18/03 2 0.13 0.17 0.00 0.00 
10/19/03–10/27/03 1 0.00 0.33 0.00 0.00 
10/28/03–11/3/03 2 0.36 0.03 0.09 0.03 
11/11/03–11/17/03 1 0.49 0.14 0.04 0.00 
11/18/03–11/25/03 1 0.60 0.05 0.04 0.00 
12/10/03–12/16/03 1 0.45 0.17 0.07 0.00 
12/17/03–12/23/03 3 0.59 0.02 0.00 0.00 
12/31/03–1/6/04 2 0.50 0.00 0.00 0.00 
1/7/04–1/13/04 2 0.32 0.27 0.04 0.01 
1/14/04–1/20/04 3 0.34 0.00 0.00 0.00 
1/28/04–2/3/04 2 0.30 0.09 0.00 0.00 
3/12/04–3/18/04 1 0.29 0.04 0.00 0.00 
4/25/04–5/1/04 2 0.51 0.03 0.02 0.00 
5/2/04–5/8/04 2 0.44 0.08 0.04 0.05 
5/23/04–5/29/04 1 0.42 0.00 0.08 0.00 
6/20/04–6/26/04 1 0.47 0.00 0.00 0.00 
Note: The ratio for each frame for a given news article was calculated as the 
number of times a given frame was mentioned divided by the total number of 
sentences in that news article, and the mean ratio for each frame in a given 
weekly interval was calculated as the average of the ratios for all news articles 
published in the weekly interval.  
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Table A4.3: Questions Regarding Willingness to Change Behavior in Response to 
 News about SARS 
Q1. Suppose you were exposed to someone who had SARS but you didn't know if 
you had the disease. Would you be willing to be quarantined in your home for10 
ten days in order to prevent spreading the disease?  
 
Survey date (Harvard/ICR) April 11–15, 2003 May 2–6, 2003
Yes 92% 93% 
No 7% 5% 
Don't know 1% 2% 
Q2. Suppose you were exposed to someone who had SARS but you didn't know if 
you had the disease. Would you be willing to be quarantined for 2 or 3 weeks in a 
health care facility to prevent spreading the disease? 
 
Survey date (Harvard/ICR) April 11–15, 2003 May 2–6, 2003
Yes 94% 95% 
No 4% 3% 
Don't know 2% 2% 
Q3. Recently, President George W. Bush signed an executive order adding SARS 
(Severe Acute Respiratory Syndrome) to the list of diseases for which people can be 
quarantined. Do you think this order threatens your personal rights and freedoms? 
 
Survey date (Harvard/ICR) April 11–15, 2003 May 2–6, 2003
No 85% 83% 
Yes 13% 13% 
Don't know 2% 2% 
Q4. Having heard about SARS, would you say you are much more likely to seek 
medical help, a little more likely to seek help, or it has not affected whether you 
would seek help if you or a family member got flu-like symptoms? 
 
Survey date (Associated Press/ICR) April 21–24, 2003   
Much more likely 39%   
A little more likely 30%   
Would have no effect 29%   
Don't Know 2%   
Note: A significantly higher percentage of subjects was willing to be quarantined at home 
or in a health care facility, thought adding SARS to the list of disease for which people 
can be quarantined did not threaten their personal rights and freedoms, and was more 
likely see help when they/their family member got flu-like symptoms according to z test 
results (z score > 1.96 or < –1.96). 
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Table A4.4: Questions about Actual Behavioral Changes Made in Response to News 
about SARS 
Q1. Have you avoided international air travel (that is airline travel outside the 
United States) in the past 12 months because of SARS? 
 
Survey date (Harvard/ICR) April 11–15, 2003 May 2–6, 2003 
Yes 17% 9% 
No 82% 91% 
Don't know 1% 0% 
Q2. Have you avoided people you think may have recently visited Asia? 
 
Survey date (Harvard/ICR) April 11–15, 2003 May 2–6, 2003 
Yes 16% 11% 
No 82% 87% 
Don't know 2% 3% 
Q3. Have you avoided Asian restaurants 
or stores?   
 
Survey date (Harvard/ICR) April 11–15, 2003 May 2–6, 2003 
Yes 14% 9% 
No 86% 90% 
Don't know 0% 0% 
Q4. Have you used a disinfectant at home or at work to protect 
against SARS?  
 
Survey date (Harvard/ICR) April 11–15, 2003 May 2–6, 2003 
Yes 21% 16% 
No 78% 83% 
Don't know 0% 0% 
Q5. Have you talked with your doctor about health issues related to SARS? 
 
Survey date (Harvard/ICR) April 11–15, 2003 May 2–6, 2003 
Yes 5% 6% 
No 94% 93% 
Don't know 0% 0% 
Q6.Have you avoided public events? 
 
Survey date (Harvard/ICR) April 11–15, 2003 May 2–6, 2003 
Yes 10% 7% 
No 89% 92% 
Don't know 0% 0% 
Q7. Have you consulted a website for information about how to protect yourself 
against SARS? 
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Survey date (Harvard/ICR) April 11–15, 2003 May 2–6, 2003 
Yes 9% 8% 
No 90% 91% 
Don't know 0% 0% 
Q8. Have you or someone in the family purchased a face mask?  
 
Survey date (Harvard/ICR) April 11–15, 2003 May 2–6, 2003 
Yes 3% 3% 
No 96% 96% 
Don't know 1% 0% 
Q9. Have you carried something to clean any object you think might have come in 
contact with someone who has SARS? 
 
Survey date (Harvard/ICR) April 11–15, 2003 May 2–6, 2003 
Yes 9% 6% 
No 90% 94% 
Don't know 1% 0% 
Note: A significantly higher percentage of subjects did not avoid international air travel, 
did not avoid people they thought may have recently visited Asia, did not avoid Asian 
restaurants or stores, did not use a disinfectant at home or work to protect against SARS, 
did not consult with their doctor about health issues related to SARS, did not avoid public 
events, did not consult a website, did not purchase a face mask, and did not carry 
something to clean any objects they thought might have come in contact with someone 
who has SARS according to z test results (z score > 1.96 or < –1.96). 
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Table A4.5: Questions about Recognition of SARS as a Threat 
Q1. How worried are you that you or someone in your family will be exposed to 
SARS? Data are from CNN/USA TODAY/GALLUP (04/05/03–04/06/03, 04/14/03–
04/16/03, 04/22/03–04/23/03) and Pew Research Centre/Princeton Survey Research 
Associates (04/30/03–05/04/03) 
 
Survey 
date 
April 5–
6, 2003 
April 14–
16, 2003 
April 
22–23, 
2003 
April 30–
May 4, 
2003   
Very 
worried 10% 10% 11% 9%   
Somewhat 
worried 27% 22% 32% 28%   
Not too 
worried 39% 43% 36% 29%   
Not 
worried at 
all 24% 24% 21% 34%   
No opinion 0% 1% 0% 0%   
Q2. How worried are you that you or someone in your family will be exposed to 
SARS? Data are from Pew Research Centre/Princeton Survey Research Associates 
(04/30/03), CBS News/The New York Times (05/09/03–05/12/03), Stony Brook 
Centre For Survey Research (05/01/03–05/20/03), Gallup (11/03/03–11/05/03) 
Survey 
date 
April 30–
May 4, 
2003 
May 9–12, 
2003 
May 1–
20, 
2003 
 
Novemb
er 3–5, 
2003   
Very 
worried 12% 8% 8% 15%   
Somewha
t 
worrie
d 23% 27% 27% 30%   
Not too 
worried 31% 35% 35% 26%   
Not 
worried 
at all 32% 30% 29% 29%   
No 
opinion 2% 1% 1% 0%   
Q3. How concerned are you that you or a family member will get SARS in the next 3 
months? Data are from Harvard ICR (12/12/03–12/16/03, 10/29 /04–11/9/04) 
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Survey 
date 
December 
12–16, 
2003 
October 29–
November 
9, 2004   
Very 
concerne
d 16% 10%   
Somewha
t 
worrie
d 14% 11%   
Not too 
worried 28% 25%   
Not 
worried 
at all 42% 47%   
No 
opinion 1% 7%   
Q4. Do you think that SARS is very likely to affect you or someone in your 
immediate family in the next 12 months? Data are from the Harvard School of Public 
Health Project on Public and Biological Security/ICR 
 
Survey 
date 
April 11–
15, 2003 
April 25–
30, 2003 
May 2–
6, 2003 
July 18–
22, 2003 
January 
7–11, 
2004 
August 25–
29, 2004 
Very 
likely 5% 3% 3% 2% 4% 2% 
Somewh
at  likely 20% 11% 13% 4% 4% 5% 
Not too  
likely 42% 33% 37% 29% 33% 31% 
Not 
likely at 
all 31% 46% 44% 62% 57% 56% 
No 
opinion 2% 7% 3% 3% 3% 6% 
Note: A significantly higher percentage of subjects did not worry about being  exposed to 
SARS, did not  have concern that they or a family member would get SARS in the next 3 
months, and did not think SARS was very likely to affect them or someone in their 
immediate family according to z test results (z score > 1.96 or < –1.96). 
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Table A5.1: Changes in Media Coverage over Time (Quarterly Intervals) 
 
Time Interval 
(Months, 
Year) 
No. of 
Articles 
Biomedical 
Ratio 
Economic 
Ratio 
Security 
Ratio 
Human 
Rights 
Ratio 
1–3, 2004 17 0.26 0.31 0.05 0.01 
4–6, 2004 1 0.20 0.24 0.16 0.00 
7–9, 2004 6 0.43 0.11 0.01 0.00 
10–12, 2004 4 0.41 0.18 0.01 0.00 
1–3, 2005 5 0.56 0.06 0.01 0.01 
4–6, 2005 8 0.44 0.19 0.13 0.00 
7–9, 2005 7 0.54 0.21 0.06 0.00 
10–12, 2005 35 0.33 0.22 0.08 0.02 
1–3, 2006 36 0.38 0.19 0.04 0.01 
4–6, 2006 17 0.43 0.14 0.01 0.01 
7–9, 2006 7 0.69 0.02 0.01 0.00 
10–12, 2006 4 0.26 0.16 0.16 0.04 
1–3, 2007 8 0.68 0.14 0.00 0.03 
4–6, 2007 1 0.90 0.00 0.00 0.00 
7–9, 2007 3 0.24 0.18 0.00 0.00 
10–12, 2007 2 0.88 0.50 0.00 0.00 
Note: The ratio for each frame for a given news article was calculated as 
the number of times a given frame was mentioned divided by the total 
number of sentences in that news article, and the mean ratio for each 
frame in a given quarterly interval was calculated as the average of the 
ratios for all news articles published in the quarterly interval.  
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Table A5.2: Changes in Media Coverage over Time (Monthly Intervals) 
 
Time 
Interval 
No. of 
Articles 
Medical 
Ratio 
Economic 
Ratio 
Security 
Ratio 
Human 
Rights 
Ratio 
Jan, 2004 7 0.37 0.10 0.03 0.00 
Feb, 2004 8 0.20 0.45 0.08 0.01 
Mar, 2004 2 0.09 0.46 0.02 0.00 
Apr, 2004 1 0.20 0.24 0.16 0.00 
Jul, 2004 2 0.50 0.04 0.02 0.00 
Aug, 2004 1 0.25 0.03 0.00 0.00 
Sep, 2004 3 0.44 0.19 0.00 0.00 
Oct, 2004 1 0.66 0.16 0.00 0.00 
Nov, 2004 1 0.26 0.05 0.02 0.00 
Dec, 2004 2 0.36 0.25 0.00 0.00 
Jan, 2005 1 0.33 0.00 0.00 0.00 
Feb, 2005 3 0.69 0.07 0.02 0.00 
Mar, 2005 1 0.41 0.09 0.00 0.07 
Apr, 2005 3 0.47 0.20 0.02 0.01 
June, 
2005 5 0.42 0.18 0.20 0.00 
Jul, 2005 2 0.33 0.00 0.10 0.00 
Aug, 2005 3 0.65 0.42 0.02 0.00 
Sep, 2005 2 0.59 0.10 0.06 0.00 
Oct, 2005 15 0.38 0.23 0.10 0.02 
Nov, 2005 12 0.28 0.29 0.05 0.03 
Dec, 2005 8 0.29 0.10 0.07 0.01 
Jan, 2006 11 0.36 0.14 0.04 0.00 
Feb, 2006 13 0.38 0.25 0.04 0.02 
Mar, 2006 12 0.40 0.15 0.03 0.00 
Apr, 2006 6 0.38 0.16 0.00 0.00 
May, 
2006 6 0.41 0.11 0.02 0.01 
June, 
2006 5 0.52 0.16 0.02 0.00 
Jul, 2006 2 0.51 0.00 0.00 0.00 
Aug, 2006 4 0.73 0.04 0.01 0.00 
Sep, 2006 1 0.90 0.00 0.00 0.00 
Nov, 2006 2 0.29 0.11 0.15 0.09 
Dec, 2006 2 0.23 0.21 0.17 0.00 
Jan, 2007 1 1.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
Feb, 2007 7 0.63 0.16 0.00 0.03 
Apr, 2007 1 0.90 0.00 0.00 0.00 
Jul, 2007 1 0.14 0.43 0.00 0.00 
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Aug, 2007 1 0.33 0.00 0.00 0.00 
Sep, 2007 1 0.23 0.12 0.00 0.00 
Nov, 2007 1 0.75 0.00 0.00 0.00 
Dec, 2007 1 1.00 1.00 0.00 0.00 
Note: The ratio for each frame for a given news article was calculated as 
the number of times a given frame was mentioned divided by the total 
number of sentences in that news article, and the mean ratio for each 
frame in a given monthly interval was calculated as the average of the 
ratios for all news articles published in the monthly interval.  
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Table A5.3: Media Coverage: Weekly Average of the Four Media Frames in 2004 
 
Time Interval 
No. of 
Articl
es 
Medical 
Ratio 
Economi
c Ratio 
Securit
y Ratio
Human 
Rights 
Ratio 
1/14/04–1/20/04 2 0.54 0.03 0.00 0.00 
1/21/04–1/27/04 3 0.41 0.02 0.03 0.00 
1/28/04–2/3/04 3 0.19 0.32 0.06 0.01 
2/4/04–2/10/04 2 0.03 0.56 0.08 0.04 
2/11/04–2/17/04 3 0.03 0.55 0.14 0.00 
2/18/04–2/24/04 1 0.50 0.13 0.00 0.00 
2/25/04–3/2/04 1 0.67 0.33 0.00 0.00 
3/10/04–3/16/04 2 0.09 0.46 0.02 0.00 
4/7/04–4/13/04 1 0.20 0.24 0.16 0.00 
7/7/04–7/13/04 1 0.50 0.08 0.04 0.00 
7/28/04–8/3/04 1 0.50 0.00 0.00 0.00 
8/18/04–8/24/04 1 0.25 0.03 0.00 0.00 
9/1/04–9/7/04 1 0.23 0.03 0.00 0.00 
9/29/04–10/5/04 2 0.55 0.27 0.00 0.00 
10/13/04–
10/19/04 1 0.66 0.16 0.00 0.00 
11/3/04–11/9/04 1 0.26 0.05 0.02 0.00 
12/22/04–
12/28/04 1 0.22 0.00 0.00 0.00 
12/29/04–
12/31/04 1 0.50 0.50 0.00 0.00 
Note: The ratio for each frame for a given news article was calculated as the 
number of times a given frame was mentioned divided by the total number 
of sentences in that news article, and the mean ratio of each frame in a given 
weekly interval was calculated as the average of the ratios for all news 
articles published in the weekly interval.  
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Table A5.4: Media Coverage: Weekly Average of the Four Media Frames in 2005 
 
Time Interval 
No. of 
Articles 
Medical 
Ratio 
Economic 
Ratio 
Security 
Ratio 
Human 
Rights Ratio 
1/12/05–1/18/05 1 0.33 0 0 0 
2/9/05–2/15/05 1 0.23 0.03 0.06 0 
2/23/05–3/1/05 2 0.92 0.08 0 0 
3/16/05–3/22/05 1 0.41 0.09 0 0.07 
4/6/05–4/12/05 2 0.43 0.17 0.03 0.01 
4/27/05–5/3/05 1 0.53 0.27 0 0 
6/1/05–6/7/05 1 0 0.08 0.75 0 
6/15/05–6/21/05 2 0.46 0.09 0.12 0 
6/22/05–6/28/05 2 0.59 0.32 0 0 
7/20/05–7/26/05 2 0.33 0 0.1 0 
8/3/05–8/9/05 2 0.48 0.14 0.03 0 
8/10/05–8/16/05 1 1 1 0 0 
9/14/05–9/20/05 2 0.59 0.1 0.06 0 
10/5/05–10/11/05 4 0.37 0.17 0.14 0.02 
10/12/05–10/18/05 5 0.44 0.2 0.14 0.02 
10/19/05–10/25/05 3 0.25 0.28 0.08 0.05 
10/26/05–11/1/05 3 0.44 0.33 0 0 
11/2/05–11/8/05 4 0.25 0.3 0.08 0.02 
11/9/05–11/15/05 1 0.04 0.72 0 0 
11/16/05–11/22/05 3 0.4 0.11 0.01 0 
11/23/05–11/29/05 4 0.28 0.31 0.07 0.08 
12/7/05–12/13/05 4 0.28 0.16 0.1 0.03 
12/14/05–12/20/05 1 0.33 0 0 0 
12/21/05–12/27/05 2 0.38 0.06 0.08 0 
12/28/05–1/3/06 1 0.06 0 0.02 0 
Note: The ratio for each frame for a given news article was calculated as 
the number of times a given frame was mentioned divided by the total 
number of sentences in that news article, and the mean ratio of each frame 
in a given weekly interval was calculated as the average of the ratios for 
all news articles published in the weekly interval.  
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Table A5.5: Media Coverage: Weekly Average of the Four Media Frames in 2006 
 
Time Interval 
No. of 
Articl
es 
Medica
l Ratio 
Econo
mic 
Ratio 
Security 
Ratio 
Human 
Rights 
Ratio 
1/4/06–1/10/06 4 0.36 0.06 0.01 0.01 
1/11/06–1/17/06 2 0.69 0.01 0.00 0.00 
1/18/06–1/24/06 4 0.20 0.31 0.09 0.00 
2/1/06–2/7/06 3 0.20 0.17 0.05 0.00 
2/8/06–2/14/06 3 0.57 0.09 0.00 0.01 
2/15/06–2/21/06 4 0.19 0.39 0.03 0.01 
2/22/06–2/28/06 3 0.51 0.34 0.04 0.06 
3/1/06–3/7/06 3 0.32 0.33 0.06 0.00 
3/8/06–3/14/06 3 0.44 0.00 0.00 0.00 
3/15/06–3/21/06 1 0.33 0.33 0.00 0.00 
3/22/06–3/28/06 4 0.60 0.09 0.07 0.00 
3/29/06–4/4/06 2 0.25 0.06 0.02 0.01 
4/5/06–4/11/06 2 0.56 0.00 0.00 0.00 
4/12/06–4/18/06 2 0.19 0.37 0.00 0.00 
4/19/06–4/25/06 1 0.64 0.09 0.00 0.00 
4/26/06–5/2/06 1 0.14 0.13 0.00 0.00 
5/10/06–5/16/06 4 0.44 0.07 0.03 0.02 
5/24/06–5/30/06 2 0.35 0.21 0.00 0.00 
5/31/06–6/6/06 1 0.69 0.00 0.00 0.00 
6/7/06–6/13/06 1 0.91 0.36 0.00 0.00 
6/21/06–6/27/06 2 0.46 0.00 0.03 0.00 
6/28/06–7/4/06 2 0.29 0.22 0.03 0.00 
7/12/06–7/18/06 1 0.50 0.00 0.00 0.00 
8/2/06–8/8/06 2 0.93 0.00 0.03 0.00 
8/16/06–8/22/06 1 0.79 0.14 0.00 0.00 
8/30/06–9/5/06 1 0.27 0.00 0.00 0.00 
9/6/06–9/12/06 1 0.90 0.00 0.00 0.00 
11/15/06–11/21/06 1 0.00 0.22 0.29 0.17 
11/22/06–11/28/06 1 0.57 0.00 0.00 0.00 
12/6/06–12/12/06 1 0.38 0.00 0.00 0.00 
12/13/06–12/19/06 1 0.08 0.42 0.33 0.00 
Note: The ratio of each frame for a given news article was calculated as the 
number of times a given frame was mentioned divided by the total number 
of sentences in that news article, and the mean ratio of each frame in a given 
weekly interval was calculated as the average of the ratios for all news 
articles published in the weekly interval.  
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Table A5.6: Media Coverage: Weekly Average of the Four Media Frames in 2007 
 
Time Interval 
No. of 
Articl
es 
Medica
l Ratio 
Economic 
Ratio 
Security 
Ratio 
Human 
Rights 
Ratio 
1/10/07–1/16/07 1 1.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
1/31/07–2/6/07 2 0.46 0.02 0.00 0.00 
2/7/07–2/13/07 2 0.55 0.30 0.00 0.05 
2/14/07–2/20/07 1 0.58 0.47 0.00 0.11 
2/28/07–3/6/07 2 0.90 0.00 0.00 0.00 
4/18/07–4/24/07 1 0.90 0.00 0.00 0.00 
7/11/07–7/17/07 1 0.14 0.43 0.00 0.00 
8/1/07–8/7/07 1 0.33 0.00 0.00 0.00 
9/19/07–9/25/07 1 0.23 0.12 0.00 0.00 
11/21/07–11/27/07 1 0.75 0.00 0.00 0.00 
12/12/07–12/18/07 1 1.00 1.00 0.00 0.00 
Note: The ratio of each frame for a given news article was calculated as the 
number of times a given frame was mentioned divided by the total number 
of sentences in that news article, and the mean ratio of each frame in a given 
weekly interval was calculated as the average of the ratios for all news 
articles published in the weekly interval.  
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Table A5.7: Questions Regarding Willingness to Change Behavior in Response to News 
about Avian Flu 
Q1. Do you agree that quarantining is important to limit the spread of avian flu? Data are 
from Wall Street Journal Online/Harris Interactive (08/03/05–08/05/05)(04/25/06–
04/27/06), Fox Broadcasting Company (10/10/05–10/11/05), Harvard/ICR (01/17/06–
01/25/06), Associated Press/IPSOS (04/18/06–04/20/06). 
Survey date Aug 3-5, 2005 
Apr 25-27, 
2006    
Absolutely 
essential 25.0% 30.0%    
Very important 40.0% 38.0% 
Somewhat 
important 27.0% 25.0%    
Not important 6.0% 4.0% 
Not at all 
important 2.0% 2.0%    
Survey date 
Oct 11-12, 
2005 
Jan 17- 25, 
2006 
Jan17-25, 
2006 
Jan17-25, 
2006 
Jan17-25, 
2006 
Yes 65.0% 78.0% 83.0% 96.0% 75.0% 
No 21.0% 14.0% 14.0% 4.0% 24.0% 
Don't know 13.0% 9.0% 3.0% 1.0% 1.0% 
Survey date 
April 18-
20, 2006 
Apr 18-20, 
2006   
Favor 79.0% 82.0%   
Oppose 19.0% 17.0%   
Not sure 2.0% 1.0%       
Q2. Would you do any of the following if a human case of the avian or bird flu was 
reported in your state? Data are from Harvard/ICR Q1: Avoid public event,, Q2: Get 
Tamiflu or other antiviral drugs Q3: Wash hands more frequently Q4: Warn others about 
avian or bird flu Q5: Reduce or avoid travel Data are from  Harvard/ICR. 
 Question  1 2 3 4 5 
Survey date 
Jan 17- 
25, 2006 
Jan 17- 25, 
2006 
Jan 17- 25, 
2006 
Jan 17- 25, 
2006 
Jan 17- 25, 
2006 
Yes 71.0% 68.0% 90.0% 94.0% 75.0% 
No 28.0% 30.0% 9.0% 4.0% 24.0% 
Don't know 1.0% 3.0% 0.0% 1.0% 1.0% 
Q3.Would you do any of the following if a human case of the avian or bird flu were 
reported in your state? Data are from  Harvard/ICR. 
  
Q7: Avoid 
traveling 
to that part 
of the 
world 
Q8: Warn 
people about 
traveling to 
these parts of 
the world 
Q9: Consult 
a website 
for 
information 
Q10: Talk 
with your 
doctor about 
health issues 
Q11: Wear 
a  face 
mask 
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Survey date 
Jan 17- 
25, 2006 
Jan 17- 25, 
2006 
Jan 17- 25, 
2006 
Jan 17- 25, 
2006 
Jan 17- 25, 
2006 
Yes 81.0% 94.0% 79.0% 84.0% 52.0% 
No 16.0% 5.0% 20.0% 15.0% 46.0% 
Don't know 3.0% 1.0% 1.0% 1.0% 2.0% 
Q4.Would you do or support any of the following if a human case of the avian or bird 
flu were reported in your state? Data are from Harvard/ICR (01/17/06–01/25/06), 
Associated Press/IPSOS (04/18/06–04/20/06)( 04/18/06-04/20/06)(04/18/06-04/20/06). 
  
Q12: Stock 
up on 
things 
Q14:Closing 
schools 
Q15:Offering 
people 
experimental 
vaccines 
Q16: Closing the 
borders 
Survey date 
Jan 17- 25, 
2006 
Apr 18- 20, 
2006 Apr 18-20, 2006 Apr 8-20, 2006  
Yes 85.0% 69.0% 65.0% 74.0% 
No 14.0% 29.0% 34.0% 25.0% 
Don't know 1.0% 2.0% 1.0% 1.0% 
Would you do any of the following if a human case of the avian or bird flu were reported 
in your state? Data are from Wall Street Journal Online /Harris Interactive (04/25/06–
04/27/06)( 04/25/06–04/27/06) 
  
Q16: Stockpile 
critical medical 
supplies 
Q17: Stockpile 
antiviral drugs    
Survey date Apr 25-27, 2006 Apr 25-27, 2006   
Absolutely 
essential 25.0% 29.0%   
Very 
important 34.0% 37.0%   
Somewhat 
important 31.0% 28.0%   
Not 
important 7.0% 5.0%   
Not at all 
important 2.0% 2.0%      
Note: A significantly higher percentage of subjects was willing to be quarantined or 
thought quarantining is important and were willing to take actions (all actions listed in 
Q2–Q10 and Q12–17) according to z test results (z score > 1.96). No significance was 
found for Q11. 
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Table A5.8: Questions about Actual Behavioral Changes Made in Response to News 
about Avian Flu 
Q1.  Have you talked with your doctor about the use of Tamiflu or other antiviral drugs 
for the treatment of avian or bird flu? Data are from Harvard/ICR 
Survey date Jan 17- 25, 2006    
Yes 4.0%   
No 96.0%   
Don't know 0.0%   
Q2.  Have you decreased the amount of chicken or turkey you eat because of concern 
about bird flu? Data are from  Fox News/ODI 
Survey date 
Feb 28-Mar 3, 
2006   
Yes 10.0%   
No 88.0%   
Don't know 2.0%   
Q3. Have you taken any steps to prevent contracting bird flu? Data are from Fox 
News/ODI (02/28/06–03/03/06), Associated Press/IPSOS Public Affairs (03/18/06–
03/20/06) 
Survey date 
Feb 28-Mar 3, 
2006 Apr 18-20, 2006 
Yes 15.0% 9.0% 
No 82.0% 91.0% 
Don't know 3.0% 0.0% 
Q4. Have you taken any of the following steps to prepare for a possible outbreak of bird 
flu among humans? Data are from Associated Press/IPSOS Public Affairs (04/18/06–
04/20/06), Wall Street Journal Online /Harris Interactive (04/18/06–04/20/06) 
Survey date Apr 18-20, 2006 Apr 18-20, 2006 
Stockpiling food and water 67.0% 7.0% 
Made plans to work from home 44.0% 3.0% 
Made plans to keep children home 33.0%   
Asked your doctor for prescriptions for 
Tamiflu or other antiviral drugs 22.0%   
Looked for information  18.0% 
Talked about pandemic 18.0% 
Adjusted travel plans 6.0% 
Prepared plan if pandemic happens 5.0% 
Changed eating habits 3.0% 
None of these 68.0% 
Note: A significantly higher percentage of subjects did not take actual steps (e.g., asked 
doctor about Tamiflu, decreased the amount of chicken or turkey eaten, stockpiled food 
and water, worked at home, avoided travel, etc) to prepare for a possible outbreak of bird 
flu according to z test results (z score > 1.96 or < –1.96). 
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Table A5.9: Questions about Recognition of Avian Flu as a Threat 
Q1. Are you worried that you or someone in your family will be the victim of the bird flu 
virus? (Survey by Cable News Network, USA Today. Data are from conducted by Gallup 
Organization (10/21/05–10/23/05), CNN/USA Today (12/09/05–12/11/05), Harvard/ICR 
(01/17/06–01/25/06), CNN/USA Today (03/10/06–03/10/06). 
Survey date 
Oct 21-
23, 
2005 
Dec 9-11, 2005 
Jan17-
25, 
2006 
Mar 
10-12, 
2006   
Worried 24.0% 20.0% 21.0% 29.0%   
Not Worried/Not 
concerned 75.0% 78.0% 78.0% 70.0%   
No opinion 1.0% 2.0% 1.0% 1.0%   
Q2. How worried /concerned are you that you or someone in your family will be exposed 
to the bird flu? Data are from Pew/Princeton Survey Research Associates (11/3/05–
11/6/05), Harvard/ICR (01/17/06–01/25/06), ABC News (03/02/06–03/05/06), 
Associated Press/IPSOS (04/03/06–04/05/06). 
Survey date 
 
Nov 3-
6, 2005 
 
Jan17-25, 2006 
 
Mar2-
5, 2006 
Apr 3-
5,  
2006   
  
Worried (concerned) a 
great deal 11.0% 4.0% 13.0% 11.0%   
Worried (concerned) 
somewhat 27.0% 13.0% 28.0% 23.0%   
Not too worried 
(concerned) 38.0% 3.0% 36.0% 37.0%   
Not concerned 78.0%   
Not worried (concerned) at 
all 23.0% 23.0% 29.0%   
No opinion/don't know 1.0% 1.0%   
Survey date 
Apr 18-
20, 
2006 
May 2 -14, 2006 Jun 7-
21, 
2006 
Jan 18-
22, 
2007   
Most concerned 9.0%   
Worried (concerned) a 
great deal/a lot/Very 
worried (concerned) 
11.0% 13.0% 12.0% 16.0% 
  
Worried (concerned) 
somewhat 23.0% 31.0% 19.0% 35.0%   
Not too worried 
(concerned) 37.0% 29.0% 24.0% 22.0%   
Not concerned   
Not worried (concerned) at 
all 29.0% 26.0% 43.0% 18.0%   
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No opinion/don't know   1.0% 1.0%     
Q3. How likely do you think it is that the bird flu virus will strike the United States? Data 
are from CNN/USA Today (10/21/05–10/23/05), CNN/USA Today (12/09/05–12/11/05), 
ABC News (03/02/06–03/05/06), Wall Street Journal Online /Harris Interactive 
(04/25/06–04/27/06), AOL/IPSOS (12/31/06). 
Survey date 
Oct 21-
23, 
2005 
Dec  9-11, 2005 Mar 2-
5, 2006 
Apr 
25-27, 
2006 
Dec. 
31, 
2006 
Very likely (concerned) 16.0% 30.0% 20.0% 12.0% 
Somewhat likely 
(concerned) 46.0%  47.0% 44.0% 38.0% 
Not too likely (concerned) 29.0% 16.0% 24.0% 36.0% 
Not likely (concerned) at 
all 7.0%  5.0% 7.0% 12.0% 
No opinion/Don't 
know/Not sure 2.0% 2.0% 1.0% 6.0% 2.0% 
Will not strike 14.0%   
Minor outbreak 63.0%   
Major outbreak 13.0%   
Crisis 8.0%   
Q4. How concerned are you that the United States will be part of an avian flu pandemic? 
Data are from Wall Street Journal Online/Harris Interactive (Polling the Nation) 
(08/03/05–08/05/05) and (04/25/06–04/27/06).  
Survey date 
Aug 3-
5, 2005 
Apr 25-27, 2006 
  
Very concerned 12.0% 20.0%   
Somewhat concerned 39.0% 44.0%   
Not very concerned 33.0% 24.0%   
Not at all concerned 8.0% 7.0%   
Don't know  9.0% 6.0%   
Q5. How concerned are you about a pandemic outbreak of avian or bird flu in many 
countries at the same time? Data are from Harvard/ICR (01/17/06–1/25/06) and 
(O6/07/06–06/21/06) 
Survey date 
Jan 17-
25, 
2006 
Jun 7-21, 2006 
  
Very concerned 20.0% 16.0%   
Somewhat concerned 42.0% 35.0%   
Not very concerned 24.0% 29.0%   
Not at all concerned 13.0% 19.0%   
Don't know            
Q6. How concerned are you about the spread of bird flu in the United States? Data are 
from Fox News/ODI (10/11/05–10/12/05) (01/10/06–01/11/06), Harvard/ICR (01/17/06–
01/25/06), Fox News/ODI (02/28/06–03/03/06), ABC News(03/02/06–03/05/06) 
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Survey date 
Oct 11-
12, 
2005 
Jan 10-11, 
2006 
Jan 17-25, 
2006 
Mar 2-5, 
2006 
Feb 28-
Mar 3, 
2006 
Very concerned 30.0% 26.0% 15.0% 23.0% 26.0% 
Somewhat concerned 33.0% 31.0% 42.0% 38.0% 40.0% 
Not very concerned 21.0% 28.0% 27.0% 25.0% 24.0% 
Not at all concerned 11.0% 15.0% 14.0% 12.0% 10.0% 
Don't know  5.0% 2.0% 1.0% 1.0%   
Q7. How likely do you think it is that there will be cases/more cases of avian or bird flu 
among…. in the United States during the next 12 months? Data are from Harvard/ICR 
  
a. Among wild 
birds 
b. Among 
chickens or other 
farm-raised 
poultry 
c. Among 
humans  
 
Survey date 
Jan 17-25, 
2006 
Jan 17-25, 2006 Jan 17-25, 
2006   
Very likely 12.0% 9.0% 6.0%  
Somewhat likely 46.0% 34.0% 28.0%  
Not too likely 27.0% 40.0% 42.0%  
Not at all  likely 11.0% 13.0% 22.0%  
Don't know  3.0% 4.0% 3.0%    
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Table A5.10: Questions about Support for Funding for Research on Avian Flu 
Q1.  How important will it be to invest government dollars in the development and 
production of avian flu vaccines? Data are from Wall Street Journal Online /Harris 
Interactive (08/03/05–08/05/06) 
Survey date Aug 3-5, 2005 Apr 25-27, 2006 
Absolutely essential 24.0% 30.0% 
Very important 37.0% 35.0% 
Somewhat important 31.0% 28.0% 
Not very important 5.0% 4.0% 
Not at all important 3.0% 3.0% 
Q2.Are you worried that the United States may not be doing enough to prevent 
contagious diseases such as SARS, lethal flu, and mad cow disease that come from other 
countries. Data are from the Public Agenda Foundation (06/01/05–06/13/05)(01/10/06–
01/22/06) 
Survey date Jun 1-13, 2005 Jan 10-22, 2006 
Worry a lot 23.0% 22.0% 
Worry somewhat 37.0% 41.0% 
Don't worry 39.0% 36.0% 
Don't know 1.0% 1.0% 
Q3.Do you think the United States is spending too much, too little, or about the right 
amount of money to protect the country against the avian or bird flu? Data are from 
Harvard/ICR (01/7/06–01/25/06), Trust for America's Health. Methodology: Greenberg 
Quinlan Rosner Research (01/18/06–01/22/07) 
Survey date Jan 17- 25, 2006 Jan18- 22, 2007 
Too much/Much more 6.0% 20.0% 
Somewhat more 26.0% 
Little more 18.0% 
Too little 36.0% 
About the right/Right amount 
now 36.0% 32.0%  
Spend less 2.0% 
Don't know 22.0% 3.0% 
Q4. Do you think it is important to improve the country's ability to respond to new 
infectious diseases such as SARS (severe acute respiratory syndrome) and avian flu? 
Data are from Harvard/ICR 
Survey date Mar 31-Apr 4, 2006(Sample A) 
Mar 31-Apr 4, 
2006(Sample B) 
Apri11-15, 
2007 
Extremely important 46.0% 47.0% 43.0% 
Very important 41.0% 41.0% 42.0% 
Somewhat important 11.0% 11.0% 12.0% 
Not an important thing to do 1.0% 1.0% 3.0% 
Don't know 1.0% 0.0% 1.0% 
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Table A6.1: Changes in Media Coverage over Time HIV/AIDS (Semi Annual) 
Time 
Interval  
Number 
of 
Articles 
Medical 
Ratio 
Economic 
Ratio 
Security 
Ratio 
Human 
Rights Ratio 
6-12, 1999 30 0.24 0.12 0.00 0.16 
1-6, 2000 25 0.25 0.14 0.07 0.07 
7-12,2000 32 0.26 0.16 0.03 0.08 
1-6, 2001 58 0.25 0.29 0.02 0.10 
7-12,2001 35 0.27 0.20 0.01 0.06 
1-6, 2002 32 0.34 0.19 0.00 0.04 
7-12,2002 32 0.17 0.29 0.01 0.11 
1-6, 2003 40 0.27 0.20 0.02 0.11 
7-12,2003 36 0.26 0.29 0.00 0.08 
1-6, 2004 28 0.28 0.22 0.00 0.13 
7-12,2004 28 0.25 0.17 0.00 0.15 
1-6, 2005 34 0.27 0.14 0.01 0.07 
7-12,2005 27 0.23 0.20 0.01 0.04 
1-6, 2006 38 0.22 0.17 0.00 0.11 
7-12,2006 31 0.30 0.17 0.00 0.13 
1-6, 2007 33 0.22 0.16 0.00 0.10 
 
Note: The ratio for each frame for a given news article was calculated as the 
number of times a given frame was mentioned divided by the total number 
of sentences in that news article, and the mean ratio for each frame in the 
given time interval (semiannual) was calculated as the average of the ratios 
for all news articles published in the monthly interval.  
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Table A6.2: Changes in Media Coverage over Time HIV/AIDS (Quarterly Interval) 
 
Time Interval 
Number 
of 
Articles 
Biomedical 
Ratio 
Economic 
Ratio 
Security 
Ratio 
Human Right 
Ratio 
4-6,1999 5 0.05 0.22 0.00 0.16 
7-9,1999 13 0.38 0.11 0.00 0.13 
10-12,1999 12 0.17 0.10 0.00 0.20 
1-3, 2000 11 0.32 0.11 0.15 0.05 
4-6,2000 14 0.20 0.16 0.01 0.08 
7-9,2000 19 0.24 0.15 0.05 0.10 
10-12,2000 13 0.29 0.17 0.01 0.06 
1-3, 2001 18 0.30 0.20 0.04 0.09 
4-6,2001 40 0.23 0.33 0.01 0.10 
7-9,2001 17 0.33 0.21 0.00 0.03 
10-12,2001 18 0.22 0.18 0.01 0.09 
1-3, 2002 15 0.42 0.16 0.00 0.03 
4-6,2002 17 0.26 0.23 0.00 0.05 
7-9,2002 14 0.21 0.26 0.01 0.18 
10-12,2002 18 0.15 0.31 0.02 0.06 
1-3, 2003 25 0.25 0.22 0.02 0.12 
4-6,2003 15 0.32 0.15 0.00 0.08 
7-9,2003 16 0.30 0.24 0.00 0.08 
10-12,2003 20 0.23 0.33 0.00 0.08 
1-3, 2004 14 0.32 0.27 0.00 0.03 
4-6,2004 14 0.25 0.17 0.00 0.22 
7-9,2004 14 0.19 0.24 0.00 0.09 
10-12,2004 14 0.31 0.11 0.00 0.20 
1-3, 2005 18 0.37 0.08 0.01 0.08 
4-6,2005 16 0.17 0.21 0.00 0.06 
7-9,2005 12 0.14 0.18 0.00 0.05 
10-12,2005 15 0.30 0.21 0.02 0.03 
1-3, 2006 15 0.21 0.14 0.00 0.12 
4-6,2006 23 0.24 0.18 0.00 0.11 
7-9,2006 15 0.30 0.18 0.00 0.12 
10-12,2006 16 0.30 0.16 0.00 0.13 
1-3,2007 15 0.21 0.12 0.00 0.11 
4-6,2007 18 0.24 0.19 0.00 0.08 
 
Note: The ratio for each frame for a given news article was calculated as the number of 
times a given frame was mentioned divided by the total number of sentences in that 
news article, and the mean ratio for each frame in a given quarterly interval was 
calculated as the average of the ratios for all news articles published in the quarterly 
interval.  
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Table A6.3: Questions Regarding Willingness to Change Behavior in Response to News 
about HIV/AIDS 
Q1.  Do you need more information about how to use condoms to 
protect against HIV and AIDS? (Kaiser/ Princeton Survey Research 
Associates)   
Survey date 
August 14 - October 26, 
2000 
March 15-May 
11, 2004   
Yes 14% 14%   
No 86% 85%   
Don't know 0% 1%   
Q2.   Do you need more information about how to talk with children 
about HIV and AIDS? (Kaiser/ Princeton Survey Research 
Associates)   
Survey date 
August 14 - October 26, 
2000 
March 15-May 
11, 2004   
Yes 44% 33%   
No 56% 66%   
Don't know 0% 1%   
Q3. Do you need more information about where to go to get tested 
for HIV?( Kaiser/ Princeton Survey Research Associates)   
Survey date 
August 14 - October 26, 
2000 
March 15-May 
11, 2004 
March 24 - April 
18, 2006 
Yes 26% 23% 35% 
No 73% 76% 64% 
Don't know 0% 1% 1% 
Q4.  Do you need more information about how to talk with your 
doctor or health care provider about HIV and AIDS?( Kaiser/ 
Princeton Survey Research Associates)   
Survey date 
August 14 - October 26, 
2000 
March 15-May 
11, 2004   
Yes 19% 18%   
No 81% 81%   
Don't know 0% 1%   
Q5.  Do you need more information about how to talk with your 
partner about HIV and AIDS?( Kaiser/ Princeton Survey Research 
Associates)   
Survey date 
August 14 - October 26, 
2000 
March 15-May 
11, 2004 
March 24-April 
18, 2006 
Yes 19% 17% 31% 
No 80% 82% 67% 
Don't know 1% 1% 2% 
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Table A6.4: Questions about Actual Behavioral Changes Made in Response to News 
about HIV/AIDS 
Q1a. Have you, yourself, ever been tested for HIV the virus that causes AIDS? (If yes, 
ask, Was that in the past 12 months, or not?)  
 Kaiser/ Princeton Survey Research Associates 
Survey date 
August 14 - 
October 26, 2000 
March 15 -May 
11, 2004 
March 24 -April 
18, 2006   
Yes, tested within 
past 12 months 17% 20% 18%   
Yes, tested, but not in 
the past 12 months 26% 28% 29%   
No, never tested 55% 50% 52%   
Don't know or 
refused 2% 2% 1%   
Q1b. Have you, yourself, ever been tested for HIV?  
Kaiser/ Princeton Survey Research Associates ( 08/14 - 10/26/2000, 03/15 - 05/11/2004) 
 National Opinion Research Center, University of Chicago (03/10/-08/07/2006) 
Survey date 
December 10 -
January 19, 2003 
March 15-May 
11, 2004 
March 10 -
August 7, 2006   
Yes 64% 48% 38%   
No 34% 50% 62%   
Don't Know 1% 2% 0%   
Q1c. Now thinking about any medical tests you may have had in the last two years, have 
you had a test for HIV the virus? (Kaiser/ Princeton Survey Research Associates). 
  
March 28 - July 
29, 2001 
July 6-
September 26, 
2004   
Yes 33% 23%   
No 64% 76%   
Don't Know 3% 1%     
Q2.  Have you ever talked with a doctor or health care provider about HIV and AIDS? 
(Kaiser/ Princeton Survey Research Associates). 
Survey date 
August 14 - 
October 26, 
2000 
December 10 
- January 19, 
2003 
March 15 -
May 11, 
2004 
March 24 -
April 18, 
2006 
Yes 30% 50% 38% 38% 
No 70% 50% 62% 61% 
Don't know 0%   0% 1% 
Q3. Have you and your partner ever had a conversation about whether to get tested for 
HIV/AIDS? (Kaiser/ Princeton Survey Research Associates) 
Survey date 
December 10 - 
January 19, 
2003 
March 15-May 
11, 2004   
Yes 51% 45%   
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No 49% 54%   
Don't know 0% 0%     
Q4.  Have you personally ever personally talked about HIV or AIDS with (your) child or 
not?  
Kaiser/ Princeton Survey Research Associates (02/07/-09/04/2000, 12/07/-01/18/2001), 
NPR/Harvard/ Kaiser/ Princeton Survey Research Associates (09/29/-10/23/2003) 
Survey date 
February 7 - 
September 4, 2000 
December 
7 - January 
18, 2001 
September 
29 - October 
23, 2003   
Yes 76% 55% 87%   
No 24% 44% 13%   
Don't know 0% 1% 0%   
 
  
262 
 
Table A6.5: Questions about Recognition of HIV/AIDS as a Threat 
Q1a.  Do you think HIV is a more urgent problem or a less urgent problem, or is it the 
same for this country, than it was a few years ago?( Kaiser/Princeton Survey Research 
Associates) 
Survey date 
February 7-
September 4, 2000 
August 14-October 26, 
2000   
More Urgent 49% 49%   
Less urgent 15% 13%   
About the same 34% 35%   
Don't know/refused 2% 3%   
Q1b.  Do you think the number of new HIV infections per year in the US (United States) 
has increased, decreased, or stayed about the same? Associated Press/IPSOS Public 
Affairs (07/19/-07/21/2004), Kaiser/ Princeton Survey Research Associates (03/24/-
04/18/2006) 
Survey date 
July 19-July 21, 
2004 
March 24-April 18, 
2006   
More people 
(Increased) 52% 57%   
Fewer people 
(decreased) 20% 12%   
About the same 25% 25%   
Don't know/refused 3% 6%   
Q1c. Do you think HIV/AIDS is a bigger or a smaller problem now than it was 5 years 
ago, or is the problem of HIV/AIDS about the same as it was 5 years ago? ( 
Kaiser/Princeton Survey Research Associates) 
Survey date 
April 23-May 6, 
2007   
Bigger problem 42%   
Smaller problem 15%   
About the same 39%   
Don't know/refused 5%   
Q2. Thinking about the way the problem of HIV/AIDS affects the United States today; 
do you think the problem is about the same as it has been, that the U.S. today is making 
progress in this area, or that the U.S. today is losing ground? Harvard/Washington 
Post(06/13/-06/23/2002), Kaiser/Princeton Survey Research associates(03/15/-
05/11/2004, 10/04/-10/09/2005, 03/24/-04/18/2006) 
Survey date 
June 13-June 
23, 2002 
March 15 - 
May 11, 2004 
October 4-
October 9, 
2005 
March 24-
April 18, 2006
Making progress 49% 47% 41% 40% 
about the same 20% 13% 26% 22% 
Losing ground  26% 36% 24% 29% 
Don't know/refused 6% 5% 9% 10% 
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Q3. Please tell me if you think it is a very big problem, a moderately big problem, a small 
problem or not a problem at all.)...The spread of HIV/AIDS and other infectious diseases. 
(Pew/ Princeton Survey Research Associates) 
Survey date 
August 19-
September 8, 2002 April 23-May 6, 2007   
Very big problem 42% 39%   
Moderate big problem 41% 42%   
Small problem 13% 15%   
Not a problem at all 1% 1%   
Don't know/refused 2% 2%     
Q4. Bearing in mind the different ways people can be infected with HIV--how concerned 
are you personally about becoming infected with HIV? Are you very concerned, 
somewhat concerned, not too concerned, or not at all concerned? Kaiser/Princeton 
Survey Research Associates (09/10-10/19/1997, 02/07-09/04/2000, 08/14/-10/26/2000, 
01/25/-01/28/2001, 03/15/-05/11/2004, 03/24/-04/18/2006) Harvard/Washington 
Post(06/13/-06/23/2002), Gallup(11/03/-11/05/2003), Associated Press(07/19/-
07/21/2004) 
Survey date 
September 17 -
October 19, 
1997 
February 7-
September 4, 
2000 
August 14 -
October 26, 
2000 
January 25 -
January 28, 
2001 
Very 
concerned/worried 24% 21% 19% 26% 
Somewhat 
concerned/worried 17% 23% 18% 15% 
Not too 
concerned/worried 21% 18% 22% 22% 
Not concerned at all 38% 38% 39% 26% 
Don't know/refused 1%   
Survey date 
June 13-June 
23, 2002 
November 3-
November 5, 
2003 
March 15 -
May 11, 2004  
July 19-July 
21, 2004 
Very 
concerned/worried 18% 7% 17% 10% 
Somewhat 
concerned/worried 15% 9% 14% 12% 
Not too 
concerned/worried 21% 18% 25% 26% 
Not concerned at all 45% 66% 44% 52% 
Don't know/refused 1%   
Survey date 
March 24-
April 18, 2006 
January 26-
March 8, 
2009 
  
Very 
concerned/worried 15% 13%   
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Somewhat 
concerned/worried 14% 12%   
Not too 
concerned/worried 22% 23%   
Not concerned at all 49% 50%   
Don't know/refused   1%     
Q5.How concerned are you about a son or daughter becoming infected with HIV? Are 
you very concerned, somewhat concerned, not too concerned, or not at all concerned? 
Kaiser/Princeton Survey Research Associates(08/14/-10/26/2000, 03/15/-05/11/2004, 
03/24/-04/18/2006) 
Survey date 
August 14 - 
October 26, 2000 
March 15-May 
11, 2004 
March 24-April 
18, 2006   
Very 
concerned/worried 44% 36% 32%   
Somewhat 
concerned/worried 27% 32% 28%   
Not too 
concerned/worried 15% 17% 21%   
Not concerned at all 14% 14% 19%   
Don't know/refused 1% 1%   
Q5b.How big a problem you think HIV/AIDS is for teens in 
general(NPR/Harvard/Kaiser/ Princeton Survey Research Associates) 
Survey date 
September 29-
October 23, 2003     
Major problem 65%   
Minor Problem 31%   
Not a problem at all 2%   
Don't know/refused 3%   
Q6.What do you think is the most urgent health problem facing this nation today? 
Kaiser/Princeton Survey Research Associates(08/14/-10/26/2000, 03/15/-05/11/2004, 
10/04/-10/09/2005,03/24/-04/18/2006)Kaiser/ Harvard/ Washington Post(06/13/-
06/23/2002) 
Survey date 
August14 - 
October26, 2000 
June 13 - June 
23, 2002 
March 15 - 
May 11, 
2004 
October 4 - 
October 9, 
2005 
HIV 26% 17% 21% 16% 
Survey date 
March 24 - April 
18, 2006   
HIV 17%       
Q7. How serious a problem would you say HIV/AIDS is? Would you say it is a very 
serious problem, a somewhat serious problem, not too serious of a problem, or not a 
problem at all? 
Survey date July 13 - July 17, 2001 July 19-July 21, 2004   
Very serious problem 82% 61%   
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Somewhat serious 
problem 14% 33%   
Not too serious a 
problem/Not very 
serious 2% 4%   
Not a problem at all 1% 2%   
Don't know/refused 1%   
Survey date July 10-July 11, 2002   
Very serious 
problems 68%   
Fairly serious 
problem 17%   
Just somewhat of a 
problem 9%   
Not really a problem 4%   
Not sure 2%   
Survey date May 10-May 16, 2004 June 23-June 28, 2005   
Extremely serious 35% 44%   
Very serious 44% 37%   
Somewhat serious 16% 15%   
Less serious 4% 3%   
No opinion/Don't 
know 1% 2%     
Q8. What do you think is the most urgent health problem facing the world today? 
Kaiser/Princeton Survey Research Associates(08/14-10/26/2000, 07/18/-
07/21/2002,03/15/-05/11/2004,03/14/-04/18/2006) Harvard/ Washington Post( 06/13/-
06/23/2002) 
Survey date 
August 14 - 
October 26, 2000 
June 13 - June 23, 
2002 
July 18 - July 
21, 2002   
HIV 37% 33% 50%   
Survey date 
March 15 - May 11, 
2004 
March 24 - April 18, 
2006   
HIV 36% 34%   
Q9 .Which one of the following two statements comes closer to your views? The 
HIV/AIDS problem worldwide is best described as 'an epidemic.' HIV/AIDS is a serious 
problem, but it is an exaggeration to call it 'a pandemic.' Kaiser Family Foundation, 
Washington Post, Harvard University (06/13-06/23/2002), Kaiser/ Princeton Survey 
Research Associates(03/15/-05/11/2004) 
Survey date 
June 13 - June 23, 
2002 
March 15 - May 11, 
2004   
Best described as 'an 
epidemic' 67% 70%   
An exaggeration to 
call it 'an epidemic' 28% 26%   
Don't know/Refused  5% 4%     
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Q10.Do you think the problem of HIV/AIDS is about the same as it has been, that the 
world today is making progress in this area, or that the world today is losing ground? 
Kaiser Family Foundation, Washington Post, Harvard University(06/13/-06/23/2002), 
Kaiser/ Princeton Survey Research Associates(03/15/-05/11/2004, 03/24/-04/18/2006) 
Survey date 
June 13 - June 23, 
2002 
March 15 - May 
11, 2004 
March 24 - 
April 18, 2006   
Making progress 35% 38% 36%   
about the same 15% 9% 16%   
Losing ground  45% 49% 40%   
Don't know/refused 5% 4% 8%   
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Table A6.6: Questions on Support for Federal Funding on HIV/AIDS  
Q1.Do you think federal spending on AIDS is too high, low or about right compared to 
other diseases? Kaiser/Princeton Survey Associates(09/17/-10/19/97,02/07-09/04/2000, 
08/14/-10/26/2000, 06/13/-06/23/2002,03/15-05/11/2004, 10/04/-10/09/2005,03/24/-
04/18/2006) 
Survey date 
September 17-
October 19, 
1997 
, February 7-
September 4, 
2000 
August 14-
October 26, 
2000 
June 13-
June 23, 
2002 
Too high/too much 11% 9% 8% 11% 
Too low/too little 40% 40% 43% 29% 
About right 5% 39% 30% 42% 
Don't know or refused 14% 12% 19% 18% 
Survey date 
March 15-May 
11, 2004 
October 4-
October 9, 
2005 
March 24-
April 18, 
2006   
Too high/too much 6% 13% 7%   
Too low/too little 42% 29% 48%   
About right 40% 43% 24%   
Don't know or refused 12% 16% 21%   
Q2. Do you think the federal government spends too much money on AIDS, too little 
money, or about the right amount? Kaiser/Princeton Survey Associates (08/14-
10/26/2000, 06/13-06/23/2002, 03/15-05/11/2004, 10/04-10/09/2005, 03/24/-04/18/2006) 
Time/ABC News (05/10-05/16/2004) 
Survey date 
August 14-
October 26, 
2000 
June 13-June 
23, 2002 
March 15-
May 11, 
2004 
May 10-
May 16, 
2004 
Too high/too much 5% 5% 5% 5% 
Too low/too little 55% 39% 52% 53% 
About right 25% 39% 36% 38% 
Don't know or refused 15% 15% 8% 4% 
Survey date 
October 4-
October 9, 
2005 
March 24-
April 18, 
2006   
Too high/too much 9% 7%   
Too low/too little 42% 63%   
About right 33% 17%   
Don't know or refused 16% 14%   
Q3.Do you think that spending more money on HIV/AIDS prevention in the United 
States will lead to meaningful progress in slowing the epidemic, or that spending more 
money won't make much difference? Kaiser/Princeton Survey Associates ( 03/15/-
03/11/2004, 10/04/-10/05/2005, 03/24/-04/18/2006, 03/24/-04/18/2006) 
Survey date 
March 15-May 
11, 2004 
October 4-
October 9, 
2005 
March 24-
April 18, 
2006 
March 24-
April 18, 
2006 
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Lead to meaningful 
progress 57% 44% 62% 59% 
Won't make much 
difference 34% 48% 30% 31% 
Depends  3% 3% 5% 3% 
Don't know or refused 7% 5% 4% 7% 
Survey date 
March 24-April 
18, 2006   
Lead to meaningful 
progress 62%   
Won't make much 
difference 32%   
Depends  5%   
Don't know or refused 4%       
Q4.Do you think improving treatment and prevention of 
HIV and AIDS is important national priority ?Harvard, 
Robert Wood Johnson Foundation/ICR( 03/30-
04/03/2005, 03/31/-04/04/2006, 03/31/-04/04/2006, 
04/11/-04/15/2007)     
Survey date 
March 30-April 
3, 2005 
March 31-
April 4, 2006 
March 31-
April 4, 2006 
April 11-
April 15, 
2007 
Extremely important 42% 49% 50% 52% 
Very important 40% 38% 39% 35% 
Somewhat important 14% 10% 10% 9% 
Not important 2% 1% 2% 2% 
Shouldn't be on 
nation's health agenda 1% 1% 0% 1% 
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FigureA6.1: Changes in Media Coverage over Time and Public Opinion about 
Willingness to Change Behavior (Coverage on United States) 
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Figure A6.2: Changes in Media Coverage over and Public Opinion about Actual 
Behavioral Changes (Coverage on United States)  
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Figure A6. 3: Changes in Media Coverage over Time and Public Opinion about HIV as 
Threat (Coverage on United States)  
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Figure A6. 4:  Changes in Media Coverage over Time and Public Opinion on Support for 
Funding (Coverage on United States) 
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